Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The grandparent visitation statute allows a court to award visitation as part of several different kinds of proceedings, including a proceeding for parentage. The district court awarded grandparent visitation to the paternal grandmother (Grandmother) of T.H. after concluding that the recognition of parentage executed by T.H.'s parents pursuant to Minn. Stat. 257.75 was a "proceeding" for parentage under the grandparent visitation statute. The court of appeals affirmed. T.H.'s mother appealed, contending that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to award visitation to Grandmother. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a recognition of parentage executed and filed with the appropriate state agency under section 257.75 is a "proceeding" for purposes of the grandparent visitation statute; and (2) therefore, a "proceeding" occurred in this case, and the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to award visitation to Grandmother. View "Christianson v. Henke" on Justia Law

Father and Mother were divorced pursuant to a judgment and decree which provided that Father pay child support to Mother. Father later moved to modify his child-support obligation, arguing that certain distributions paid to Mother as a shareholder of a closely-held subchapter S corporation should be included in her gross income, as defined by Minn. Stat. 518A.29(a) and 518A.30 for the purpose of calculating the child-support amount. The district court granted the motion. The court of appeals reversed, determining that because the distributions either were not available to Mother or were designated to pay her income tax obligation, the distributions did not constitute gross income within the meaning of the statutes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that gross income from a shareholder's interest in a closely-held subchapter S corporation must be calculated using the statutory formula in section 518A.30 and does not depend on the amount actually distributed or available to the parent shareholder. Remanded. View "Haefele v. Haefele" on Justia Law

At the time of his divorce from Wife, Husband was a participant in a pension fund (Fund). To enforce the interest awarded to her under the decree, Wife needed to serve a domestic relations order (DRO) on the Fund and its administrators (collectively, the Plan) for qualification. Before Wife served any DRO on the Plan, Husband remarried. At the time of Husband's retirement, he made a survivor annuity payable to his current spouse upon his death. Wife eventually served a DRO on the Plan in 2005, but the Plan refused to qualify the DRO. After Husband died, Wife brought a motion to enforce the 2005 DRO. The district court ruled in favor of Wife, concluding (1) surviving spouse benefits do not vest in a plan participant's current spouse at the time of the plan participant's retirement; and (2) therefore, the 2005 DRO served on the Plan was a qualified domestic relations order. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under ERISA, surviving spouse benefits vest in a plan participant's current spouse at the time of the plan participant's retirement; and (2) accordingly, the 2005 DRO in this case could not be qualified. View "Langston v. Wilson McShane Corp." on Justia Law

Two children's foster parents filed a petition to adopt the children, as did the children's grandparents. The district court concluded that it was in the best interests of the children to be adopted by the foster parents and accordingly granted the foster parents' petition. The court then denied the adoption petition of the grandparents. The court of appeals affirmed. The grandparents appealed, contending that the district court erred in not according them preference and ignoring the plain language of Minn. Stat. 259.57(2)(c) by considering the grandparents' and the foster parents' petitions side-by-side. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly applied section 259.57(2)(c) and did not abuse its discretion in concluding that adoption by the foster parents was in the children's best interests. View "In re Petition to Adopt P.U.K." on Justia Law

The issue in this case was whether an order for protection (OFP) may be issued under the Domestic Abuse Act on behalf of a minor child in the absence of a finding by the district court that the child was a victim of domestic abuse. The district court issued an OFP to Respondent on behalf of his minor son against Appellant, the child's grandfather and Respondent's father-in-law, when the alleged victim of the domestic abuse did not seek or want protection against Appellant. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred when it issued the OFP without finding that the child was a victim of Appellant's domestic abuse, as, when viewed in its entirety, the Act authorizes a district court to grant an OFP only to a victim of domestic abuse. View "Schmidt v. Coons" on Justia Law

