Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Kathy and Curtis Rice were married approximately four months before separating and filing for divorce. While they were separated but still married, Curtis died in a work-related accident. Jackie Griffin, Curtis's mother and the administratrix of his estate, claimed Kathy was barred by Ky. Rev. Stat. 392.090(2) from receiving an interest in Curtis's estate. The statute provides that a spouse who voluntarily leaves the other and "lives in adultery" forfeits his or her right to and interest in the other's estate and property. Based on Griffin's proof at trial that Kathy had sexual intercourse with another man the night prior to Curtis's death, the trial court held that Kathy forfeited her interest in Curtis's estate pursuant to section 392.090(2). The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statutory language "lives in adultery" requires more than a single instance of adultery. View "Griffin v. Rice" on Justia Law

The underlying case here was a divorce action between Appellant John Lee and Jill Stanley. Judge Stephen George of the family court heard the divorce proceedings. Because of Appellant's pattern of litigation, Stanley filed a motion to require Appellant to post a bond prior to any future motions being called. The court agreed and issued an order imposing a bond. Appellant then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition asking the court of appeals (1) to order Judge George to disqualify himself because he had not acted impartially and (2) to disqualify Stanley's counsel and the guardian ad litem because they had engaged in fraudulent activity and nefarious conduct. The court of appeals denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a writ was not an available remedy for Appellant's claims that the trial court was biased against him and that the court erred in refusing to disqualify the guardian ad litem and opposing counsel; and (2) Appellant was not entitled to a writ regarding the bond order because Appellant did not clearly state the relief he was requesting and the grounds for that relief with sufficient specificity. View "Lee v. Family Court (George)" on Justia Law

The family court granted the petition of Appellant, Samantha Daugherty, and issued a domestic violence order (DVO) against Appellee, John Telek, to remain in effect for three years. Telek appealed. The court of appeals held that the family court lost jurisdiction to issue the DVO because it failed to conduct the DVO hearing within fourteen days after the issuance of an emergency protective order as required by Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.740(4). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the family court did not lack jurisdiction to issue the DVO and that it properly followed statutory requirements for the issuance of the DVO. Remanded. View "Daugherty v. Telek" on Justia Law

Appellants Mother and Father were the natural parents of Child. Child was removed from home in 2004 and committed to the custody of the Cabinet for Health and Human Services after an abuse petition was filed. The district court adjudicated that physical abuse and neglect had occurred. Child was returned to his parents' home on certain conditions but was later removed. The district court once again adjudicated that Child had been physically abused. At a termination hearing, the trial court declined to terminate parental rights to the child, finding that the Cabinet had not met its burden of proving that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of Child and that there was no evidence Child would be abused in the future. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the circuit court, holding (1) there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's decision; and (2) in reversing the trial court's decision, the court of appeals improperly substituted its judgment for that of the trial court.

After Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services found Appellee Patrick O'Conner's children in filth, unsanitary living conditions, and misery in Appellee's home, Appellee was indicted by a grand jury for three counts of first-degree criminal abuse. Specifically, the grand jury charged that Appellee intentionally abused his three children, each of which were under the age of twelve at the time, by placing them in a situation that could have caused physical injury or which was cruel confinement or cruel punishment. Appellee was convicted as charged. The court of appeals reversed, declaring there was insufficient evidence to indicate that Appellee's criminal actions were intentional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals did not properly defer to the jury its proper fact-finding role in this case, as the jury had sufficient evidence to reasonably conclude that Appellee was guilty of first-degree criminal abuse. Remanded for reinstatement of the trial order and judgment.

Kathleen and Richard Mitchell divorced in 1990. In 2008, Richard filed a motion to modify spousal maintenance. In 2009, Kathleen filed a motion for attorney fees and costs incurred as a result of defending Richard's motion. On June 30, 2009, the family court entered an order finding there were insufficient grounds to support Richard's motion. The order, however, did not mention Kathleen's motion. On September 16, 2009, the family court granted Kathleen's motion and awarded her $19,161 in attorney fees. The court of appeals reversed, finding that the family court did not have jurisdiction over Kathleen's motion. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that the order denying Richard's motion to modify maintenance did not terminate the family court's jurisdiction as to Kathleen's motion for fees and costs. Remanded.

Father and Mother were awarded joint custody of their two children by the family court. The original divorce decree provided that if either party relocated to a different country or state, the parties would move for an order of modification. The children resided primarily with Mother. When Mother sought to relocate and filed a motion to modify the parents' parenting time, the family court judge ruled that the decree would be modified so the children would live primarily with Father. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the family court's order failed to reflect any consideration of the factors set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 403(2) relating to custody determinations. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed with respect to the inadequacy of the order because of its failure to include written findings in support of its custody determination; (2) concluded that adequate findings were made from the family court bench; but (3) further remanded with specific directions for the entry of a new order that complies with the Court's recent decision in Anderson v. Johnson, which requires that trial court opinions affecting child custody state the court's findings in support of its decision in writing.

The Cabinet for Health and Family Services filed a motion to hold Renee Ivy in contempt after Ivy fell behind in her child support payments. At the hearing on the motion, Ivy presented evidence that her sole source of income was a federal benefit under the Supplemental Security Income program (SSI). The trial court reduced Ivy's support obligation and held her in contempt for having failed to pay the past due amount. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the contempt finding and the order to pay even reduced child support could not stand because evidence showed Ivy did not have the ability to pay. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court of appeals' decision to the extent that it suggested that a SSI recipient-parent's present inability to pay precludes even the assessment of child support; (2) vacated the existing order and remanded for the family court to determine if the guidelines-based amount would be unjust or inappropriate pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.211(2); and (3) affirmed the holding that a contempt finding was inappropriate here where there was essentially uncontroverted evidence that Ivy's failure to provide child support stemmed only from her inability to do so.

The Family Division of the Jefferson Circuit Court granted a divorce to Saeid and Denise Shafizadeh pursuant to a decree of dissolution, which incorporated an order of custody in which Saeid and Denise agreed to share joint custody of their two minor children. The family court later granted Denise's motion to relocate to Louisiana with the children and entered an order modifying the parenting schedule. Saeid moved the court of appeals for a writ of prohibition and emergency relief, arguing that the family court proceeded outside of its jurisdiction. The court denied the motion, determining that Saeid had failed to meet the threshold requirements for the issuance of a writ, and denied the motion for emergency relief as moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the family court had jurisdiction to entertain Denise's motion, and therefore, the petition for the writ was properly denied.

After Suzanne Anderson and Joseph Johnson divorced, the family court entered an order awarding joint custody of their daughter which stated that timesharing would be on an equal time basis. Anderson subsequently filed a motion to modify the timesharing schedule to allow her to move with the child to Kentucky. The family court denied the motion, determining that it was not in the child's best interests to relocate. Anderson appealed, asking that the case be remanded for specific findings of fact. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that findings of fact are not necessary when the court denies a modification motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court's order, which included no findings of fact to support its conclusion, violated Ky. R. Civ. P. 52.01. Remanded to the family court to make specific findings of fact and separate conclusions of law.