Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A married couple formed a business, Outkast Environmental, LLC, during their marriage, which was classified as community property. After their divorce was finalized in October 2019, Mr. Reis formed a new company, Outkast Industrial Group, LLC, in February 2020, which operated in a similar field. Disputes arose during the partition of their community property, with Ms. Reis claiming that Outkast Industrial should also be considered community property. She alleged that community funds were used to start the new business and that resources from the original company were diverted to the new entity. There was conflicting testimony regarding the source of funds and use of business assets.The 34th Judicial District Court (St. Bernard Parish) first found that Outkast Industrial was community property, relying on prior appellate decisions that treated new businesses as “substitute corporations” for former community businesses when a spouse transfers value or operations. The Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, affirmed this classification, finding no manifest error in the trial court’s assessment of credibility and the facts surrounding the formation and funding of Outkast Industrial.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and concluded that the lower courts erred by applying the concept of a “substitute corporation,” which the Supreme Court found has no basis in Louisiana law. The Supreme Court held that property classification is fixed at the time of acquisition; since Outkast Industrial was formed after termination of the community regime, it is Mr. Reis’s separate property. The Court distinguished between classification issues and potential claims for mismanagement or breach of fiduciary duty, which may entitle Ms. Reis to other remedies but do not change the classification of the new company. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ rulings and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "REIS VS. REIS" on Justia Law

A biological father filed a petition to establish paternity and seek custody of a minor child born to the mother approximately 100 days after the termination of her marriage. Due to the timing, the child was legally presumed to be the offspring of the former husband. The biological father asserted he had acted as the child’s parent since birth, providing financial support, living with the child, and being named on the birth certificate. The mother challenged his petition by claiming it was time-barred under Louisiana Civil Code article 198, which restricts actions to establish paternity when a presumed father exists to within one year of the child's birth. The presumed father filed a petition to disavow paternity, stating he was not involved with the mother at the relevant time and had no relationship with the child.The Juvenile Court for the Parish of Lafayette held a hearing on the mother's exceptions and ruled that Article 198 was unconstitutional as applied to the facts, finding that its application would sever an existing parental relationship and deprive the child of a father. The court denied the mother's exceptions and ruled the biological father had a right to proceed. The mother sought supervisory review, which the Court of Appeal denied. She then filed a writ application to the Supreme Court of Louisiana.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the constitutionality of Article 198 de novo. It held that, under these particular circumstances, the biological father had established a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parenting his child, and Article 198’s one-year limitation, as applied here, violated his due process rights under both the Louisiana and United States Constitutions. The court affirmed the trial court’s ruling, declaring Article 198 unconstitutional as applied to this case. View "DAVIDSON VS. HARDY" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Kelly O. Orgeron, sought a community property share of $16,949,000 in liquidated damages paid to her ex-husband, Edward J. Orgeron, Jr., upon the termination of his employment as a college football coach in 2021. The liquidated damages were a contractual benefit guaranteed by his employer, Louisiana State University (LSU), effective January 14, 2020, before the defendant filed for divorce on February 26, 2020. The agreements relevant to this case included a Binding Term Sheet, an Employment Agreement, and a Termination Agreement, all of which had provisions regarding liquidated damages upon termination without cause.The trial court did not award the plaintiff a share of the liquidated damages, interpreting the January 2020 Binding Term Sheet as an agreement to agree rather than a binding contract. The Court of Appeal, First Circuit, upheld this decision.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred in its interpretation. The court held that the January 2020 Binding Term Sheet was a binding and enforceable contract, and the subsequent Employment Agreement continued and confirmed the termination-without-cause provisions. Both agreements were effective during the existence of the community property regime between the plaintiff and the defendant, making the liquidated damages a community asset.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the district court's judgment in favor of the defendant and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, awarding her a one-half share of the net liquidated damages, amounting to $8,134,500. View "Orgeron v. Orgeron" on Justia Law

