Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

In a custody dispute between the natural father and the maternal grandmother, the chancellor granted custody to the father, finding that the father had not deserted his child. Although the grandmother had stood in loco parentis to the child since the mother’s death, the chancellor correctly recognized that this alone could not overcome the natural-parent presumption. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court's judgment. View "Davis v. Vaughn" on Justia Law

Terence Jones appealed a Chancery Court's denial of his 2011 petition to disestablish paternity, which relied on Section 93-9-10(3)(c) of the Mississippi Code. Because Jones signed a stipulated agreement of paternity that was approved by court order in 2000, the chancery court properly denied Jones's petition as presented. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court's judgment denying Jones's petition. View "Jones v. Mallett" on Justia Law

Every divorce based on irreconcilable differences in Mississippi must proceed under either Section 93-5-2(2) or Section 93-5-2(3), but not both. In this case, the two subsections were conflated and confused. As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the Chancery Court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Sanford v. Sanford" on Justia Law

An interlocutory appeal stemmed from a circuit court's denial of Robert Germany’s motion to sever and transfer claims filed against him by his wife, Ginger Germany, to their pending divorce proceeding. Finding that many of Ginger’s claims against Robert were either equitable in nature or were related to divorce and alimony, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and remanded the case with instructions to sever and transfer those claims to the pending divorce action in the Chancery Court. View "Germany v. Germany" on Justia Law

Kenton McNeese appealed the dismissal of his Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment and Other Relief. This Rule 60(b) motion was filed with respect to a judgment of divorce from which he already had perfected an appeal. At that time, his first appeal was pending with the Supreme Court. In response, his former wife Katherine (“Katye”), filed a motion to dismiss and requested that Kenton be required to pay attorneys’ fees. The trial court denied Kenton’s motion for relief and granted Katye’s motion to dismiss and request for attorneys’ fees. The trial court ruled that the Rule 60(b) motion was not timely and that the court lacked jurisdiction “due to the pendency of the case’s appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court. . . .” The trial court also found that Kenton’s motion was frivolous and without substantial justification and that it was interposed for delay and harassment and, therefore, imposed a $1,000 sanction against Kenton to be applied toward Katye’s attorneys’ fees. Finding that the trial court erroneously ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Kenton’s Rule 60(b) motion, but concluding that the trial court did not err in denying the motion, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Kenton Hal McNeese v. Katherine J. McNeese (Graves)" on Justia Law

George Neville filed a petition for modification of a final judgment of divorce seeking to have his ex-wife, Tina Blitz, pay their daughter's college expenses. The chancellor ordered the parties to divide the college expenses equally, after scholarships and a monthly housing stipend from the Post-9/11 GI Bill were deducted. George, who had assigned his Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits to his daughter, appealed arguing the chancellor erred by dividing the monthly housing stipend between Tina and himself. The chancellor found that George should take credit for the payment of the daughter's tuition, fees, and books from the Post-9/11 GI Bill, but not the monthly housing stipend. He ordered that the housing stipend be taken off the top , along with the daughter's scholarships, before the remaining expenses were divided between George and Tina. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the chancellor's allocation of the monthly housing stipend was a violation of 38 U.S.C. 3319(f)(3) because it constituted division of the benefit between parties in a civil proceeding. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case back to the chancellor to modify the order to give George credit for all benefits from the Post-9/11 GI Bill. View "Neville v. Blitz" on Justia Law

M.E.V. was a minor child whose biological mother lived in Mississippi, and whose biological father lived in Texas. The youth court removed M.E.V. from her mother’s custody. After several periodic reviews, the youth court judge issued a review order giving legal and physical custody of the child to her biological father in Texas on a trial basis. The mother wanted to appeal that review order. Because the review order was not a final judgment, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. View "In the Interest of M.E.V." on Justia Law

Thirteen years after the divorce was finalized, the Lamar County Chancery Court found that the former husband, Appellee John David Gatwood, was in arrears on certain financial obligations imposed by the divorce decree. Because of various extenuating circumstances, the chancellor ordered Gatwood to pay off his debt in monthly installments. More than a year after the chancery court judgment, the former wife's attorney, Jack Parsons, successfully filed a suggestion for writ of garnishment, significantly accelerating payment of Gatwood's financial obligations. Circumstances related to the manner in which the writ of garnishment was obtained resulted in sanctions against Parsons; the garnishment proceedings also gave rise to other rulings which were appealed to this Court. After review, the Supreme Court declined to find the trial court erred: evidence at trial supported that court's finding that attorney's fees and sanctions against Parsons and his client were appropriate. Accordingly, the circuit court's decision was affirmed. View "Cooper v. The Estate of William David Gatwood" on Justia Law

After being separated from her newborn infant for more than a year, Cirila Baltazar Cruz received an award of full legal and physical custody of her child from the Youth Court. The youth court further ordered that its proceedings and records remain confidential and that those present at the final hearing refrain from speaking to the media about the case. Cruz wanted to be able to discuss the case publicly and to share documents and transcripts from the proceedings and requested that the order of confidentiality be set aside. The youth court denied her motion. The court said that none of the parties had objected to the confidentiality order and found that it was not in Baby Doe's best interest to set aside that order absent some reason under Section 43-21-261 of the Mississippi Code. Cruz appealed the decision of the youth court to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the youth court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that the youth-court records remain confidential; however, the youth court failed to apply the proper legal standard when it issued the gag order. Therefore, the Court affirmed in part and reversed and in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Cruz v. Jackson County Dept. of Human Services" on Justia Law

After filing for a no-fault divorce, Perry and Iretha Collins asked the chancery court to decide the questions of alimony, child support, attorney's fees, and the division of marital assets. Dissatisfied with the chancellor's decision, Perry appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Perry then petitioned the Supreme Court raising four issues; the Court granted certiorari to consider two: (1) the calculation of Perry's gross income for purposes of determining child support and (2) the designation of marital property. Finding that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's decision regarding both issues, the Court affirmed in part and reversed and remand in part. View "Collins v. Collins" on Justia Law