Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff and Defendant were divorced in 2005. In 2008, the parties stipulated to a modification of the divorce judgment. The modified divorce judgment required Defendant to pay Plaintiff weekly spousal and child support and to file a motion to modify his child support obligation within thirty days of becoming employed. Plaintiff later filed a motion for contempt. The district court concluded that Defendant had violated the divorce judgment as modified because he owed past-due child support and because he had failed to move the court to modify his child support obligation after becoming employed. The court then found Defendant in contempt, ordered Defendant to pay Plaintiff's attorney fees and ordered Defendant be incarcerated for sixty days, allowing Defendant to purge himself of contempt by paying the $46,272 he owed within sixty days. The Supreme Court (1) vacated the court's order of coercive imprisonment, holding that Defendant's coercive imprisonment could not be made conditional upon his payment of a sum that included amounts Defendant owed for a compensatory fine and newly imposed attorney fees; and (2) affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "Dostanko v. Dostanko" on Justia Law

The Maine Department of Health and Human Services (Department) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the Mother and Father of two minor children. After a termination hearing, the district court found the Department had made diligent and reasonable efforts to rehabilitate and reunify the family but that termination of parental rights as to both parents was in the best interests of the children. Both parents appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not violate the parents' due process rights by issuing an order terminating their parental rights before receiving their post-trial briefs and by admitting into evidence statements that one of the parents' children made to the court without counsel for the parents being present; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to prove that the parents were unfit and that termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the children. View "In re M.B." on Justia Law

After Stepmother and Father separated, Father's son, Stepmother's stepson (Stepson) continued to live with Stepmother. Stepmother subsequently filed a protection from abuse complaint against Father on behalf of herself, two of her biological children, and Stepson. Stepmother also petitioned for full guardianship of Stepson. Thereafter, Stepmother requested temporary parental rights and responsibilities for Stepson at the protection and abuse hearing. The district court awarded protection to all four petitioners but denied Stepmother's request for temporary parental rights and responsibilities for Stepson. The probate court then awarded Stepmother full guardianship of Stepson. The Supreme Court (1) vacated the portion of the trial court's judgment denying temporary parental rights and responsibilities to Stepmother, holding that the protection from abuse statute permits the court to award temporary parental rights to a stepparent, and the award would not have violated Father's due process rights; and (2) otherwise affirmed. View "Sparks v. Sparks" on Justia Law

Dale and Diane Charette's divorce incorporated a settlement agreement in which the parties agreed that Dale would pay Diane $200 per week as general spousal support. The district court later reduced Dale's spousal support obligation to $165, finding that a reduction was warranted due to Dale's significantly changed medical circumstances. After Dale failed to make several of the reduced payments, the court first granted Diane's motion to enforce and then found Dale to be in contempt for failing to pay support as ordered. Dale, meanwhile, filed a second motion to modify, which the trial court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to further lower Dale's spousal support obligation on the ground that Diane was cohabitating with someone; (2) the court's factual finding that Dale was able to continue paying $165 per week in support was not clearly erroneous; and (3) the court did not err in ordering Dale to pay an additional $400 per month until the arrearage he had accumulated was cleared, as there was ample competent evidence to support the court's finding that Dale had the ability to make the additional payments. View "Charette v. Charette" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defended were divorced pursuant to a judgment that required Defendant to transfer paperwork to Plaintiff, assure that Plaintiff's tractor and snow blower were in working condition, and make property settlement payments to Plaintiff. Subsequently, Plaintiff obtained a final protection from harassment (PFH) order that prohibited Defendant from having any direct or indirect contact with Plaintiff. Some months later, Plaintiff filed a motion for contempt, alleging that Defendant had failed to comply with the divorce judgment. The court concluded that Defendant was not in contempt regarding the property settlement payment, the paperwork, the tractor, or the snow blower because Plaintiff had failed to prove that Defendant could comply with the judgment as to these items without violating the PFH order's no-contact provision. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment insofar as it found that the PFH order prevented compliance with the divorce judgment. Remanded. View "Waltz v. Waltz" on Justia Law