Respondent Robert Half International (RHI) terminated Appellant Kim Hansen's employment shortly after she returned from maternity leave and failed to reinstate her to the same or similar position. Hansen filed an action against RHI, alleging that it violated the Minnesota Parenting Leave Act (MPLA) and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) by failing to reinstate her to her position or a comparable position after maternity leave, for retaliating against her for taking maternity leave, and for terminating her because of her sex. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of RHI. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that judgment was appropriate as a matter of law. View "Hansen v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose out of dispute between two counties over which county was the "county of financial responsibility" for the out-of-home placement costs incurred after October 1, 2008, for a minor child named S.M. The Minnesota Department of Human Services (MDHS) held that Nobles County was responsible for S.M.'s costs. The district court reversed, concluding that the legislative history of Minn. Stat. 256G.10 indicated the legislature intended the county of financial responsibility to be the county where the child last resided with a parent, and therefore, Brown County was the county of financial responsibility. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the language of section 256G.10 was unambiguous and, by its plain language, the county of financial responsibility was the county of the residence of the parent with whom the child last lived, determined at the time the child entered excluded time status; (2) the county of financial responsibility in this case was the county in which S.M.'s mother resided on May 16, 2008, the date S.M. entered excluded time status; and (3) therefore, Nobles County was the county of financial responsibility for S.M.'s out-of-home placement costs for services provided on and after October 1, 2008.

Kelli Rohmiller was the sister of the mother of B.H. After B.H.'s mother died, B.H.'s father, Andrew Hart, was awarded custody of B.H. Rohmiller and her father, Clayton Rohmiller, subsequently petitioned the district court for visitation with B.H. The court jointly granted Rohmiller and Clayton unsupervised visitation with B.H. and provided that Rohmiller could exercise visitation without the presence of Clayton. Hart objected to Rohmiller's independent visitation with B.H. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's grant of visitation to Clayton but reversed the award of visitation to Rohmiller, holding that Minn. Stat. Ann. 257C.08 does not extend visitation rights to aunts generally and that she had no right to visitation under Minnesota law apart from the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an aunt who does not stand in loco parentis with a child has not right under Minn. Stat. Ann. 257C.08 to visitation with the child over the objection's of the child's fit parent; and (2) an award of visitation outside of section 257C.08 and the common law and over the objections of a child's fit parent cannot be based solely on what is in the best interests of the child.

After parental rights to an Indian child were involuntarily terminated in district court, the White Earth Band of Ojibwe (the Band) petitioned for transfer of the ensuing preadoptive placement proceedings to its tribal court. The district court granted the Band's motion even though the child did not reside and was not domiciled within the tribe's reservation. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that with respect to an Indian child not residing or domiciled on the child's tribe's reservation, (1) the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) permits transfer to tribal court of only foster care placement and termination of parental rights proceedings; and (2) Rule 48 of the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure, providing for transfer of the juvenile protection matter to an Indian child's tribe, is limited to foster care placement and termination of parental rights proceedings.

D.T.R., a minor, was born in 2004 to Lynette Marthe and her then-husband Derek Reiter. At the time, both believed Reiter was D.T.Râs biological father. However, in 2007, genetic testing would prove that Michael Richards was D.T.R.âs biological father. In 2008, Richards sought joint legal custody of D.T.R., and named Marthe and Reiter as parties. Before trial, the parties stipulated paternity, but could not agree who should be deemed D.T.R.âs âlegalâ father. The case proceeded to trial in 2009. While the paternity suit was pending, Marthe and Reiter had filed for divorce. In 2010, the district court filed detailed and thorough findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issued an order that concluded that a parent-child relationship existed between Reiter and D.T.R., and adjudicated Reiter as the childâs âlegalâ father. Marthe appealed the courtâs determination of paternity, but Richards did not. The appellate court questioned Martheâs standing to appeal the dismissal of Richardsâ petition. After additional briefing on the issue, the appellate court dismissed Martheâs appeal. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Marthe argued that she had standing to appeal as an aggrieved party pursuant to the applicable state case law and the Minnesota Parentage Act. Reiter asserted that Marthe did not have standing because her rights were not affected by the judgment adjudicating paternity. According to Reiter, Martheâs rights would be affected when her individual interests were at stake, such as a decision determining custody, parenting time or child support. The Supreme Court concluded that Marthe had standing to appeal as an aggrieved party the district courtâs determination of D.T.R.âs paternity. The Court reasoned that the determination of paternity directly impacted her responsibility for child support and her rights related to child support. The Court reversed the appellate courtâs holding, and remanded the case for further proceedings.