Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Sharon and Nathan Weston divorced in 2005 pursuant to a divorce decree stating that Nathan would provide child support for the couple's adult disabled son, Alex, as long as Alex was unemancipated, which was defined as domiciled with Sharon and "principally dependent upon Sharon for support." In 2008, Alex and Sharon began participating in a program that provided Sharon about $30,000 annually. The district court granted Nathan's subsequent motion to modify child support, concluding that Alex was emancipated pursuant to the terms of the divorce decree because Alex was financially supported by the state and the Social Security Administration. The Supreme Court vacated the order terminating Nathan's child support obligation, holding that notwithstanding the government benefits he received, Alex was principally dependent on Sharon's financial contribution, and therefore, Alex was not emancipated.

R.M. appealed from a judgment entered in the probate court denying his petition to establish his parental rights to Tobias D. and granting the petition of the child's current guardians to terminate R.M.'s parental rights to the child. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the probate court and remanded the matter for entry of an order requiring DNA testing, as the child's actual parentage was not resolved. If, as the probate court assumed, R.M. was the child's biological father, the probate court would need to decide R.M.'s petition to establish parental rights and the guardians' petition to terminate R.M.'s parental rights in accordance with this opinion.

Wife and Husband divorced pursuant to a judgment entered in April 2009. The trial court subsequently granted Wife's motion to modify and motion for contempt. Husband appealed, arguing that the court erred when it (1) modified the divorce judgment to order Husband to continue making payments toward the mortgage on the home that had been awarded to Wife, as Wife had unilaterally refinanced the home in her name only, thereby extinguishing the second mortgage for which Husband was responsible; and (2) found Husband in contempt of the divorce judgment when he discontinued making payments to Wife comparable to the payments he was to have made on the second mortgage after Wife refinanced the home. The Supreme Court vacated the portions of the court's order granting Wife's motion to modify and motion for contempt, holding that although Wife's unilateral action in refinancing the property caused the intended distribution of debt in the divorce judgment to be complicated, her action did not absolve Husband of his responsibility for paying an amount equivalent to the principal indebtedness on the now-extinguished second mortgage. Remanded.

April Casale filed a complaint for protection from abuse against her then-husband, Randall Casale, on behalf of herself, her child, and Randall's three minor children. The district court issued a final protection order, specifically prohibiting Randall from having any contact with April and all four children. Thereafter, the divorce court issued a divorce judgment awarding the parties shared parental rights as to their three children and placing residence of the children with April. Randall later moved to modify the protection order. Without holding a hearing, the court issued an amended final protection order prohibiting Randall from having contact with April and the four children but indicating an exception to the no-contact provision to coordinate exchanges for contacts and incidental contact during those exchanges pursuant to the terms of the divorce judgment. April appealed, contending that the court erred in modifying the protection order to allow Randall to have some contact with her without conducting a hearing. The Supreme Court vacated the amended final protection order, holding that the court's decision not to conduct a testimonial hearing on Randall's motion was error. Remanded to the district court for it to conduct the required hearing.

Husband and Wife divorced in 1989 pursuant to a divorce judgment that incorporated an agreement dividing the parties' property. Husband retired from the Air National Guard in 2002 and began collecting his retirement benefits in 2006. In 2010, Wife filed a motion to modify the divorce judgment, requesting that the district court specify the amount of Husband's military pension to which she was entitled. The court granted the motion and awarded a portion of Husband's benefits to Wife after concluding that the provision of the divorce judgment regarding Husband's military pension was ambiguous. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court, holding that the provision awarding Husband his military pension was unambiguous and that Wife's motion to modify was improperly granted. Remanded.

Husband and Wife divorced pursuant to a divorce judgment entered in the district court. The judgment awarded shared primary residence of the parties' two children and ordered Husband to pay child support. Husband appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of two of his expert witnesses and in quashing his subpoena of another witness. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that Husband did not identify that the trial court committed error, as the appeal lacked an adequate record, and Husband did not establish that the trial court showed actual error in the judgment. Remanded for the trial court to address the cost of the appeal, including reasonable attorney fees.

This appeal involved six siblings and their mother. The parties participated in mediation that resulted in an agreement, which, among other things, divided Mother's real property. After disputes arose over the agreement, the probate court ordered arbitration pursuant to the agreement's arbitration clause. The arbitrator concluded that the agreement was enforceable and ordered the transfer of land necessary to effectuate it. Four of the sisters (Appellants) and the remaining siblings and mother (Appellees) then filed a series of motions. The superior court confirmed the arbitration award, denied a motion to vacate the award, denied a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and granted a motion to dismiss a complaint for declaratory judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in affirming the arbitrator's award and in concluding that the arbitrator and that the settlement agreement gave the arbitrator the authority to determine whether the agreement was valid and enforceable.

Raymond Cloutier appealed from a judgment entered in the district court granting Robin Turner's motion to enforce the child support provisions of a 1992 amended divorce judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) Turner had standing to bring the motion even though the children were above the ages of eighteen because, although the obligation to provide future support ends when the child reaches majority, liability for arrearages does not terminate then; (2) where child-support arrearages are considered money judgments and there is no statute of limitations for money judgments, Turner's claim of overdue child support was not time-barred; (3) the court's failure to apply the statute of limitations did not deprive Cloutier of his constitutional right of equal protection because Cloutier was not treated any differently than fathers who are subject to child support enforcement stemming from a paternity action; and (4) Cloutier failed to make the showing necessary to establish the defense of laches.

Laurie Katon was involved in continuing litigation with her daughter and former son-in-law concerning their child, her granddaughter. In the instant case, Katon petitioned for visitation pursuant to the Grandparents Visitation Act. The district court dismissed the petition, concluding that because Katon had improperly withheld her granddaughter from the father, she could not establish standing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition because the urgent reasons that may justify grandparent visitation consistent with constitutional standards do not exist where a grandparent has improperly withheld a grandchild from his or her parents.

After Wife filed a complaint for divorce from Husband, the district court learned that the couple had not obtained a legally enforceable marriage license. Therefore, the court converted the complaint for divorce into a petition to determine parental rights and responsibilities. The court subsequently (1) awarded Wife primary residential care of the children and final decision-making authority in the event the parties disagreed about significant decisions affecting the children and (2) ordered Husband to make weekly child support payments. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in (1) awarding Wife primary residence of the three minor children as that determination was not based upon clearly erroneous findings, (2) allocating final decision-making authority to Wife where the court found that Husband had a history of abuse and that Wife received substantial support in caring for the children, and (3) imputing Husband's earning capacity for the purpose of establishing the child support order partially due to Husband's limited efforts to find employment.