Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction Appellant’s appeal from the denial of the portion of his complaint and associated motion asking the district court to declare void a dissolution decree that it had issued more than a year previously.Appellant filed a “complaint” under the same case number as the dissolution decree asserting that the decree was void by virtue of a motion to dismiss he filed prior to the entry of the decree. However, Appellant’s notice of appeal was from an April 4 order denying his requests for various temporary orders and retaining for decision his application to modify the custody provisions of the decree. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that it had no jurisdiction over the appeal because the April 4 ruling was not a final order. View "Tilson v. Tilson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part the district court’s decree of dissolution in this case, as modified, and vacated in part the decree.In its decree of dissolution, the district court dissolved the marriage of Mark Constot and Maria Onstot, divided their assets and debts, and awarded spousal support for Maria. The contested issues at trial, as relevant to this appeal, were the equitable division of the house Mark owned prior to the marriage and the determination of appropriate spousal support for Maria. The Supreme Court held (1) the order of spousal support was not an abuse of discretion; (2) the district court’s requirement that Mark refinance the mortgage on the house within sixty days was an abuse of discretion, and the decree is modified to extend the time period to six months from the filing of the mandate in the district court; and (3) the portion of the district court’s order stating that Mark’s support obligation would terminate upon Maria’s cohabitation with a significant other was vacated because Maria’s cohabitation with another person was not within the parties’ contemplation at the time of the entry of the decree. View "Onstot v. Onstot" on Justia Law

At issue in this custody action was whether the district court’s consent to adoption or the court’s stay of the custody action pending the resolution of the adoption petition presented a final order.Plaintiff, the former partner of the biological mother of the child in this case, brought this custody action, alleging that she had loco parentis status to the child. Approximately one month after Plaintiff’s custody action was filed. Defendant, the biological mother, and her wife then filed a petition in county court for stepparent adoption. The district court consented to the adoption and state the custody action pending the resolution of the adoption petition. Plaintiff appealed the order consenting to the adoption proceeding. The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal, holding that neither that order granting consent to adoption nor the order staying the custody proceedings pending further order of the court presented a final, appealable order. View "Jennifer T. v. Lindsay P." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court finding Father in willful contempt of a support order for failure to pay child support. On appeal, Father argued that he did not willfully disobey the support order and that the purge plan set forth in the contempt order was impossible to perform, making it punitive rather than a coercive sanction. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Father was in contempt; and (2) the contempt order did not impermissibly impose a criminal or punitive sanction in a civil proceeding because it was not impossible to comply with the order. View "State ex rel. Maria B. v. Kyle B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court finding Father in willful contempt of a support order for failure to pay child support. On appeal, Father argued that he did not willfully disobey the support order and that the purge plan set forth in the contempt order was impossible to perform, making it punitive rather than a coercive sanction. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Father was in contempt; and (2) the contempt order did not impermissibly impose a criminal or punitive sanction in a civil proceeding because it was not impossible to comply with the order. View "State ex rel. Maria B. v. Kyle B." on Justia Law

Margaret and Hannah lived together in a romantic relationship in Nebraska. They moved to Texas, in 2003 where they legally changed their last names to “Whilde.” In 2010, Hannah gave birth to a baby, conceived by artificial insemination. Margaret did not adopt the child. In 2011, Hannah returned to Otoe with the baby. Ultimately, a Nebraska court determined that Nebraska law applied but considered the effect of a Texas court’s temporary order granting Margaret rights, and concluded that an in loco parentis relationship “at one time did exist” between Margaret and the child but had ceased after Margaret returned to Texas. The court awarded sole custody to Hannah. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed. Margaret later sought to vacate an order changing the child’s name to Hannah's family name. She argued that she was entitled to notice by certified mail as a “noncustodial parent” under Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-21,271(2) and had not received such notice. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed rejection of Margaret’s motion. The order extinguishing Margaret’s rights was effective at all relevant times: when Hannah filed the name change petition, when she published notice, when the petition was considered and granted by the district court, and when Margaret filed her motion to vacate the name change order. View "In re Change of Name of Whilde" on Justia Law

Margaret and Hannah lived together in a romantic relationship in Lincoln, Nebraska. They moved to Austin, Texas, in 2003. In 2010, Hannah gave birth to a baby, conceived by artificial insemination. Margaret did not adopt the child. The relationship declined. In 2011, Hannah returned to Otoe with the baby. A Texas court entered a temporary order, finding that Margaret had legal standing to assert rights with respect to the child and setting forth certain rights and duties that the women would share. In 2014, Hannah sought to register the Texas order (Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-1226) and requested that the Nebraska court set aside the Texas order and modify custody. Margaret was living in Nebraska. No effort had been taken to obtain entry of a final order in Texas. Margaret returned to Texas. Her contact with the child was minimal thereafter, Hannah moved to suspend Margaret’s contact with the child because of Margaret’s mental health issues. The Nebraska court preliminarily ordered that there be no contact. The Texas court relinquished its jurisdiction. The Nebraska court determined that Nebraska law applied but considered the effect of the Texas court’s determination and concluded that an in loco parentis relationship “at one time did exist” between Margaret and the child but had ceased after Margaret returned to Texas. The court awarded sole custody to Hannah. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, stating that in loco parentis status is transitory and may be lost. View "Whilde v. Whilde" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed, as modified by this opinion, the order of the district court dissolving Brian Osantowski’s marriage to Dori Ann Osantowski, dividing the martial assets and debts, and ordering Brian to make an equalization payment of $680,000, distributing the estate about equally. The Supreme Court held (1) contrary to Brian’s argument on appeal, the district court’s decision that stored and growing crops should not be treated the same as cattle herds for tracing purposes was not in error; but (2) the district court committed an abuse of discretion and plain error in its division of certain marital assets and debts. View "Osantowski v. Osantowski" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the decision of the juvenile court finding allegations of domestic violence to be true, adjudicating Father’s child on those grounds, and ordering Father to undergo evaluations and to participate in an accredited domestic violence program. The court held (1) the juvenile court erred in finding sufficient evidence that Father’s faults or habits placed the children at risk for harm; (2) the district court erred in taking judicial notice of disputed adjudicative facts; (3) the district court erred in failing to provide notice and a hearing for disposition; and (4) the remainder of Father’s arguments were without merit. View "In re Interest of Lilly S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the county court, sitting as a juvenile court, to decline to adopt a case plan and court report recommended by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). Instead, the juvenile court ordered certain other directives, including specifically ordering that DHHS update the children’s immunizations. The parents of the children appealed, arguing that the juvenile court was without authority to order DHHS to immunize the children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-488(2), the juvenile court was authorized to require DHHS to immunize the children. View "In re Interest of Becka P." on Justia Law