Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the divorce judgment entered by the district court, holding that district court did not err in its property distribution between the parties.On appeal, Dorothy Lovell argued (1) the district court erred when it determined that Paul Lovell was not judicially estopped from arguing that a retirement account was marital property, despite a contrary provision in a previous divorce judgment; (2) she received insufficient notice of the district court's intention to reevaluation the distribution of the entire marital estate; and (3) the district court committed obvious error when it determined that part of the retirement account was marital property. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the doctrine of judicial estoppel did not apply here; (2) Dorothy's due process argument was waived; and (3) the district court did not err in its property distribution. View "Lovell v. Lovell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court entering a protection form abuse order against Mark Forino and in favor of Forino and Pat Doe's two children after a hearing on Doe's complaint for protection from abuse, holding that the district court did not err.On appeal, Forino argued that the district court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss Doe's complaint on res judicata grounds and his motion in limine to exclude evidence relating to allegations in Doe's previous complaint against him for protection from abuse. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed after emphasizing the need for caution in applying res judicata in cases regarding family matters, holding that res judicata did not bar Doe's second complaint. View "Doe v. Forino" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court awarding almost $400,000 in this action to enforce a divorce judgment, holding that the trial court's factual findings were supported by competent evidence.In 2018, Frances Quirk filed a motion to enforce her divorce judgment from 1973. Quirk alleged that John Quirk, her ex-husband, was obligated to pay her forty-five dollars weekly in spousal support and owed her $97,875 in arrears. John asserted laches as an affirmative defense. The court awarded Frances spousal support, interest, and attorney fees, finding that John had not made payments since 1977, that Frances had not pursued the payments because of John's threatening behavior, and that John had not been prejudiced by Frances's delay in enforcing the obligation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) John's laches defense failed; (2) the court did not abuse its discretion by awarding the full amount of post-judgment interest to Frances; (3) the statutory presumption of satisfaction was overcome in this case; and (4) the court did not abuse its discretion by awarding Frances all of her attorney fees. View "Quirk v. Quirk" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the district court granting Pat Doe a protection from abuse order against Appellant on behalf of Doe's two minor children, holding that the district court erred as a matter of fact and law by finding that Appellant committed abuse within the meaning of Me. Rev. Stat. 19-A, 4002.Doe filed a complaint for protection from abuse on behalf of his two minor children against Appellant, the children's maternal grandmother. The court issued a protection order prohibiting Appellant from having any contact with the children after determining that Appellant's actions in taking the children to Arizona and keeping them there after their mother's death constituted abuse within the meaning of the protection from abuse statute. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding that, on this record, there was insufficient evidence to support the court's finding that Appellant knowingly restricted the children's movement without consent or lawful authority to do so. View "Doe v. Batie" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment entered by the district court terminating Mother's parental rights to three of her children, holding that the court did not clearly err in finding at least one ground of parental unfitness by clear and convincing and did not abuse its discretion in concluding that termination was in the children's best interests.The district court terminated Mother's parental rights to three of her children pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055(1)(A)(1)(a), (B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(iv). The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the express findings the court made were sufficient to support its determination to terminate Mother's parental rights. View "In re Children of Loretta M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the probate court terminating the parental rights of Parents in anticipation of adoption pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 18-A, 9-204, holding that the court did not err or exceed the bounds of its discretion.The child's maternal aunt and uncle - the child's legal guardians - petitioned to terminate Parents' parental rights and for adoption of the child. After a hearing, the court entered judgment terminating both Parents' parental rights, finding that both parents abandoned the child and that termination of Parents' parental rights was in the child's best interest. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the court's findings that Parents were unfit to parent the child were supported by competent evidence. View "Adoption by Jessica M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the portion of the judgment of divorce denying Sarah Teske's request to change her name and otherwise affirmed the judgment, holding that the court's rationale for denying the name change was erroneous.Tegan Teske filed a complaint for divorce from Sarah. Sarah filed an answer and counterclaim but did not request that the court change her name. Before a final hearing, each party submitted a proposed judgment to the court. Sarah's proposed judgment included a provision changing her name to her former name, Sarah Chagnon. The court subsequently entered a divorce judgment that did not change Sarah's name. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded with instructions to amend the judgment to provide that Sarah Teske's name be changed to Sarah Chagnon, holding that the trial court erred in not granting Sarah's request to change her name to her former name. View "Teske v. Teske" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the juvenile court placing A.I. in the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services, holding that the juvenile court correctly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard when it determined whether to place A.I. in the custody of the Department.On appeal, Mother argued that the matter should be remanded to the juvenile court so that findings can be addressed under a clear and convincing standard rather than a preponderance of the evidence standard. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding that A.I.'s dispositional hearing fell on the less-intrusive end of the continuum and that the juvenile court did not err when it applied the preponderance of the evidence standard in the proceedings below. View "State v. A.I." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Mother's parental rights to her child, holding that the record contained sufficient evidence for the trial court to find by clear and convincing evidence that Mother was unfit and that termination was in the best interest of the child.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the district court's findings as they relied to Mother's unfitness were supported by the evidentiary record, such as evidence regarding Mother's inability to remain child-focused and her longstanding health issues; and (2) there was neither error nor abuse of discretion in the district court's determination that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest. View "In re Child of Louise G." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Father's parental rights to his two children, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that Father was parentally unfit and that the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that termination was in the best interests of the children.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the record contained sufficient evidence for the trial court to find by clear and convincing evidence that Father was unable or unwilling to protect the children from jeopardy or take responsibility for the children within a time reasonably calculated to meet the children's needs or in finding that Father failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the children and was therefore unfit to parent the children; and (2) the record contained sufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude that termination was in the children's best interests. View "In re Children of Jason C." on Justia Law