Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

This matter came before the Supreme Court on appeal of a trial court's grant of an irreconcilable-differences divorce in late 2008. David and Helen Rogillio were married for eleven years, living in Vicksburg with their minor son. David filed for a divorce on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhumane treatment, or, in the alternative, irreconcilable differences. He filed an Amended Complaint listing habitual drug use and adultery as additional grounds for divorce. At trial, the parties ultimately consented to a divorce based on irreconcilable differences and entered an Agreed Order Allowing Withdrawal of Contested Allegations. The court entered a Final Judgment of Divorce, dividing the marital assets and awarding lump-sum alimony of $15,000 to Helen. Helen appealed arguing that she should have been awarded periodic-payment alimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Helen then petitioned to the Supreme Court, which held that the chancellor had abused her discretion through errors in her accounting of the marital assets. On remand, the chancellor found that the previous judgment did contain accounting errors. After recalculating the marital assets, the chancellor ordered David to pay Helen lump-sum alimony of $18,204, periodic-payment alimony in the amount of $1,500 per month, and $4,369.50 for her attorney fees. David appealed pro se arguing: (1) the chancery court erred in awarding periodic-payment alimony; and (2) the chancery court erred in ordering David to pay Helen’s attorney fees. Helen did not file a brief in response to David’s claims. Finding that the chancellor did not abuse her discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court. View "Rogillio v. Rogillio" on Justia Law

In late 2011, the Bolivar County prosecuting attorney filed a petition in the county Youth Court, seeking an adjudicatory hearing, after receiving a complaint that two minor girls, S.G.M. and C.D.M., ages thirteen and eleven, respectively, had been sexually abused by their father. The youth court conducted an adjudicatory hearing. Those present at the hearing, apart from the attorneys, were Jim Warrington, the guardian ad litem (GAL) assigned to the case; Johnnie Rushing, a social worker with the Department of Human Services; David Monroe, the girls' biological father; Peggy Monroe, the girls' stepmother; K.T.M., the girls' older brother, age fourteen; Tammy and Tawanda Latham, the girls' maternal aunts; and Marie Miller, the girls' maternal grandmother. At the time of the adjudicatory hearing, S.G.M., C.D.M., and K.T.M. were in the custody of Peggy, as David had allowed Peggy to obtain custody of the children sometime after the children's biological mother had passed away. Shortly into the hearing, the youth court became aware that only Tammy and Tawanda had been issued summonses to appear at the hearing. All others agreed to waive service of process, and the court allowed David to waive service of process for S.G.M., C.D.M., and K.T.M. At the conclusion of the hearing, the youth court found there was no basis to support the sexual-abuse allegation. The youth court then proceeded to conduct a disposition hearing. At that point, the prosecuting attorney informed the youth court that the court was without authority to conduct a disposition hearing because the two girls had not been adjudicated sexually abused. The youth court had this matter placed on the court docket and held a hearing in the court's chambers. Tammy, Tawanda, Marie, and Peggy were the only parties present. The youth court stated on the record that, during the adjudicatory hearing, it had ordered that S.G.M., C.D.M., and K.T.M. were to be placed in the custody and care of their maternal aunt Tammy. Both the county prosecutor and legal counsel for Peggy disputed that such an order had been issued by the youth court at the hearing. The youth court entered an adjudicatory order, placing all three minor children in the custody of Tammy. Peggy thereafter filed a notice of appeal, asserting that: (1) the youth court had no jurisdiction to conduct the adjudicatory hearing because of lack of service of process on the children; (2) the youth court had no jurisdiction to conduct a subsequent adjudicatory hearing because of failure to give proper notice of the hearing; (3) the youth court could not conduct a disposition hearing after finding that the abuse allegations were unsubstantiated; and (4) the order to remove the children from their home was not supported by the evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the children did not receive process, and accordingly vacated the youth court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Interest of S.G.M., C.D.M., and K.T.M." on Justia Law

James Mallard and Tonya Mallard (now Tonya Mallard Burkart) were divorced on in 2001. Incorporated into the Final Judgment of Divorce was the Child Custody and Support and Property Settlement Agreement executed by the parties. A significant portion of the financial settlement that Burkart received in the property settlement agreement consisted of forty percent of Mallard's "disposable military retirement pay" for ten years. Following the divorce, Mallard elected to adopt a sixty-percent disability rating as part of his retirement pay. Mallard did not provide any of these disability benefits to Burkart. When Mallard filed a Petition for Modification of Judgment of Divorce in chancery court pursuant to child-support and custody matters, Burkart filed a counterpetition for contempt, asserting that Mallard had structured his retirement in such a way as to defeat her forty-percent interest in the total retirement pay. The chancellor determined that Burkart was entitled to forty percent of the disability benefits, but he declined to find Mallard in contempt. Mallard appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that since federal law preempts state law, state courts are precluded from allocating military disability benefits to a nonmilitary spouse; therefore, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mallard v. Burkart" on Justia Law

