Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The parties were married in October 1996, and John A. Jewell Sr. filed for divorce in February 2018. The divorce judgment, entered in March 2019, required Jewell to pay Carol L. Brewer $2,000 per month in spousal support indefinitely. Jewell was found to have an earning capacity of $80,000, while Brewer was deemed fully disabled with no formal education or training. Jewell later moved to modify the spousal support, citing decreased earning capacity and Brewer’s cohabitation, but his motion was denied in June 2021. Jewell appealed, but the denial was upheld.In December 2022, Jewell filed another motion to modify the spousal support, again alleging Brewer’s cohabitation. The District Court (Bangor, Szylvian, J.) held a hearing in August 2023 and found that Jewell’s income had decreased to $52,000 per year and that Brewer had the capacity to work, despite her disability claims. The court terminated Jewell’s spousal support obligation but required him to pay $500 per month towards arrearages and attorney fees.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that there was no evidentiary support for the District Court’s finding that Brewer had the capacity to earn income. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for the District Court to reevaluate whether there has been a substantial change in circumstances since the most recent judgment. If such a change is found, the court must then determine whether to modify the spousal support based on the new findings. View "Jewell v. Brewer" on Justia Law

Gregory R. Flagg filed for divorce from Shauna K. Bartlett in 2012, resulting in a settlement agreement that included shared parental rights and responsibilities, with a child support order requiring Flagg to pay $81 weekly. In 2021, Bartlett moved to modify the child support order, and Flagg cross-moved to modify the divorce judgment and child support order, citing substantial changes in circumstances. The District Court initially granted Flagg's motion, determining that Bartlett did not provide substantially equal care and awarded primary residence to Flagg without child support. Bartlett then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment.The District Court later amended its judgment, granting Bartlett's motion to modify child support and denying Flagg's cross-motion. The court found that although Flagg provided more care, the level of care had not significantly changed since the original agreement. The court concluded that the care provided by both parents was substantially equal and modified Flagg's child support obligation to $185 weekly. Flagg appealed, arguing that the court erred in determining that the parties provided substantially equal care.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that the District Court had abused its discretion by failing to properly assess whether the parties provided substantially equal care for the purpose of determining child support. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the amended judgment, the amended child support order, and the order denying Flagg's motions for findings of fact and conclusions of law. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the parties are providing substantially equal care and to make consistent findings of fact and conclusions of law. View "Flagg v. Bartlett" on Justia Law

The case involves a divorce judgment from the District Court in Biddeford, where the court disposed of the marital property and awarded Cynthia (Pray) Wood McKenna $8,400 per month in general spousal support for life. Thomas Pray appealed, arguing that the court double-counted the value of trucks used in his pest-control business, failed to account for the value of the business attributable to his personal goodwill, engaged in improper "double dipping" by relying on his income from the business to determine both the value of the business and the amount of spousal support, failed to consider all relevant spousal support factors, and abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Wood McKenna.The District Court awarded Wood McKenna the marital residence, several IRAs, bank accounts, and personal property, while Pray received an IRA, credit union accounts, the pest-control business, and trucks. To equalize the property division, Pray was ordered to pay Wood McKenna $288,150. The court also awarded Wood McKenna spousal support based on several statutory factors, including the length of the marriage, disparity in earnings, age difference, and her health condition. Pray filed a motion for further findings of fact and conclusions of law, which the court denied without altering its findings.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that the District Court erred in double-counting the trucks' value in the property allocation and in making insufficient findings to explain the spousal support award. The court vacated the property disposition and spousal support award and remanded for further consideration. The court dismissed Pray's appeal regarding attorney fees as not ripe for review. The court held that the lower court must reconsider its calculations and any effect on the division of marital property, and make specific findings regarding Pray's income and the income potential from the assets awarded to Wood McKenna. View "McKenna v. Pray" on Justia Law

