Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The common law governs provisions of an antenuptial agreement that do not fall within the safe harbor of Minn. Stat. 519.11(1), and the multifactor Kinney test is the common-law test applicable to antenuptial agreements. See In re Estate of Kinney, 733 N.W.2d 118 (Minn. 2007).Wife petitioned for dissolution and moved to set aside the antenuptial agreement she signed just before her marriage. The district court invalidated the agreement, concluding that it was procedurally unfair because Wife did not have an adequate opportunity to meet with legal counsel of her own choice and that it was substantively unfair and the time it was made and executed. The court of appeals affirmed on different grounds, concluding (1) to the extent the district court relied on Minn. Stat. 519.11 for evaluating procedural fairness, the court erred; (2) agreements that purport to distribute marital property, such as the agreement in this case, must be evaluated under the common law; and (3) the agreement was procedurally unfair. The Supreme Court affirmed after applying the Kinney factors to the entire agreement, holding that this agreement did not satisfy the common law test for procedurally fairness, and therefore, the agreement was invalid and unenforceable. View "Kremer v. Kremer" on Justia Law

In a proceeding to terminate parental rights that is governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA), qualified expert witness testimony is required to support the determination that continued custody of the child by the parent is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.The district court terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father, concluding that ICWA and MIFPA applied to the proceedings and that the laws’ requirements had been satisfied. The court of appeals reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in failing expressly to find under ICWA and MIFPA that continued custody of the child by the parent was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. On appeal, the district court stated as much in a one-sentence addendum to its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s termination decision. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in terminating Father’s parental rights because the qualified expert witness’s testimony did not support the court’s determination that continued custody of the children by Father would likely result in serious damage to the children. View "In re Welfare of Children of S.R.K. & O.A.K." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the district court’s denial of Father’s request for additional parenting time to provide before- and after-school child care for the parties’ son, K.T., while Mother was working.The parties stipulated to joint legal and physical custody with equal parenting time, and the district court approved the parenting time. Ten days later, Father filed a motion for additional parenting time to provide child care for K.T. before and after school on Mother’s parenting days. The district court denied the request. Father appealed, arguing that the district court based its decision on irrelevant or repealed factors and that the district court erred by failing to make detailed findings on the newly amended best-interest factors listed in Minn. Stat. 518.17(1)(a). The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) parenting time modifications under Minn. Stat. 518.175(8) do not require the same detailed, specific findings that an order establishing custody or parenting time now requires; and (2) the district court did not rely on factors that were either repealed or irrelevant. View "Hansen v. Todnem" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the district court’s denial of Father’s request for additional parenting time to provide before- and after-school child care for the parties’ son, K.T., while Mother was working.The parties stipulated to joint legal and physical custody with equal parenting time, and the district court approved the parenting time. Ten days later, Father filed a motion for additional parenting time to provide child care for K.T. before and after school on Mother’s parenting days. The district court denied the request. Father appealed, arguing that the district court based its decision on irrelevant or repealed factors and that the district court erred by failing to make detailed findings on the newly amended best-interest factors listed in Minn. Stat. 518.17(1)(a). The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) parenting time modifications under Minn. Stat. 518.175(8) do not require the same detailed, specific findings that an order establishing custody or parenting time now requires; and (2) the district court did not rely on factors that were either repealed or irrelevant. View "Hansen v. Todnem" on Justia Law

The deadline for an appeal in a juvenile protection proceeding is based on the district court’s service of notice by mail. In this case, because the appeal was filed by that deadline, the court of appeals erred in dismissing the appeal as untimely. Here, the district court terminated L.A.’s parental rights after allegations were made that L.A. was in need of protection or services. L.A. filed a notice of appeal. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals, holding that L.A.'s appeal was timely filed because nothing in the plain language of the rules told him that he could not rely on the service upon him by mail when calculating the deadline for filing his appeal. View "In re Welfare of Child of R.K." on Justia Law

