Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

This case involves a mother, Leah B., who appealed from the order of the county court for Dodge County, Nebraska, sitting as a juvenile court, denying her challenge to the validity of her relinquishment of parental rights to her child, Jordon B. Jordon was removed from Leah's care shortly after his birth in 2020 and placed into the temporary custody of the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). Leah relinquished her parental rights to Jordon in November 2022. The State then filed a motion to terminate Leah's parental rights based on the relinquishment, which the court granted. Leah subsequently filed a pro se motion to rescind the termination order, alleging that she signed the relinquishment involuntarily and under duress and that she was developmentally disabled and should have been appointed a guardian ad litem.The juvenile court denied Leah's motion, finding that she lacked standing to file her motion because she was no longer a party to the action after she relinquished her parental rights. The court also found that Leah's relinquishment was validly executed and that there was no evidence to demonstrate that Leah was under any duress when she signed the relinquishment.Leah appealed, arguing that the juvenile court erred in determining that she lacked standing to file her motion, in denying her motion on the merits, and in not affording her due process by ruling on the motion without providing her with a reasonable opportunity to be heard and a meaningful evidentiary hearing.The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the juvenile court's decision, finding that Leah's motion was a substantive challenge to the validity of the relinquishment of her parental rights and not a challenge to the court's order terminating her parental rights. The court held that Leah had standing to file her motion and that the court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The court also held that Leah was not provided a meaningful hearing on her motion challenging the validity of the relinquishment of her parental rights, and therefore, her due process rights were violated. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Interest of Jordon B." on Justia Law

In this case, Asia R. Mann, now known as Asia R. Harrison, and Brian L. Mann were disputing modifications to their stipulated dissolution decree. The main issues in the case revolved around child custody, visitation, child support, and attorney fees.Prior to this case, the couple had been granted joint legal and physical custody of their two children. However, after Brian was convicted of stalking Asia, she sought sole legal and physical custody of the children. She argued that Brian's conviction constituted domestic intimate partner abuse under the Parenting Act, and as such, the court should take specific actions to protect her and the children.The Nebraska Supreme Court found that Brian's conviction for stalking did not constitute domestic intimate partner abuse under the Parenting Act, as the act requires that bodily injury be attempted, caused, or credibly threatened. The court found no evidence of this in Brian's conduct. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's decision to deny Asia's request for sole custody of the children.The court also found no error in the lower court's decisions regarding child support, health insurance, and attorney fees. The court affirmed the lower court's decision to allow Brian to choose between two school districts for the children's enrollment.Finally, the court affirmed the lower court's decision to vacate the portion of the dissolution decree that found Brian stood in loco parentis to Asia's child from a previous relationship, Maleah. The court found that the lower court lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act to modify the California child custody judgment as to Maleah. View "Mann v. Mann" on Justia Law

In a marital dissolution case, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the division of assets, alimony, attorney fees, and other matters. The couple, Clint and Lisa Seemann, had a premarital agreement that classified certain assets as marital or nonmarital. The court found that the appreciation of certain assets, such as a membership interest in a limited liability company (LLC) and carpet and tile, should have been included in the marital estate. The court also found that Lisa's retirement accounts were overvalued and that the value of Clint D. Seemann, P.C. should have been included in the marital estate.The court affirmed the lower court's decision in part, but reversed the division of the marital estate and remanded the case for a new equitable division of the marital estate. The court also modified the decree to require Clint to pay a larger amount towards a line of credit debt. The court affirmed the lower court's decision on alimony, attorney fees, and other matters.The court's decision was based on a de novo review of the record, and it made independent factual determinations based on the record. The court also considered the parties' premarital agreement and the general rule that a spouse should be awarded one-third to one-half of the marital estate. The court did not find any abuse of discretion by the lower court in its determinations regarding alimony, attorney fees, and other matters. View "Seemann v. Seemann" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between a decedent's wife and the co-personal representatives of the decedent's estate over the ownership of $100,000 and a camper under the terms of a premarital agreement. The decedent's wife, Yvonne M. White, argued that she was entitled to these assets based on the premarital agreement she had with her late husband, Leonard P. White. The co-personal representatives of Leonard's estate, his sons Jamison Patrick White and Ryan Howard White, contested this claim.The District Court for Washington County, Nebraska, ruled in favor of Yvonne, awarding her the $100,000 and the camper. The co-personal representatives appealed this decision to the Nebraska Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court's ruling. They then sought further review from the Nebraska Supreme Court.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court found that Yvonne's suit for the $100,000 and the camper did not constitute a "claim" against the estate, but rather, she was a beneficiary of the estate entitled to the assets she sought under a breach of contract theory according to the terms of the premarital agreement. Therefore, her suit was not subject to the nonclaim statute's requirements for the timely filing of a claim. The court also found that the camper was a joint asset under the premarital agreement, rejecting the co-personal representatives' argument that it was the decedent's separate property. View "White v. White" on Justia Law