In this case, a couple, Joseph R. and his wife, sought to adopt the wife's two minor children and terminate the parental rights of the children's biological father. The mother had been granted sole parental rights and responsibilities in a 2016 divorce judgment, and the biological father, who resides in Scotland, had not had contact with the children or the mother since the divorce. The couple married in 2017 and filed their petitions for adoption, change of name, and termination of parental rights in the York County Probate Court in April 2023.The York County Probate Court dismissed the couple's petitions, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to recent legislative changes. Specifically, the court cited the enactment of 19-A M.R.S. § 1658(1-A) in 2021, which it interpreted as giving exclusive jurisdiction to the District Court in cases involving one parent's attempt to terminate another parent's parental rights to a minor child. The couple appealed this decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court disagreed with the lower court's interpretation of the statute. The court noted that the Probate Court has exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for adoption and termination of parental rights proceedings brought pursuant to section 9-204. The court found that the language in section 1658(1-A) does not divest the Probate Court of subject matter jurisdiction in this matter. The court further examined the legislative history of section 1658 and concluded that section 1658(1-A) applies only to termination petitions brought pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 1658 and does not divest the Probate Court of its subject matter jurisdiction over termination petitions filed in conjunction with adoption proceedings under 18-C M.R.S. § 9-103. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Adoption by Joseph R." on Justia Law

Jamie Pacheco filed a divorce case against her then-husband, Kevin Pacheco, in 2015. She was represented by Jeffrey Bennett, Esq., and his firm, Legal-Ease, LLC, P.A. During the divorce proceedings, Bennett voluntarily produced to Kevin's counsel, Libby, O’Brien, Kingsley, and Champion, LLC, the complete counseling session notes of Jamie’s therapist, Sandra Falsey, with one redacted line. Libby later subpoenaed Falsey without notifying Bennett and obtained her complete counseling records related to Jamie, including the unredacted therapy notes. After the divorce proceedings concluded, Jamie, still represented by Bennett, filed an action against Libby asserting claims of abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) based on Libby obtaining Falsey’s unredacted therapy notes and disclosing them to Kevin.The Superior Court (Androscoggin County, Stewart, J.) had previously granted a motion to dismiss Jamie’s tort complaint. However, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court partially vacated the dismissal, leaving Jamie’s claims of abuse of process and IIED in dispute. Later, Libby filed a motion to disqualify Bennett, asserting that Bennett’s continued representation of Jamie would violate Maine Rule of Professional Conduct 3.7 and prejudice Libby. The Superior Court granted Libby’s motion, finding that Bennett is likely to be a necessary witness on several topics related to the case.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Bennett's actions or inactions in the treatment and disclosure of Jamie’s psychotherapy records were central to Jamie’s case, and Bennett alone had this knowledge, making his testimony relevant, material, and unobtainable from other sources. The court also found that there were sound bases in the record for the lower court’s conclusion that there would be actual prejudice in allowing Bennett to continue representing Jamie. View "Pacheco v. Libby, O'Brien, Kingsley and Champion, LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Jessica A. Williams, who was convicted for depraved indifference murder of her son, Maddox Williams. Maddox was born to Jessica and his father in 2018, and lived with Jessica after his father's arrest in 2020. From October to December 2020, Maddox occasionally had bruises on his body when he came from Jessica's care. In March 2021, Jessica assumed sole custody of Maddox. During her custody, Maddox had multiple injuries, which Jessica attributed to his clumsiness. In June 2021, Maddox was taken to the hospital where he lost consciousness and was pronounced dead. Jessica did not appear to react strongly to Maddox’s death and left the ER shortly after his death. She was later arrested by the police.The trial court had previously heard the case, where the State sought to introduce evidence of prior bad acts by Jessica. Over Jessica's objection, the court granted the motion. At the close of the evidence, Jessica moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the court denied. The jury subsequently returned a verdict of guilty and Jessica was sentenced to forty-seven years in the Department of Corrections.In the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, Jessica appealed her conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting evidence related to a prior bad act, admitting evidence regarding her lack of communication with police officers, and denying her motion for a judgment of acquittal. She also argued that the cumulative effect of all three issues constituted a violation of her due process rights. The court disagreed with her contentions and affirmed the judgment. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant, Barni A., appealed against an order from the District Court in Lewiston, Maine, terminating her parental rights to her older child. The child was born prematurely with a genetic abnormality that led to several medical issues, including tumors on his brain, leading to seizures and affecting his executive functioning, vision, and visual processing. The child qualified for 24/7 private nursing care under Maine's Medicaid program, MaineCare, but never received it. Barni A. argued that the State of Maine's failure to provide the child with the required care resulted in the trial court erroneously finding her unfit because she could not address her child's complicated medical needs.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court agreed with Barni A., stating that the trial court's findings did not address important issues that needed to be answered before determining whether the record supports a finding by clear and convincing evidence that she is unfit. The court noted that the child's right to full-time private nursing care under federal and state law had not been provided by the Department of Health and Human Services, and this failure affected the mother's ability to care for the child. The court further explained that while the mother had made significant progress in dealing with her personal challenges, her visitation time with the child was substantially limited, and she was never afforded the assistance necessary to care for her child.The court therefore vacated the judgment and remanded the matter to the trial court, instructing it to consider whether the mother has an intellectual disability, whether the mother is or would be unfit regardless of the Department's failure to meet its MaineCare obligation regarding skilled nursing care, and whether there is an alternative to termination of the mother's parental rights that meets the best interest of the child. View "In re Child of Barni A." on Justia Law