The district court’s denial of Mother’s motion to “reinstate” joint custody of the parties’ children, though appealable, erroneously modified custody without complying with the requirements of Minn. Stat. 518.18.After dissolving their marriage, Mother and Father agreed to share joint legal and physical custody of their two children. The district court adopted the parties’ agreement. Thereafter, the district court issued a series of orders granting Father temporary sole custody of the children. When the parties did not resume joint physical custody more than one year later, Mother moved to reinstate joint custody. The district court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred when it modified the custody arrangement established by the judgment and decree. The court remanded the case to reinstate the original custody order or, upon a motion to modify, for an evidentiary hearing. View "Crowley v. Meyer" on Justia Law

In 2012, Wife filed a petition to dissolve her marriage to Husband. The court approved the parties’ stipulation and entered partial final judgment dissolving the marriage. The stipulation, however, did not address Wife’s request for spousal maintenance. After a trial on the issue, the district court declined to award maintenance to Wife, determining that Wife could reallocate the investment assets equitably distributed to her in the property settlement to produce sufficient income to meet her reasonable monthly expenses. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in taking into account the income-earning potential of the assets that Wife received in the equitable distribution of marital property; but (2) under the circumstances, the district court’s obligation to consider the tax consequences of the reallocation required remand. View "Curtis v. Curtis" on Justia Law

After Gordon Brown’s debt to Citizens State Bank Norwood Young America (Bank) became delinquent, Gordon petitioned to dissolve his twenty-three-year marriage to Judy Brown. The Browns executed a marital termination agreement that was incorporated into the marital dissolution decree. Pursuant to the dissolution judgment and decree, Gordon transferred to Judy several assets. When it was unable to collect from Gordon on the original judgment, the Bank brought this action under Minnesota’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (MUFTA) to levy execution on the assets Gordon transferred to Judy, alleging that the transfers were made with the intent to defraud the Bank. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bank, determining that the transfers were voidable under MUFTA. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment granting the Bank authority to levy execution on assets fraudulently transferred to the extent necessary to satisfy the Bank’s claim, holding that MUFTA applies to transfers made pursuant to an uncontested marital dissolution decree. View "Citizens State Bank Norwood Young Am. v. Brown" on Justia Law

James Bergstrom and Vanessa Rew dissolved their marriage in 2008. In 2002, 2007, and 2008, Rew obtained a series of one-year orders for protection (OFPs) against Bergstrom. In 2010, before the extended expiration date of the 2008 OFP, Rew filed an application under Minn. Stat. 518B.01(6)(a) to extend the terms of the 2008 OFP. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court extended the OFP for up to fifty years in favor of Rew and the couple’s minor children. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) section 518B.01(6)(a) does not require a finding of domestic abuse before a district court may extend the duration of an OFP; (2) the extension of an OFP under section 518B.01(6)(a) does not facially violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or Minn. Const. art. I, 3; (3) the record was insufficient to conclude that the extended OFP was constitutional with respect to Bergstrom’s children; and (4) the extension of an OFP for up to fifty years does not implicate the prohibition against double jeopardy or the Ex Post Facto Clause of either the United States of Minnesota Constitutions. Remanded. View "In re Rew" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of felony-level failure to provide care and support to his children due to his omission and failure to pay court-ordered child support. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, concluding (1) the phrase “care and support” in Minn. Stat. 609.375(1) refers exclusively to a person’s financial obligations to a spouse or child; and (2) the district court did not err when it excluded Appellant’s evidence that he had provided nonmonetary care to his children. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) to obtain a conviction under section 609.375(1) the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant knowingly omitted and failed to provide both care and support to a spouse or child; and (2) the State did not present any evidence that Appellant knowingly omitted and failed to provide care to his children, and therefore, insufficient evidence supported Appellant’s conviction under the care-and-support statute. View "State v. Nelson" on Justia Law