Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Father's parental rights to his children pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii), holding that the court did not impermissibly consider Father's incarceration in reaching its parental unfitness determination and that Father failed properly to raise his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the termination hearing.Specifically, the Court held (1) the lower court's findings were supported by competent record evidence and, given these findings, the court did not err in finding that Father was unfit; and (2) because Father raised his ineffective representation claim on direct appeal without submitting an affidavit, Father's ineffective representation claim must be denied. View "In re Children of Matthew G." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Mother's parental rights to her child pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055(1)(A)(1)(a), (1)(B)(2)(a)-(b)(i), holding that there was no clear error or abuse of discretion in the court's findings or analysis.On appeal, Mother argued that the court erred in finding by clear and convincing evidence that she was an unfit parent after determining that she would be unable to protect the child from jeopardy within the statutorily-required timeframe. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding that the trial court's conclusion that the child had waited long enough for permanency was well supported by the record. View "In re Child of Amey W." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Father's parental rights to his child pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(ii), holding that the court did not err or abuse its discretion by concluding that terminating Father's parental rights was in the child's best interest.The district court based its best interest determination primarily on the child's need for permanency. On appeal, Father did not challenge the court's factual findings or its determination of parental unfitness. Instead, Father asserted only that the court erred by concluding that termination of his parental rights was in the child's best interest. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the court did not err or abuse its discretion by concluding that terminating Father's parental rights was in the child's best interest. View "In re Child of Scott L." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Mother's parental rights to her child, holding that the court did not err in determining that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the best interest of her child.After a termination hearing, the court determined that the child's best interest would be served through the permanency plan of adoption. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that, given the strength of the record, particularly the length of time the child had been in kinship care and Mother's consistent and demonstrated inability to provide a safe and stable home for the child, the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest. View "In re Child of Shannon S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Mother's and Father's parental rights to their child, holding that the record contained competent evidence to support the court's findings, by clear and convincing evidence, of both parents' parental unfitness.Specifically, the Court held (1) the court's findings of unfitness were supported by competent record evidence; and (2) the court did not violate Mother's due process rights by denying her motion to continue and then commencing the termination hearing in her absence with the knowledge that she had been arrested, as Mother failed to show that she was prejudiced by her partial absence. View "In re Child of Raul R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father to their child, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.On appeal, Mother argued that the district court erred in denying her motion for relief from the termination judgment, in which she alleged that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. Father argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the termination of his parental rights. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mother's motion for relief from the termination of her parental rights; and (2) there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the court's termination of Father's parental rights. View "In re Child of Dawn B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court modifying certain provisions of the parties' divorce judgment relating to parental rights and responsibilities, holding that any judicial error was harmless.On appeal, Appellant argued that the district court erred by admitting into evidence a report submitted by the guardian ad litem (GAL) after the court had excused the GAL from being present during the hearing. Specifically, Appellant argued that he was prevented him from cross-examining the GAL about her report. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that, assuming that Appellant was entitled to challenge the admission of the GAL report despite his failure to object, it was highly probable that the admission into evidence of the report did not prejudice Appellant or materially contribute to the court's ultimate determination. View "Banks v. Leary" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated in part the judgment of the district court granting Mark Klein a divorce from Jessica Demers, setting parental rights and responsibilities between them as to their minor child and denying Mark's motion for further findings of fact, holding that the court's judgment did not contain adequate factual findings to support its conclusions.Specifically, the Court held (1) the court's judgment did not contain the express factual findings that were necessary to support its conclusion that allocation of final decision-making authority to Demers and limitations on Klein's contact was in the best interest of the child; and (2) therefore, the court abused its discretion by denying Klein's motion for further findings of fact. View "Klein v. Klein" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellant's complaint seeking to be determined a de facto parent of Appellee's adopted child, holding that the district court erred in dismissing this case for lack of standing.The district court dismissed Appellant's complaint for lack of standing. On appeal, Appellant argued that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to hold a hearing to determine disputed facts and in concluding that Appellee's refusal to allow Appellant to adopt the child was dispositive of the issue of whether Appellee acknowledged or behaved as though Appellant was a parent to the child. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case, holding that the court's treatment of the single fact of Appellee's refusal to allow Appellant to adopt as dispositive in the standing analysis constituted an error of law, and the court should have held a hearing to determine disputed facts regarding the issue of standing. View "Young v. King" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Mother's parental rights to her child, holding that Mother had a right to the effective assistance of counsel at the proceeding where she consented to the termination of her parental rights and that Mother received effective assistance when she voluntarily gave her consent.At a hearing, Mother advised the court that she had decided to consent to a termination of her parental rights. Satisfied that Mother's decision was knowing and voluntary, the court ordered that Mother's parental rights be terminated. Mother later filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 59, arguing that her consent was involuntary and that she had received ineffective assistance of counsel in giving consent. The court denied Mother's request to set aside her consent. Mother also filed a Me. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) motion for relief from the termination judgment based on counsel's alleged ineffective assistance. The court denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the court did not clearly err in finding that Mother voluntarily consented to a termination of her parental rights or in denying the Rule 60(b)(6) motion for relief without holding a second evidentiary hearing. View "In re Child of Rebecca J." on Justia Law