In this case, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed a dispute between Heather Keep and Christopher Indorf regarding the division of real estate they owned jointly. Keep and Indorf were unmarried domestic partners who had one child together. They purchased a house in Saco together, with Indorf contributing the down payment and both parties being liable for the mortgage. When their relationship ended, Keep moved out and Indorf assumed sole responsibility for the house. Keep filed a complaint for equitable partition in 2019. During the litigation process, the parties reached a partial settlement agreement, which was placed on the record during a judicial settlement conference. The agreement stated that for the valuation and division of any expenses associated with the home, they would use the date of May 1st, when Indorf had fully assumed all responsibility for the residence.The District Court (Biddeford, Tice, J.) eventually entered a partition judgment, setting aside the partial settlement agreement and dividing the real estate. Indorf appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion by setting aside the settlement agreement.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court agreed with Indorf. It found that the parties had entered into an enforceable agreement, which the lower court could not simply disregard because it appeared unfair in light of subsequent events. The supreme court held that the agreement was ambiguous and remanded the case back to the District Court to determine the meaning of the agreement and to divide the property accordingly. The supreme court also dismissed Keep's cross-appeal as untimely. View "Keep v. Indorf" on Justia Law

Patrick S. White appealed a judgment from the District Court in Lewiston, Maine, which determined parental rights and responsibilities concerning his minor child with Darcy L. Howard. The main issue on appeal was whether the court erred by including the cost of White's employer-provided health insurance in his gross income when calculating his child support obligation. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court agreed with White that this inclusion was erroneous.The court explained that under Maine law, gross income for child support calculations includes in-kind payments received by a parent if they reduce the parent's personal living expenses. However, the court clarified that the burden is on the party seeking to include the value of such a benefit to prove that it actually reduces the other parent's personal living expenses and the amount of that reduction. In this case, Howard did not provide evidence showing that White's receipt of health insurance from his employer reduced his personal living expenses by the full cost of the insurance to his employer. The court concluded that it is the value to the employee, not the cost to the employer, that matters for purposes of determining gross income for child support calculations.As a result, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to recalculate White's child support obligation based on his gross income without the inclusion of his employer's cost of providing health insurance. View "Howard v. White" on Justia Law

In the case before the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, George E. Gooley appealed and Danielle L. Fradette cross-appealed from the District Court’s judgments on their post-divorce and post-trial motions. The court held that the specific provisions concerning parent-child contact and the computation of Gooley’s income, the determination of Gooley’s imputed income, and the award of Fradette’s attorney fees could not be meaningfully reviewed without clear and specific findings. Therefore, those parts of the judgment were vacated and sent back to the lower court for further findings.The couple had divorced and had two minor children. There were several modifications to the divorce judgment, most notably in relation to the children's contact schedule with each parent. Later, Gooley filed a motion for contempt, alleging that Fradette was not following the contact schedule set by the court. Fradette filed a motion for post-judgment relief, requesting modifications to parental rights and responsibilities and asking for attorney fees. Fradette later amended her motion to add her decision to move from Maine to Massachusetts as a basis for modification. The court approved the amendment and held a four-day hearing on the parties’ post-judgment motions.The court found that Fradette met her burden of demonstrating that there had been a substantial change in circumstances due to her plan to relocate to Massachusetts, and granted her motion for post-judgment relief in part. The court awarded Fradette primary residency of the children and the right of final decision-making for the children’s education, and awarded the parties shared parental rights and responsibilities in all other respects. Gooley was awarded contact with the children on specific weekends and Wednesday evenings. The court also ordered Gooley to pay Fradette attorney fees of $30,000.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgments in part but vacated the portions of the judgment related to parent-child contact, computation of Gooley’s income, determination of Gooley’s imputed income, and the award of Fradette’s attorney fees. The court remanded the case for further findings on these matters. View "Gooley v. Fradette" on Justia Law