The "Child Custody, Support and Property Settlement Agreement" between A.M.L. and J.W.L., incorporated into their February 2002 "Final Judgment of Divorce," provided that they would share "joint legal custody" of their four daughters, with A.M.L. having "primary physical custody" and J.W.L. having frequent visitation. The Agreement also provided for, inter alia, child support, medical expenses and reimbursement, college expenses, and life insurance naming the children as beneficiaries. In the following years, J.W.L. became effectively estranged from his two oldest daughters, and ceased overnight and weekend visitation with both. In 2008, A.M.L. filed a "Petition for Modification and/or Clarification of Final Judgment of Divorce" and J.W.L. responded with a "Counterclaim for Modification of Custody and Other Relief." A.M.L.'s Petition requested full "legal and physical custody" of the children, an increase in child support, clarification of several Agreement provisions, contempt orders against J.W.L. for his alleged failure to comply with various Agreement provisions, and attorney fees. J.W.L.'s Counterclaim sought "full legal and physical custody" of their two youngest daughters, with attending modifications of Agreement provisions regarding child support, medical expenses, and college expenses. Following trial, the Chancery Court of Madison County, Mississippi, entered its "Opinion and Judgment on Petition for Modification and/or Clarification of Final Judgment of Divorce." Regarding child custody, the chancellor found a "material change in circumstances . . . which warrant[ed] modification of custody and the transfer of primary physical and legal custody of [the three youngest children] to [J.W.L.,]" based upon conduct of the children which was attributed to A.M.L. "impos[ing] little or no discipline." Yet the court delayed ordering custody modification, holding such ruling in abeyance, "subject to the parties adhering to" several court-imposed conditions. A.M.L. retained physical custody of the children. The "Opinion and Judgment" also modified J.W.L.'s child-support and college-expense obligations, and denied A.M.L.'s request for attorney fees. Following the denial of post-trial motions filed by A.M.L. and J.W.L. with respect to the rulings challenged on appeal, A.M.L. filed "Notice of Appeal" and J.W.L. filed "Notice of Cross-Appeal." Based upon this analysis, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's findings: (1) that A.M.L. had not "actively engaged" in alienation efforts; (2) that there would be no "upward retroactive modification" in J.W.L.'s child-support obligations for C.D., W.X., and Y.Z.; (3) that J.W.L. did not act in contempt in failing to comply with the thirty-day, noncoveredmedical-and-dental-expenses reimbursement provision of the Agreement; (4) that J.W.L. did not act in contempt of the "written proof" requirement in the life-insurance provision of the Agreement; and (5) that A.M.L.'s request for contempt-related attorney fees should be denied. The Supreme Court reversed the chancellor's findings: (1) of child-custody modification, as there was no "material change in circumstances" in the custodial home and no "Albright" analysis at the time of the initial ruling; (2) of retroactively terminating J.W.L.'s child support obligations for A.B.; (3) of applying "Hambrick" to C.D. and, based thereon, limiting J.W.L.'s college-expense obligation for her; and (4) of denying A.M.L.'s modification-related attorney fees for failure to "timely introduce any evidence" thereon. View "A.M.L. v. J.W.L." on Justia Law

William and Sarah Smith are the grandparents of Jason Wells. Jason's mother, Tara Wells, is Sarah's daughter. The Smiths filed a petition for temporary and permanent custody of Jason. They later filed a separate petition for adoption and to terminate the parental rights of Tara and Robert Johnson, the biological father. The chancellor declined to terminate Tara's and Robert's parental rights but awarded the Smiths primary custody of Jason. In awarding the Smiths custody, the chancellor found that Tara had "by her long and continuous absences from [Jason] failed to exercise her parental rights and fulfill her parental responsibilities." He found that this had caused the Smiths to assume the role of parents to Jason for virtually his entire life and that the Smiths thus stood in loco parentis. The chancellor then conducted a best-interest, "Albright" analysis and concluded that Jason should remain with the Smiths. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the chancellor found that the natural-parent presumption under "Albright" had been overcome based on the doctrine of loco parentis (which would have been in error), or based on a finding of desertion by Tara which necessitated the Smiths standing as in loco parentis for Jason. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the latter and therefore affirmed the judgment of the chancery court. View "In re Smith adoption of Minor Tara Wells" on Justia Law

