Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Cabinet for Health and Family Services filed a motion to hold Renee Ivy in contempt after Ivy fell behind in her child support payments. At the hearing on the motion, Ivy presented evidence that her sole source of income was a federal benefit under the Supplemental Security Income program (SSI). The trial court reduced Ivy's support obligation and held her in contempt for having failed to pay the past due amount. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the contempt finding and the order to pay even reduced child support could not stand because evidence showed Ivy did not have the ability to pay. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court of appeals' decision to the extent that it suggested that a SSI recipient-parent's present inability to pay precludes even the assessment of child support; (2) vacated the existing order and remanded for the family court to determine if the guidelines-based amount would be unjust or inappropriate pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.211(2); and (3) affirmed the holding that a contempt finding was inappropriate here where there was essentially uncontroverted evidence that Ivy's failure to provide child support stemmed only from her inability to do so.

The Family Division of the Jefferson Circuit Court granted a divorce to Saeid and Denise Shafizadeh pursuant to a decree of dissolution, which incorporated an order of custody in which Saeid and Denise agreed to share joint custody of their two minor children. The family court later granted Denise's motion to relocate to Louisiana with the children and entered an order modifying the parenting schedule. Saeid moved the court of appeals for a writ of prohibition and emergency relief, arguing that the family court proceeded outside of its jurisdiction. The court denied the motion, determining that Saeid had failed to meet the threshold requirements for the issuance of a writ, and denied the motion for emergency relief as moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the family court had jurisdiction to entertain Denise's motion, and therefore, the petition for the writ was properly denied.

After Suzanne Anderson and Joseph Johnson divorced, the family court entered an order awarding joint custody of their daughter which stated that timesharing would be on an equal time basis. Anderson subsequently filed a motion to modify the timesharing schedule to allow her to move with the child to Kentucky. The family court denied the motion, determining that it was not in the child's best interests to relocate. Anderson appealed, asking that the case be remanded for specific findings of fact. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that findings of fact are not necessary when the court denies a modification motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court's order, which included no findings of fact to support its conclusion, violated Ky. R. Civ. P. 52.01. Remanded to the family court to make specific findings of fact and separate conclusions of law.

Appellant, a mother of an infant child, appealed a decision denying her petition for a writ of prohibition where she sought the writ to bar appellee from proceeding with the adjudication of an action filed in family court by real party in interest, C.H.E., to determine the paternity of the child. At issue was whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a claim brought under KRS Chapter 406 to establish the paternity of a child born to a married woman and conceived while she maintained sexual relations with her husband. The court held that the allegations of C.H.E.'s pleadings were supported as a preliminary matter by evidence that satisfied the jurisdictional threshold of KRS Chapter 406 and vested him with standing as a putative father under KRS 406.021 with the right to plead and an opportunity to prove that he was the father of the child. The court also held that the trial court was acting within its subject matter jurisdiction and properly denied appellant's motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of appellant's petition for a writ of prohibition.

The parties were divorced in September 2005 by the circuit court which incorporated into the judgment a settlement agreement awarding maintenance to appellee. Appellant's motion to modify the maintenance award in July 2008 was denied by the trial court and appellate court pursuant to Dame v. Dame. At issue was whether the twenty-year-old Dame case should be overruled where the Dame court stated that it had no jurisdiction to modify an agreement fixing a set amount of maintenance to be paid either in a lump sum or in a specific amount over a definite period of time. The court overruled Dame and held that a maintenance award in a fixed amount to be paid over a definite period of time was subject to modification under KRS 403.250(1). Accordingly, the court reversed the denial of appellant's motion to modify the maintenance award and remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.

The decree dissolving the Howards' marriage provided for the joint custody of their minor child, with the Wife serving as primary residential custodian. The decree stated that the Husband was voluntarily unemployed. The trial court divided the parties' marital property and determined which marital debts each party had to pay. Fifteen months after the decree, the Husband filed a motion with the trial court seeking a reduction in his child support obligation because of a change in his material circumstances retroactive to the date of his motion. At the hearing of this motion, the Wife brought her own motions, seeking to have her ex-Husband held in contempt of court for failure to pay some of the marital debts he agreed to in the divorce decree. The court found the Husband in contempt for failing to pay the agreed-to marital debts, and denied his motion to reduce his child support. The Husband appealed all of the trial court's rulings, and the appellate court affirmed them. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision on all issues.