Articles Posted in Montana Supreme Court

by
The Supreme Court reversed the order and decree of adoption issued by the district court terminating Father’s parental rights and ordering the adoption of his minor daughter, L.F.R., by her stepfather, K.J.D., holding that the district court’s failure to notify Father of his right to counsel violated his constitutional rights. During a hearing on the petition for termination of Father’s parental rights, Father appeared but was not represented by counsel. On appeal, Father argued that the district court’s failure to notify him of his right to counsel during the proceeding violated his constitutional rights. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that Father did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. The Court remanded the cause for a new hearing. View "In re Adoption of L.F.R." on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court amending the parenting plan of Mother and Father, holding that the district court did not err in amending the parties’ parenting plan. On appeal, Mother argued that the district court made several errors when it amended the parties’ initial parenting plan. Primarily, Mother argued that the district court erred in its application of Mont. Code Ann. 40-4-219(1), the statute controlling parenting plan amendments. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) amending a parenting plan pursuant to a periodic-review provision exists as an alternative to amending a parenting plan pursuant to section 40-4-219(1); and (2) the district court properly amended the initial parenting plan and did not abuse its discretion in determining that an amendment was in the child’s best interest. View "Sinram v. Berube" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court terminating Mother’s parental rights to her two children, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it continued with child custody proceedings before conclusively determining the children’s Indian status. After Mother’s children were adjudicated as youths in need of care the district court terminated Mother’s parental rights. The order stated that the children were not Indian children subject to the provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). On appeal, Mother argued that the district court erred in categorizing the children outside the scope of ICWA without first making a conclusive determination that the children were not Indian children pursuant to ICWA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it applied the non-ICWA statutory standards because the court had neither a reason to believe nor a reason to know that the children were Indian children subject to ICWA. View "In re J.J.C." on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court terminating Father’s parental rights to his two children, holding that the district court correctly determined to proceed as if the children were Indian children and the Indian Child Welfare Act applied, but the court erred in failing to make specific findings about how or if the facts of the case met the “active efforts” required by clear and convincing evidence prior to removal and beyond a reasonable doubt prior to termination. The district court’s order found that children were Indian children, but neither transcripts nor written orders discussed how the Department of Public Health and Human Services made “active efforts” before removal and before termination. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order and remanded the matter for the court to document in detail if the Department met its burden of providing “active efforts” by clear and convincing evidence prior to removal and beyond a reasonable doubt prior to termination pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 1912(d) and 25 CFR 23.2. View "In re B.Y." on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s denial of Heather Remitz’s Mont. R. Civ. P. 60 motion for relief from judgment and remanded the matter to the district court to conduct limited discovery, holding that the Rule 60 motion should be decided on the merits. A standing master entered a final decree of dissolution dissolving the marriage of Heather and Rick Remitz. The district court ordered the parties’ business asset to be equally divided between Heather and Rick. Less than one month after the decree was finalized, Rick sold the business for allegedly ten times the district court’s valuation. Heather filed her Rule 60 motion alleging that the property terms of the divorce decree should be vacated and the matter reopened to allow inquiry into the sale process, the cause of the disparity between Rick’s valuation and the actual sale price, and whether it would be fair that Heather share in the increased value. The motion was deemed denied by the passage of time. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the circumstances, the Rule 60 motion should be decided on the merits. View "In re Marriage of Remitz" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court order modifying Dennis Simpson’s and Larissa Simpson’s property settlement agreement and order awarding attorney fees, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion. On appeal, Larissa argued that the district court abused its discretion when it modified the agreement, terminating monthly payments to her, and when it limited the amount of her attorney fees to those incurred during contempt proceedings. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that continued imposition and enforcement of the parties’ agreement was unconscionable; (2) the district court’s modification of the agreement based on the parties circumstances was appropriate; and (3) the court did not abuse its discretion in limiting Larissa’s attorney fees. View "In re Marriage of Simpson" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dissolving the marriage of Michele Hutchins and Michael Hutchins, holding that the parties’ premarital agreement was enforceable under Nevada law and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its valuation or distribution of the parties’ marital estate. On appeal, Michele argued that the premarital agreement was unenforceable where she was presented with the agreement by attorneys she had never encountered before one week before the parties’ wedding date. The district court applied Montana law and enforced the agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Nevada law applied to determine whether the premarital agreement was enforceable, and under Nevada law, the parties’ premarital agreement was enforceable; (2) the district court equitably apportioned the marital estate; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion by valuing some of the parties’ assets at the time of separation instead of at the time of dissolution. View "In re Marriage of Hutchins" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court terminating Father’s parental rights to his biological child, I.K., holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination was in the best interests of I.K. The district court terminated Father’s parental rights to I.K. for failure to comply with an appropriate court-approved treatment plan and because Father had been incarcerated for more than one year. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the district court’s finding that termination was in I.K.’s best interests was supported by clear and convincing evidence and that the court did not abuse its discretion when it found that termination of Father’s parental rights was in I.K.’s best interests. View "In re I.K." on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court terminating Mother’s parental rights to her biological child, X.M., holding that Mother was not denied due process in the termination proceedings and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Mother’s rights. Specifically, the Court held (1) clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that the termination process was fundamentally fair to Mother; and (2) where clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that Mother’s treatment plan adequately addressed her specific needs and that Mother did not complete the treatment plan, and where Mother’s condition was unlikely to change within a reasonable time, the district court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights. View "In re X.M." on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court terminating Mother’s parental rights to her two children, holding that the district court erred when it proceeded with termination of Mother’s parental rights before it had a conclusive determination of the children’s status in the Chippewa Cree Tribe and when it did not address whether the Department of Public Health and Human Services made “active efforts” to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that those efforts were unsuccessful. Specifically, the Court held (1) where the district court had reason to believe that the children may be eligible for enrollment in the Chippewa Cree Tribe, the court failed to satisfy the threshold requirement of the Indian Child Welfare Act to verify the children’s eligibility; (2) the district court did not err when it did not address whether the Department provided “active efforts” pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 1912(d); and (3) Mother’s due process were not violated when the Department raised the issue of abandonment during closing arguments at the termination hearing and Mother’s counsel did not object. View "In re L.A.G." on Justia Law