The Nebraska Supreme Court ruled that the State of Nebraska and the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) are immune from a lawsuit brought by three siblings who were physically and sexually abused in a foster home. The siblings, Joshua M., Sydnie M., and Abigail S., were placed in the foster home by DHHS in 1996. They alleged that DHHS was negligent in recommending and supervising their placement and in failing to remove them from the home when DHHS knew or should have known they were being abused. The court found that the siblings' claims fell within the State Tort Claims Act's exemption for claims arising out of assault or battery, and thus were barred by the State's sovereign immunity. The court also found that DHHS did not breach its duty of care to the siblings. The court affirmed the judgment in favor of DHHS and remanded the case with directions to dismiss the claims against DHHS. The court also affirmed a judgment against the siblings' former foster parent in the amount of $2.9 million. View "Joshua M. v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves an appeal against a county court's decision to appoint a permanent guardian for Patrick W., an individual deemed incapacitated due to a stroke. The appellant, Patrick W., argued that the court erred in admitting a neuropsychological report as evidence over his hearsay objection and that without this report, the evidence was insufficient to prove his incapacitation.Previously, Adult Protective Services (APS) had opened an investigation into Patrick's medical needs and financial management. Concerned about Patrick's vulnerability to financial exploitation, self-neglect, and undue influence, APS contacted an attorney to inquire about establishing a guardianship. Becky Stamp was identified as a potential guardian. The county court appointed Stamp as Patrick's temporary guardian, and later, Patrick's cousin, Terry Crandall, was substituted as the temporary guardian. The court also ordered Patrick to undergo a neuropsychological evaluation.At the guardianship hearing, the county court received several exhibits into evidence and heard testimony from six witnesses, including Patrick. The court found clear and convincing evidence that Patrick was incapacitated and appointed Crandall as his permanent guardian.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the county court's decision. It held that the neuropsychological report was admissible in evidence under Nebraska Revised Statute § 30-4204, as it was a medical report obtained by the guardian ad litem regarding the person for whom she was appointed. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the county court's finding that Patrick was incapacitated and that a full guardianship was the least restrictive alternative to provide for his continuing care. View "In re Guardianship of Patrick W." on Justia Law

In this case, a couple, Kelley L. and Richard L., sought to have Richard adopt Kelley's daughter, Kate S., without the consent of the child's biological father, Dustin S., alleging that Dustin had abandoned Kate. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the County Court's decision, which denied the adoption petition, holding that Dustin had not abandoned Kate. The Supreme Court found that, although Dustin could have done more to be involved in Kate's life and did not fully comply with court-ordered reunification therapy and child support payments, the evidence suggested that Kelley had hindered Dustin from having meaningful contact with Kate. Therefore, they found that Dustin had not demonstrated a "settled purpose to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims" to Kate. The court also noted that the county court's reference to unresolved proceedings in the District Court did not constitute an error, as it simply acknowledged another potential route to adoption without Dustin's consent if his parental rights were subsequently terminated in those proceedings. View "In re Adoption of Kate S." on Justia Law

In this Nebraska case, the appellant, Christian G., filed a motion to vacate a domestic abuse protection order issued against him, arguing that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over him and that the court erred in excluding his affidavit, which sought to prove he did not receive timely notice of the hearing. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that by filing a request for a hearing on the protection order, Christian made a general appearance in court, thereby conferring the court personal jurisdiction over him. The court also held that while an affidavit may be used in motion practice, including for preliminary, collateral, and interlocutory matters, it is not exempt from the rules of evidence. The court determined that the portion of Christian's affidavit that contained hearsay was correctly excluded by the district court because Christian did not properly limit his offer to the admissible parts of the affidavit. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which upheld the district court's ruling that denied Christian's motion to vacate the protection order. View "K. v. G." on Justia Law

In a divorce case, the appellant, Brian M. Noland, sought to establish that he stood in loco parentis to his stepdaughter, A.B., in order to litigate issues of custody and parenting time. The Nebraska Supreme Court found that the district court had erred in its interpretation of the law when it ruled that the biological mother, Erin N. Yost, had the absolute right to unilaterally terminate the in loco parentis relationship. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that parental preference principles did not give natural parents an absolute right to terminate an established in loco parentis relationship at will. The court reasoned that while the presumption that fit parents act in their child's best interest must be considered, it must give way where the child has established strong psychological bonds with a person who, although not a biological parent, has lived with the child and provided care, nurture, and affection. The court reversed the order of the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Noland v. Yost" on Justia Law

In this case, the Nebraska Supreme Court had to consider an appeal against a lower court's decision to terminate the parental rights of a mother, Samantha M., to her daughter, Jessalina M. The child had been removed from Samantha's care shortly after her birth due to concerns about Samantha's behavior and mental health issues. The child was placed in foster care and later with her father, Jose M.The court firstly clarified the meaning of "out-of-home placement" for the purposes of the relevant statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292(7). It held that this term refers to any placement outside the home of the parent whose rights are at issue, including placement with another parent. Therefore, it held that Jessalina’s placement with her father was an “out-of-home placement” as far as Samantha was concerned.The court then considered the point at which the existence of the statutory basis for termination should be determined. It held that this should be determined as of the date the petition or motion to terminate parental rights is filed, not the date of trial or the date of the termination order. This is because the facts supporting the grounds for termination must be set forth in the petition or motion and must be based on facts existing at that time.Based on these interpretations, the court determined that the statutory basis for termination existed in this case, as Jessalina had been in out-of-home placement for more than 15 of the most recent 22 months before the termination petition was filed. It also held that the lower court did not err in finding that Samantha was unfit and that termination of her parental rights was in Jessalina's best interests. Therefore, it affirmed the decision of the lower court to terminate Samantha's parental rights. View "In re Interest of Jessalina M." on Justia Law