When Mother's child was eleven weeks old, Mother left the infant in the care of her boyfriend. The boyfriend shook the baby and threw it into the couch, resulting in severe injuries to the child. The district court placed the child in the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services, finding that the child was in immediate risk of serious harm due to Mother's inability to protect him from physical abuse. The court subsequently conducted a full testimonial hearing, after which it issued an order finding jeopardy as to Mother and maintaining custody with the Department. The court also ordered the Department to cease reunification efforts with Mother. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court did not err in issuing the cease reunification order. View "In re B.C." on Justia Law

The parents of L.E. appealed from a judgment of the county probate court terminating their parental rights. The mother challenged the sufficiency of the evidence terminating her rights, and both parents argued that the court erred in failing to order attempts at rehabilitation and reunification prior to granting the petition for termination. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the record was sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that both parents were unfit, and that it was in the best interest of L.E. for the court to terminate parental rights and grant the adoption petition. View "In re Adoption of L.E." on Justia Law

The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) appealed from a judgment entered in the district court modifying a child support order of the family law magistrate. DHHS asserted (1) the district court erred in crediting toward Father's support obligation the dependent benefit his daughter received based on his Social Security retirement account, and (2) the magistrate did not abuse her discretion in declining to deviate from the child support guidelines. The Supreme Court agreed and vacated the district court's judgment, holding (1) the district court erred in granting Father credit toward his support obligation based on his daughter's Social Security retirement dependent benefit; and (2) the magistrate acted within the bounds of her discretion in concluding that a deviation was not warranted. Remanded with instructions to reinstate the magistrate's modification order. View "Wong v. Hawk" on Justia Law

Mother appealed from a judgment entered in the district court terminating her parental rights to her son. Mother argued (1) because she was in law enforcement custody on the morning of the trial, the court violated her due process rights by denying her motion to continue the proceedings; and (2) the district court erred in admitting testimony from one of the officers involved in her arrest because he had not been included in the Department of Health and Human Service's witness list; and (3) the court erred in its factual findings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Mother was not deprived of due process; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings or commit clear error in its factual findings. View "In re A.M." on Justia Law

Paul Clark obtained a temporary protection from abuse order on behalf of his thirteen-year-old son against Defendant Michelle Fundalewicz, the child’s mother and Paul’s ex-girlfriend. At the time, the child resided with Paul and Paul’s then-fiancée (now wife), Miranda Clark. The child received a phone call on the home’s landline while Paul or both Paul and Miranda were not home. The child eventually revealed that Defendant had called him earlier that day. Paul reported the incident to the police. The child provided a written statement to the police stating that Defendant did call and speak with him. The State charged Defendant with violation of a protection order; Defendant pled not guilty to the charge and the matter proceeded to a jury-waived trial. At trial, the child testified that it was instead his cousin who called him. He testified that he said it was Defendant in his written statement to police because Paul had told him that if he did not name Defendant, the child would have to move back in with his mother where he would "get treated like crap" as he had been when he lived with her in the past. Miranda testified that a few days after the incident, she spoke with Defendant on the phone, and Defendant admitted to having called and spoken with the child. At the close of the trial, Defendant orally moved for a judgment of acquittal on the grounds that "the State failed to establish a corpus for the offense charged" because the State did not provide "evidence independent of any potentially incriminating statements that [Fundalewicz] . . . made." The court denied the motion, found Defendant guilty of violating the protection order, and sentenced her to pay a $400 fine. Although largely circumstantial, the Supreme Court concluded that the evidence presented at trial, along with the reasonable inferences that could have been drawn from it, adequately supported the corpus delicti requirement, as well as the court’s finding that Defendant did in fact call her son in violation of the protection order. View "Maine v. Fundalewicz" on Justia Law