An infant child, G.K., suffered grievous injuries while in the legal custody of the Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) and under the physical care of foster parent Samantha Gafford. Brittany Howe, G.K.'s biological mother, filed a lawsuit individually and as natural tutrix of G.K. against Gafford and DCFS. The plaintiffs alleged that DCFS had a non-delegable duty of care towards G.K. and was liable for the actions of the foster parent.The trial court granted DCFS's motion for summary judgment, agreeing with DCFS's argument that the non-delegable duty was effectively overturned by the case Kunath v. Gafford and that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding Gafford's employment status with DCFS. The Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, affirmed the trial court's decision, reasoning that Louisiana Revised Statute 42:1441.1 prohibited DCFS from being held liable for the actions of foster parents unless the foster parent was an official, officer, or employee of the state.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that DCFS has a non-delegable duty of care and well-being owed to children in its legal custody, which cannot be abrogated by La. R.S. 42:1441.1. The court clarified that this duty is distinct from vicarious liability arising from a master-servant relationship and is an affirmative duty owed by the state. The court concluded that the statute does not apply to the duty of care DCFS owes to children in its custody. Consequently, the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "HOWE VS. GAFFORD" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled in a case involving allegations of child sexual abuse by a Roman Catholic priest. The plaintiffs alleged that the abuse occurred between 1971 and 1979 when they were aged between eight and fourteen. The defendants argued that the claims were subject to the one-year prescriptive period for delictual actions under former La. Civ. Code art. 3536(1).While this case was pending, the legislature amended La. R.S. 9:2800.9 to revive certain prescribed child sex abuse claims for a limited three-year period. However, the court found that the statutory enactment was contrary to the due process protections enshrined in the Louisiana Constitution and must yield to that supreme law. The court reversed and vacated the trial court's decision to the extent it found the statutory enactment to be constitutional.The court determined that once liberative prescription accrues, it becomes an accrued, vested right. It noted that the right to plead prescription in defense to a claim on the obligation itself is "property that cannot be taken from [the defendant]." Hence, when a party acquires the right to plead the defense of accrued prescription, his right becomes a vested property right protected by constitutional due process guarantees.The court concluded that the legislature lacked the authority to revive the prescribed claims set forth under the facts alleged in this case. However, the court remanded the case to the trial court to rule on the exception anew after plaintiffs have had an opportunity to raise any additional arguments regarding contra non valentem and the timeliness of their claims. View "BIENVENU VS. DEFENDANT 1" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the surviving parents of their deceased daughter, brought an action to nullify their daughter’s marriage to defendant, Eden Kol, based upon the allegation that their daughter and defendant entered into the marriage for the sole purpose of evading federal immigration laws to obtain permanent resident status for defendant. Defendant filed an exception of no cause of action, alleging the petition failed to state a cause of action for nullification of marriage under the Louisiana Civil Code. The trial court granted the exception, and the court of appeal affirmed. Finding no reversible error, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Wederstrandt v. Kol" on Justia Law

The putative biological father sought to rebut, pursuant to La. C.C. art. 198, a presumption set forth in La. C.C. art. 185, despite having filed his avowal petition more than one year after the birth of the child and even though no “bad faith” was found on the part of the mother. After years of litigation on preliminary issues, the appellate court reviewed an earlier district court ruling, which found that La. C.C. art. 198 was not unconstitutional, and reversed the district court, concluding Article 198 was unconstitutional as applied. On review, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that under the facts presented here, that the putative biological father had no fundamental constitutional right to parent a child born to a mother, who was married to and living with another man at the time of the child’s conception and birth. Therefore, the Court reversed the appellate court, reinstated the district court judgment holding that La. C.C. art. 198 was constitutional, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Kinnett v. Kinnett" on Justia Law

The decedent Willie Clyde Burns married Silver Ruth Cooper in 1959. The couple lived in Claiborne Parish, Louisiana and had three children. A divorce petition was filed in 1966 in Arkansas, captioned “Sybia Ruth Burns vs. W. C. Burns.” A final judgment of divorce was rendered on August 26, 1966 by the Arkansas court. Willie filed a divorce petition in Claiborne Parish in 1967, and the petition was served on Silver, captioned “W.C. Burns (Col.) vs. Sylvia Ruth Burns.” There was no judgment of final divorce rendered in this case. Silver went on to marry Welcome Boyd in 1968. Willie went on to marry Annie Bradley in 1970. Annie testified at trial that at the start of their marriage she and Willie had no assets and that anything Willie owned at the time of his death was acquired during their marriage. The couple was married for 45 years and had two children. Willie died intestate in 2015. Annie petitioned to open Willie’s succession and appoint an administratrix. Silver filed a Petition in Intervention in which she sought to be named Willie’s surviving spouse as she was never lawfully divorced from him. In support of her position, Silver provided a report by a forensic document examiner who concluded that the signatures on the documents of both divorce proceedings did not belong to Silver. She also testified that she never went by the names Sybia or Sylvia. The trial court granted the petition to intervene, declared the Arkansas divorce invalid, and recognized Silver as the legal wife of Willie at the time of his death. In addition, the trial court found that Annie was a good faith putative spouse based on Annie’s testimony that Willie told her he was divorced. The trial court then said that the estate would be divided according to the formula in Prince v. Hopson, 89 So.2d 128 (La. 1956), allocating one-fourth of the community to the legal spouse, one-fourth to the putative spouse, and the decedent’s one half to his heirs. The Lousiana Supreme Court reversed the trial court's division of the community, finding that as a good faith putative spouse, Annie had an undivided one-half interest in the community. Willie’s five children were to divide equally his undivided one-half interest in the community, subject to Annie’s usufruct. View "Succession of Willie Clyde Burns" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Dejaun Kendrick, individually and on behalf of her minor son, sued the estate of the deceased, Anthony Michael Barre, seeking filiation and child support. The estate filed exceptions of prescription, no cause of action, and no right of action. The trial court granted the exceptions, but the court of appeal reversed. Finding an initial child support claim cannot be brought after the father’s death, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal and reinstated the trial court’s ruling granting the exception of no cause of action. View "Kendrick v. Estate of Michael Barre, et al." on Justia Law

Keith Andrews intervened in the divorce proceedings of Karen and Jarred Kinnett, asserting he was the biological father of Ms. Kinnett’s youngest child. His avowal action was filed eighteen months after the child’s birth. The Louisiana Supreme Court found the avowal action untimely and perempted under Louisiana Civil Code article 198 . The case was remanded for the court of appeal to address Andrews’ remaining constitutional challenge. View "Kinnett v. Kinnett" on Justia Law