Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant brought her seven-week-old son, John Doe, to a medical center for injuries. A jury later convicted Defendant of assault on a minor and aggravated assault. The district court ordered a change in parenting arrangements for John Doe as part of the criminal sentence despite pending dependency and neglect proceedings. As part of Defendant's sentence, the district court ordered Defendant to pay fees, costs, and surcharges without recording findings regarding Defendant's financial situation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Defendant had regained custody of John Doe through the civil proceeding, her claim regarding the imposition of a condition concerning the temporary custody of John Doe was moot; however, the statement in the court's written judgment that the father should be presumed to have custody of John Doe should not have been included in the criminal sentence; and (2) the district court acted within its discretion in imposing fees. View "State v. MacDonald" on Justia Law

Mother and Child were seriously injured in an automobile accident. Mother and her husband (Husband) hired Viscomi & Gersh (Viscomi) to represent Mother and Child in their claims for damages resulting from the accident. Matthew O'Neill was subsequently appointed to act as guardian ad litem (GAL) and conservator for Child. After Mother's case settled, Mother and Husband agreed with Morales Law Office (Morales) that Morales would represent Child. Morales then filed a motion to disqualify counsel. The district court denied the motion because it did not contain the consent of Viscomi and O'Neill. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when Mother and Husband consented to the appointment of a GAL and conservator to act in Child's best interests in the legal claims she had arising from the accident, they divested themselves of the right to determine who should represent Child in her personal injury claim; (2) Mont. Code Ann. 37-61-403 and Mont. Code Ann. 72-5-427 are not unconstitutional as applied in this case; and (3) section 37-61-403 does not conflict with the Montana Rules of Professional Conduct. View "In re Estate of C.K.O." on Justia Law

Child was born with numerous medical issues and hospitalized for the first three months of his life. The suspected cause of Child's medical problems was maternal drug use. The Department of Public Health and Human Services filed a petition to adjudicate Child as a youth in need of care. After an adjudicatory hearing, the district court found, based upon a preponderance of the evidence, that Child was a youth in need of care. The district court then awarded custody of Child to Father. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in finding that Child was a youth in need of care; and (2) did not err when it granted custody of Child to Father. View "In re M.J." on Justia Law

Wife petitioned the district court for dissolution of her marriage to Husband, who was incarcerated. Husband proceeded as a self-represented litigant, and the district court allowed Husband to appear telephonically at all hearings. When the final pretrial conference was held, Husband did not appear telephonically. Unbeknownst to the district court, Husband was experiencing medical problems that required surgery and hospitalization. After Husband was released from the prison infirmary, he mailed a motion to the district court requesting a sixty-day continuance. The district court received the motion, but after Husband failed to appear at a hearing to consider the motion, the court entered a default decree and declared the parties' marriage dissolved. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under these extraordinary circumstances, the district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant Husband's motion for a continuance. Remanded to allow Husband to appear at a final pretrial conference and trial. View "Eslick v. Eslick" on Justia Law

Larissa Simpson filed a petition for dissolution of her marriage to Dennis, citing serious marital discord. As part of the dissolution, Dennis and Larissa entered into a property settlement agreement and a stipulated final parenting plan. The combined operation of the plan and the agreement entitled Larissa to a $10,000 per month payment from Dennis for the rest of her life, first in child support and later in the form of a property settlement. Later, Dennis and Larissa agreed to amend the court's final decree. The stipulation did not decrease Dennis's total month child support obligation. Dennis subsequently filed a motion to modify child support, alleging that the child support amount was unconscionable in light of changed circumstances. Larissa also filed a motion to invalidate the parties' stipulation amending the final decree. Both motions were denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying Dennis's motion to modify child support and Larissa's motion to invalidate the stipulation. View "Simpson v. Simpson" on Justia Law

After Mother filed a petition for dissolution of her marriage to Father, the parties entered a marital dissolution agreement and parenting plan providing that the parties would share alternate two weeks of parenting with the minor children. Mother subsequently filed a motion to modify the parenting plan, stating that she and Father had not followed the plan due to Father's business activities and personal trips. The district court ultimately amended the prior parenting plan and granted primary custody of the children to Mother. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not clearly err in determining that Mont. Code Ann. 40-4-219 did not apply in its case and did not abuse its discretion in relying on the factors listed in Mont. Code Ann. 40-4-212 when deciding the best interest of the children; and (2) did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the wishes of the children, continuity of and stability of care, and other factors weighed in favor of modifying the parenting plan. View "In re Marriage of Klatt" on Justia Law

Brent Anderson purchased life insurance from Insurer and named three beneficiaries under the policy: (1) his then-wife, Lucia, (2) his parents, and (3) his sister. Brent and Lucia subsequently divorced. Later that year, Mont. Code Ann. 72-2-814 became effective. The statute provides that a divorce revokes "any revocable disposition or appointment of property made by a divorced individual to the individual's former spouse in a governing instrument." Brent died several years later without having changed his designation of Lucia as primary beneficiary under the life insurance policy. Insurer filed an interpleader action to determine the rightful beneficiary under Brent's policy. The district court ruled in favor of Lucia based in part on the fact that section 72-2-814 became effective after Brent and Lucia's divorce. The Supreme Court accepted a certified question from the U.S. court of appeals and answered that section 72-2-814 applies to a divorce that pre-dates the statute's enactment. View "Thrivent Fin. for Lutherans v. Andronescu" on Justia Law

Terance Perry filed for dissolution of his marriage to Karen Perry. Terance named Gail Goheen as his counsel of record. Karen filed a motion to disqualify Goheen after speaking with Goheen over the telephone. Before the disqualification hearing, Karen filed a motion to strike office memorandums and affidavits filed by Terance regarding Goheen's conversation with Karen as privileged communications between attorney and client. The district court denied Karen's motion to disqualify, finding no attorney-client relationship existed between Karen and Goheen. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) denying Karen's motion to disqualify; (2) permitting Goheen to testify at the disqualification hearing; (3) relying on communications between Goheen and Karen in making its decision; and (4) determining that Karen abused the rules of disqualification. The court also found that Goheen did not violate her duty to Karen under Rule 19 of the Montana Rules of Professional Conduct. View "In re Marriage of Perry" on Justia Law

After the district court awarded the Department of Health and Human Services temporary legal custody of Mother's two children, the court adjudicated the children as youths in need of care. The State subsequently petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights. After a termination hearing, the district court concluded it was in the children's best interests to terminate Mother's parental rights and issued an order to that effect. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order, holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the State established by clear and convincing evidence that the best interests of the children would be served by termination of the parent-child legal relationship. View "In re H.R." on Justia Law

Brenette Garrett and Jason LeProwse were the biological parents of T.G. In September 2011, the justice court issued a temporary order of protection (TOP) against LeProwse pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 40-15-201. Shortly thereafter, the justice court case was removed to the district court where the parties had been involved in a parenting action since 2008. The district court held a hearing on the TOP in October 2011 at which it heard considerable testimony from numerous witnesses. In January 2012, the court dissolved the TOP. The Supreme Court dismissed Garrett's appeal without prejudice, holding that the order dissolving the TOP was not immediately appealable because a final decision and resolution of all issues raised in the case had not yet been rendered. View "LeProwse v. Garrett" on Justia Law