Anthony Cuccia (Tony) separated from his wife, Julie Anne Cuccia after eleven years of marriage. At some point near the end of the marriage, Julie Anne began allowing rottweiler and pitbull dogs to live in the home. Tony disagreed with Julie Anne’s decision, resulting in a dispute that led to Tony filing for divorce. A few months later, Tony filed an amended complaint for divorce, adding that he was entitled to a divorce on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhumane treatment. Julie Anne filed an answer and counterclaim in which she denied being guilty of habitual cruel and inhumane treatment but admitted that irreconcilable differences existed, arguing in the alternative that she was entitled to a divorce on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. Tony and Julie Anne consented to an irreconcilable-differences divorce, but left equitable distribution of property, child custody, and alimony for the chancery court to decide. After a trial on September 21, 2009, the chancery court issued its final divorce decree and order, granting custody to Julie Anne, dividing the marital estate, and awarding alimony. Tony appealed the divorce decree due to the nature of the award given to Julie Anne regarding child custody, alimony, and equitable distribution of marital property. On appeal, the Court of Appeals overturned several of the chancery court’s findings and remanded the issues for reexamination. As a result, Julie Anne petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari to review the findings of the Court of Appeals and the chancery court. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in part and reversed in part. On remand, the chancery court was instructed to determine the demarcation date for dividing the marital property, consider marital debt in that division, consider whether alimony was appropriate after making that division, reevaluate the custody matter, and craft an appropriate custody arrangement with the best interest of the children in mind. View "Cuccia v. Cuccia" on Justia Law

Charlotte and Larry Wilson, parents of Crystal Wilson (deceased), filed an action requesting visitation with their grandchildren. The chancellor granted the request. Aggrieved, Stephen Smith, Crystal's former husband, and Melissa LuAnn Smith, Stephen's current wife, appealed the chancellor’s decision and challenged the constitutionality of Mississippi’s grandparent-visitation statutes. The Smiths raised four issues on appeal; the Supreme Court addressed each and held: (1) Mississippi's grandparent-visitation statute and the "Martin v. Coop" (693 So.2d 912(Miss. 1997)) factors do not violate the Constitution. (2) the chancellor did not err in applying the grandparent-visitation statutes, the "Martin" factors and "Troxel v. Granville" (530 U.S. 57 (2000)) to this case; (3) the chancellor properly applied the "Martin" factors; and (4) the Wilsons' visitation was not excessive. Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's judgment.

The issue before the Supreme Court concerned a custody dispute on interlocutory appeal. The Lauderdale County Youth Court denied Theresa and Ralph Anderson's Motion to Transfer Jurisdiction to the Chancery Court of Neshoba County in the matter involving neglected and abused minors. Aggrieved, the Andersons appealed, arguing that the youth court erred in retaining jurisdiction over the matter because chancery courts have jurisdiction over custody matters, and because the youth court previously terminated its jurisdiction over the minors involved. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error and affirmed the order of the youth court denying the Motion to Transfer Jurisdiction.

These three consolidated appeals (all springing from a divorce granted in 1994) presented thirty-eight issues including one of first impression. A judgment creditor served writs of execution on two corporations whose restricted stock was owned by the judgment debtor, who then sold his stock back to the corporations. The chancellor dismissed the writs, holding that the sale of stock rendered them moot. Upon review of the case, the Supreme Court held that statutory restrictions on the transfer of restricted shares of corporate stock apply to both voluntary and involuntary transfers of the shares; that after a judgment creditor serves a corporation with a writ of execution regarding one of its shareholders, repurchasing the shareholder’s shares will not excuse the corporation from responding to the writ of execution by filing the statutorily required sworn statement; and that the judgment creditor may (to the extent allowed by Mississippi statutes and other applicable law) execute on all benefits due the judgment debtor by the corporation, including the purchase price of the judgment debtor’s stock. Because the Court reversed the chancellor on three issues and remanded for a new trial, and because the chancellor's resolution of those issues may affect the outcome of others, the Court held that all issues not specifically resolved in this opinion could be presented by the parties to the chancellor for adjudication.

This guardianship case began in the Youth Court for the City of Pearl. Petitioners Wanda Bell and Jane Dennis Morse requested that the case be transferred to the Rankin County Chancery Court. Later, Bell and Morse requested that the chancery court dismiss their petition, alleging that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. In addition to dismissing the case with prejudice, the chancellor awarded custody of the child to Frances Cathryn Dennis Finnegan, the child’s natural mother. Aggrieved, Bell and Morse appealed raising two issues: (1) whether the youth court erred by transferring the case to chancery court; and (2) whether the chancellor erred by awarding custody to Finnegan. Upon review, the Supreme Court determined the chancellor properly had jurisdiction of the case. However, the chancellor erred by dismissing the case and awarding custody to Finnegan without any on-the-record findings. The case was remanded for further proceedings.