Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The juvenile court adjudicated twin brothers LeVanta S. and LeRonn S. under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(c) as mentally ill and dangerous. The brother were placed in out-of-home care. The juvenile court later changed the brothers’ permanency objective from family reunification to guardianship. Mother and Father appealed from this order in both cases. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the juvenile court’s order affected a substantial right of the parents, and therefore, the order was a final, appealable order; and (2) the juvenile court exceeded its authority by adopting the permanency plan of guardianship in these cases where there had been no adjudication under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a). Remanded. View "In re Interest of LeVanta S." on Justia Law

Appellants were the adoptive parents of Katherine, who was an older sibling of Nettie, the child who was the subject of this juvenile dependency proceeding. Appellants filed a complaint seeking to intervene on Katherine’s behalf to seek guardianship or adoption of Nettie. The court ultimately limited Nettie’s foster parents and Appellants to presenting evidence on their own qualifications to be Nettie’s adoptive parents. The juvenile court determined, after a hearing, that Nettie’s foster parents and Appellants were equally qualified to be foster parents but that it was in Nettie’s best interests to be placed with her foster parents because a joint-sibling placement with Appellants would be contrary to Nettie’s safety and well being. Appellants appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Appellants had no right to appeal the court’s order on Katherine’s behalf, and therefore, the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction over Appellants’ purported appeal. View "In re Interest of Nettie F." on Justia Law

Clarence Devney petitioned for the dissolution of his marriage to Elizabeth Devney. The district court dissolved the marriage and divided the parties’ assets and debts and, in so doing, found that a postnuptial property agreement entered into by the parties was valid and enforceable and that the division of the martial estate was fair and reasonable. The Supreme Court reversed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) Nebraska statutes do not authorize postnuptial agreements to allocate the parties’ property rights upon separation or divorce unless such agreements are attendant upon the spouses’ separation or divorce, and therefore, the district court erred in enforcing the property agreement provision of the parties’ postnuptial agreement; and (2) the district court erred in its determinations of the marital residence’s value, the appropriate setoff for the marital residence, and the division of the marital debts and assets. Remanded. View "Devney v. Devney" on Justia Law

In 2015, the State filed a motion to terminate Mother’s parental rights to her minor child. After conducting a termination hearing, the juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights, finding by clear and convincing evidence that the State proved grounds for termination under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-292(2),(6), and (7) and that termination was in the child’s best interests. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the State failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence that terminating Mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State adduced clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the child’s best interests. Remanded. View "In re Interest of Alec S." on Justia Law

While they were married, Marcia and Gene Schlake purchased residential property as joint tenants. After the parties divorced, Marcia conveyed a remained interest in her undivided one-half interest to her two children but retained a life estate interest in her one-half interest. Marcia and her children later filed a complaint in partition regarding the property. Gene opposed the partition, noting that the parties’ divorce decree provided that they shall not sell the property unless they both agreed in writing. The district court granted summary judgment in Marcia’s favor and ordered that partition should be made. Gene then filed a motion to vacate the summary judgment order, raising as an affirmative defense that Marcia should be precluded from seeking partition as a matter of equity. The district court overruled the motion to vacate, concluding that Gene’s failure to present such an affirmative defense in response to Marcia’s summary judgment was not grounds to vacate the judgment. The district court then ordered that the premises be sold at public auction. Gene appealed, seeking review of several orders entered by the district court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that none of the orders were properly before the Court for review. View "Schlake v. Schlake" on Justia Law

Mother and Father divorced pursuant to a decree that granted Mother full custody of the parties' two daughters, with regular visitation for Father. Almost a decade later, Mother filed an application to modify visitation. Father counterclaimed, seeking full custody of the parties’ children on the ground that Mother’s current spouse resided with and had unsupervised access to the children and is a registered sex offender due to a felony involving his minor stepdaughter. The district court denied Mother’s application to modify and denied Father’s counterclaim. Father filed a petition for further review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Mother met her statutory burden to produce evidence that her spouse was not a significant risk to the girls; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the girls were not at significant risk. View "Hopkins v. Hopkins" on Justia Law

In 2014, Wife filed a complaint to dissolve her marriage from husband. After the district court entered a decree of dissolution, both parties appealed. The issues on appeal related primarily to the district court’s division of the property was proper. Specifically, the parties challenged the court’s determination of whether a cattle herd and certain other assets and debts associated therewith should be included in the marital estate. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court’s ruling treating Wife’s fifty-percent interests in three LLCs as martial property and dividing them between the parties; (2) reversed and struck the decree’s finding related to the debts associated with the LLCs; and (3) affirmed the district court’s determination that the cattle operation was Husband’s separate property. View "Sellers v. Sellers" on Justia Law

Jennifer Lorenzen filed a complaint seeking to dissolve her marriage to David Lorenzen. The parties reached an agreement on certain issues, but a trial was required to determine other property-related issues, including the division of the parties’ retirement plans. The trial court determined that the entire marital portion of David’s pension plan should be included in the marital estate and divided equally between the parties. David appealed, arguing that the court erred when it included a certain portion of his pension plan as marital property because the court determined that Jennifer’s future Social Security benefits should not be considered part of the marital estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that David’s proposal was effectively a direct offset from the marital estate based on the fact that Jennifer was expected to receive Social Security benefits and David was not, and such an offset is prohibited by precedent and federal law. View "Lorenzen v. Lorenzen" on Justia Law

In 2014, Elizabeth Stanosheck filed for divorce from Joseph Jeanette. After a trial in 2015, the district court entered judgment diving the marital estate. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in valuing the marital estate at the time of trial rather than the date the divorce was filed; (2) did not abuse its discretion in dividing the remaining proceeds from the sale of the marital home equally, rather than awarding the entire sum to Joseph; but (3) erred in classifying, valuing, and dividing the parties’ retirement accounts. Remanded. View "Stanosheck v. Jeanette" on Justia Law

Mother and Father divorced in 2002. The parties share legal custody of their two minor children, and Mother has physical custody. Pursuant to a 2011 parenting plan, Father was to have rights of visitation. In 2015, Father filed a motion for an order for Mother to show cause why she should not be held in contempt for her alleged failure to allow Father to exercise parenting time on certain days. After a hearing, the district court found Mother in contempt of court for willful failure to comply with the district court’s order with regard to parenting time. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not commit clear error in its factual findings; (2) did not abuse its discretion in finding Mother in contempt and in imposing a sixty-day jail sentence; and (3) did not abuse its discretion in modifying the parenting plan within the contempt proceeding to require the parties to obtain written consent of the guardian ad litem before changing the parenting schedule. View "Martin v. Martin" on Justia Law