Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
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The court examined a case involving a divorcing couple, Amy Sue Openshaw and Glen Romney Openshaw, who had a custom of regularly saving a portion of their income throughout their marriage. The husband contested the judge’s alimony decision, arguing that the judge should not have considered the couple's practice of saving as part of the marital lifestyle in setting the amount of alimony.The court held that where a couple has a customary practice of saving during the marriage, such saving can be considered as a component of the couple's marital lifestyle in determining alimony. Therefore, the judge did not err in considering the parties' regular savings practice in setting the alimony amount.The husband also disputed the division of liabilities, as the judge assigned the wife only $5,032 in liabilities, while the husband was assigned $343,280, primarily for the family's unpaid tax debt. The court found the division of liabilities to be erroneous as the judge did not explain why the tax debt, a significant marital liability, was assigned solely to the husband. The court ordered a remand to reevaluate the division of liabilities in the judgment. View "Openshaw v. Openshaw" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the probate and family court judge denying M.H.'s motion to intervene in an action brought by J.M. against C.G. seeking custody and expanded parenting time and affirmed the judgments dismissing two other actions brought by M.H., holding that there was no clear error.In 2016, J.M. had executed a voluntary acknowledgment of parentage as to Amelia. In 2020, J.M. brought an action seeking legal custody and expanded parenting time. M.H., Amelia's putative biological father, moved to intervene in the action as Amelia's putative biological father. M.H. filed complaints in both equity and under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209C to establish his paternity of Amelia. The lower judge dismissed both complaints and denied the motion to intervene. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) to the extent M.H. challenged the VAP on the basis of fraud, his claim was time barred; and (2) there was no reason to address the constitutionality of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209B. View "J.M. v. C.G." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court dismissing as moot Father's petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that there was no abuse of discretion.The Department of Children and Families filed a care and protection petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, 24 after the child in this case tested positive at birth for drugs. Thereafter, temporary custody was granted to Father. Father filed a motion to dismiss the petition for temporary custody on the grounds that there was no need for judicial intervention. The judge denied the order. Thereafter, Father brought his Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition. While the petition was pending, the juvenile court dismissed the care and protection case. On that basis, the single justice dismissed Father's as moot Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that this Court declines to exercise its discretion to consider Father's appeal notwithstanding the fact that it was moot. View "In re Care & Protection of a Minor" on Justia Law

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In this post divorce dispute over child support and alimony, the Supreme Judicial Court held that a provision of the Alimony Reform Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 208, 53(c)(2), allows for the concurrent award of child support and alimony and that several of the judge's rulings relating to the divorce judgment and calculation of child support constituted error.In this dispute, both parties sought a modification of the child support order issued as part of the divorce judgment and Mother sought alimony for the first time in the proceedings. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated certain portions of the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding (1) the judge abused her discretion by not considering an award where alimony was calculated before child support and denied without consideration of the mandatory statutory factors set forth in section 53(a); (2) the judge erred in interpreting the language in the separation agreement as to the parties' obligations for the youngest son's schooling; and (3) the judge abused her discretion in excluding certain interest and capital gains on transactions other than those related to real and personal property in calculating Father's gross income for the purposes of child support. View "Cavanagh v. Cavanagh" on Justia Law

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In this case concerning the scope of the litigation privilege, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the protection afforded by the litigation privilege applies even where the statements in question are fraudulent misrepresentations and that the litigation privilege extends to actions taken during the course of litigation.Plaintiffs were creditors of William von Thaden, who was married to Kimberly von Thaden until their divorce. Defendant represented Kimberly in the divorce proceedings. Before they filed the instant complaint against William and Kimberly Plaintiffs had asserted several claims against William related to contract disputes. William subsequently declared bankruptcy. Plaintiffs then commenced this action against Defendant, seeking to hold him liable for allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations he made to the court during the divorce trial. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the dismissal of this complaint, holding that the litigation privilege applied under the circumstances of this case. View "Bassichis v. Flores" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court terminating Mother's parental rights to her child and granting permanent guardianship to the child's paternal grandmother, holding that the juvenile court properly exercised its authority even where the Department of Children and Families did not have physical custody of the child when they petitioned for termination.While the child was still in his grandmother's custody the Department filed a notice of intent requesting that the juvenile court terminate Mother's parental rights pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 210, 3. The judge found Mother unfit, terminated her parental rights, and ordered conditional permanent custody to the grandmother. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the judge was warranted in terminating Mother's parental rights. View "In re Care & Protection of Zeb" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the decree entered by the superior court terminating Mother's parental rights and remanded this case for a new trial, holding that the conduct of the trial violated Mother's right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 10 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.On the first day of the two-day virtual bench trial conducted in this case was afflicted by technological issues, resulting in Mother's inability to participate and interruptions to the testimony of certain witnesses. The virtual trial resumed two days later. The judge ultimately issued a decree terminating Mother's parental rights to her child. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment below, holding that the trial was conducted in violation of Mother's right to due process. View "In re Adoption of Patty" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Judicial Court held that the appropriate standard of proof by which the Department would have to prove that it had made "reasonable efforts to make it possible for the child to return safely to his [or her] parent or guardian" under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, 29C is proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence.The parties in this case jointly petitioned for clarification of the standard by which the Department would have to prove that it has made reasonable efforts. The Department argued that the standard of proof should be fair preponderance of the evidence, and the child at issue and its mother argued for a more demanding clear and convincing evidence standard. The Supreme Judicial Court declared that, at a reasonable efforts hearing, the Department's burden is to prove that it has made reasonable efforts by a preponderance of the evidence. View "In re Care & Protection of Rashida" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Judicial Court answered three reported questions regarding whether the provision in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, 29C that the court shall determine reasonable efforts not less than annually permits or requires a juvenile court judge to make a reasonable efforts determination at other times, holding that a party may file a motion for a determination of reasonable efforts at other times.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held that, following judicial certification of reasonable efforts at the emergency custody hearing and the seventy-two hour hearing, there is no requirement that a trial court judge determine that the department has continued to engage in reasonable efforts at any time prior to the statutorily mandated annual review, but the trial judge has the discretion to do so upon the motion of a parent or child. View "In re Care & Protection of Rashida" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Judicial Court held that social workers, and their approving supervisors, in the Department of Children and Families who attest to facts in sworn affidavits as part of care and protection proceedings commenced by the Department in the juvenile court pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 119, 24 are entitled to absolute immunity in these circumstances.Plaintiff brought an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 against a social worker with the Department, alleging that the social worker intentionally misrepresented facts in a sworn affidavit filed in support of a care and protection petition in the juvenile court. Plaintiff further alleged that the social worker's area supervisor (together, with the social worker, Defendants) was liable because she had approved the social worker's actions. Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that they were entitled to absolute immunity. A superior court judge allowed the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Defendants were entitled to absolute immunity under the circumstances of this case. View "C.M. v. Commissioner of Department of Children & Families" on Justia Law