Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Victoria was declared a child in need of assistance after her father, George, would not allow her return to the home he shared with his wife, Kieran, and their two children, Lance and Evan. Victoria later sought visitation with Lance and Evan. An assigned master recommended supervised visitation. George and Kieran filed joint exceptions to recommendation in light of Koshko v. Haining because Victoria did not meet her burden of showing prima facie evidence of exceptional circumstances demonstrating detriment to the children absent visitation from Victoria. The circuit court then denied the exceptions and ordered supervised visitation. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that Victoria had not proven exceptional circumstances within the analytical framework established by Koshko. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the court of special appeals, holding (1) the master and circuit court relied on the incorrect applicable standard in determining whether exceptional circumstances existed to order visitation; and (2) therefore, the order should be reversed and remanded for consideration of whether jurisdiction actually existed to order sibling visitation and, if so, whether a deleterious effect on Lance and Evan could be proven. View "In re Victoria C." on Justia Law

Wife and Husband married in 2003. In 2005 and 2008, Wife and Husband executed marital settlement agreements. In 2009, Husband filed a complaint for divorce, alleging that the separation agreements were voidable at his demand. In support of his demand, Husband argued that the attorney, who earlier assisted the Wife in obtaining permanent resident status and in the United States and largely served as scrivener to the settlement agreements, violated the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to obtain Husband’s informed consent to her representation of Wife in connection with the two settlement agreements. The circuit court held that the separation agreements were not voidable and entered a judgment of absolute divorce in which the separation agreements were incorporated. The intermediate appellate court affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that sufficient grounds to render the agreements voidable were not present in this case. View "Li v. Lee" on Justia Law

In 2010, Wife filed an amended complaint for divorce, alleging that she and Husband were married in 1993 in a civil ceremony in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. At a merits trial, Husband contested the divorce on the premise that he and Wife were never legally married. The circuit court found that a valid marriage between the parties took place even though Husband was not physically present at the wedding ceremony because he participated in the ceremony by telephone. The court then entered a judgment of absolute divorce in Wife's favor. The court of special appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment that the marriage between the parties was valid. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, under the principles of comity, Maryland recognizes wedding ceremonies where the groom participated only by telephone. View "Tshiani v. Tshiani" on Justia Law

Father filed a complaint for absolute divorce from Mother and sought sole physical and legal custody of the parties' two children. Before the merits hearing on Father's divorce petition, the circuit court ordered that a custody investigation report (the Report) be completed. Counsel's access to the Report was limited by the "Policy Regarding Distribution of Court Ordered Evaluative Reports" (the Policy), which the trial court relied upon to prevent Mother's counsel from receiving a copy of the Report. The trial court subsequently granted Father's petition for divorce and awarded him sole legal and physical custody of the children. Mother appealed, arguing that the Policy afforded her inadequate procedural protection. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by applying the Policy to procedural matters that required the court to exercise its discretion, and this error presumptively prejudiced Mother. Remanded. View "Sumpter v. Sumpter" on Justia Law

Ryan W. entered the care of the Department of Social Services at age nine as a child in need of services (CINA) and was placed in foster care. After Ryan's parents died, the Department was appointed by the Social Security Administration (SSA) as Ryan's representative payee for Old Age and Survivor's Disability Insurance (OASDI) benefits to which Ryan was entitled. The Department received Ryan's benefit payments and applied them to partially reimburse itself for the current cost of Ryan's foster care. The circuit court determined that the Department violated Ryan's due process and equal protection rights by failing to notify him before applying his OASDI benefits toward the current costs incurred by the Department on his behalf. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) a local department of social services, acting in the capacity as an institutional representative payee appointed by the SSA, has discretion to apply a CINA foster child's OASDI benefits to reimburse the Department for its costs incurred for the child's current maintenance; but (2) the department must provide notice to the child that the department applied to the SSA and received such benefits on the child's behalf. View "In re Ryan W." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed in the Orphans' Court a petition to obtain legal guardianship of Tracy, her nephew. At the time of the filing of the petition, Tracy's mother (Mother) was deceased and Tracy was living with Petitioner. Also, no legal proceedings had occurred seeking to terminate Tracy's father's (Father) parental rights, nor was Tracy entitled to any disposition from Mother's estate. The court dismissed the petition on the ground that the Orphans' Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Orphans' Court lacks jurisdiction over petitions for guardianship of the person where at least one of the natural parents is alive, parental rights have not been terminated, and no testamentary appointment has been made. View "In re Adoption/Guardianship of Tracy K." on Justia Law

Child spent twenty-seven months in foster care without progress by his parents toward reunification and without consistently active involvement by other relatives. The juvenile court subsequently decided to pursue a plan of adoption by non-relatives. The court's order, which changed the permanency plan to adoption, triggered the filing of a termination of parental rights petition. Mother succeeded on her appeal of the plan change but not on her motion to stay the termination case. Consequently, by the time the court of special appeals ruled in Mother's favor on the plan change, Mother's parental rights had been terminated. At issue on appeal was whether the juvenile court erred in terminating Mother's parental rights while her appeal of the permanency plan change was pending. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) whether to stay a termination of parental rights case is within the juvenile court's discretion, and in this case, the court did not abuse its discretion because a stay would not have been in Child's best interests; and (2) the court did not err when it took into account Child's attachment to his foster parents in terminating parental rights. View "In re Adoption/Guardianship of Jayden G." on Justia Law

This case arose out of a domestic altercation between Husband and Wife. Wife filed a petition for protection from domestic violence against Husband. The district court issued a final protective order against Husband. Prior to the expiration of the protective order, Wife filed a motion to extend the order. Two days after the expiration of the protective order, the district court scheduled a hearing on the motion. After the hearing, the district court extended the protective order. The circuit court affirmed, reasoning that, as long as a motion to extend a protective order is filed during the term of the order, that protective order may be extended even if a hearing on the motion is held after the protective order has expired. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Md. Code Ann. Fam. Law 4-507(a) does not permit a court to extend an expired protective order even when the motion to extend the order was timely filed during the term of the order. View "La Valle v. La Valle" on Justia Law

After various reports of neglect by their mother, the juvenile court determined two sisters to be children in need of assistance (CINA) and placed them in foster care pending implementation of a plan for their permanent placement. After the girls had been in foster care for nearly a year, the court of special appeals reversed the CINA designation of the younger sister and the foster care placement of both girls due to the insufficiency of the juvenile court's factual findings. The juvenile court subsequently again determined the younger sister was a CINA. The juvenile court then again took up the matter of deciding on a plan for the girls' permanent placement. In so doing, the court considered the girls' positive experiences with their foster parent and their mother's failure to cooperate with court orders and social workers. As a result, the court approved a change of the permanency plan from reunification with the mother to adoption for both girls. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the juvenile court, in deciding to approve a permanency plan of adoption, properly regarded all the relevant circumstances and facts before it in reaching a decision that was in the children's best interests. View "In re Ashley S." on Justia Law

This case involved the adoption of a minor child, Sean, by his stepfather. William, the putative father of Sean, filed an objection to the stepparent adoption one day after the expiration of the thirty-day deadline provided by the show cause order issued by the circuit court. The trial court granted Stepfather's motion to strike William's untimely objection and directed that the adoption proceed as an uncontested matter, noting that William did not allege any circumstance to excuse his failure to timely file his objection. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) William's failure to file a timely objection constituted an irrevocable consent to the adoption of Sean; and (2) the deemed consent statutory scheme of the Maryland Family Law Article and the Maryland Rules does not offend due process. View "In re Adoption of Sean M." on Justia Law