Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Wife filed a domestic violence petition against Husband. Following a hearing, the family court entered a domestic violence order (DVO) against Husband, finding by a preponderance of the evidence that acts of domestic violence or abuse had occurred and may occur again. Husband appealed, arguing that the family court erroneously relied on domestic violence “lethality factors” rather than the standard set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.702 and 403.750 when entering the DVO. The court of appeals affirmed the DVO. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the family court adhered to the proper standard and that its reference to lethality factors did not indicate otherwise. View "Pettingill v. Pettingill" on Justia Law

In this divorce action between Michael and Mary Bell, the trial court set the amount of Michael’s monthly child-support obligation by deducting unreimbursed business expenses from Michael’s gross income rather than making an appropriate adjustment in the guideline award as allowed by Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.212. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by deducting Michael’s unreimbursed business expenses from gross income because Michael was not self-employed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in order to deduct unreimbursed business expenses from gross income, a trial court must find the parent is self-employed; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in this case by deviating from the statutory method of determining gross income when calculating child support. Remanded. View "Bell v. Bell" on Justia Law

Appellant and her former husband filed competing domestic violence petitions against each other. Emergency protective orders were entered against each. Shortly after entry of the orders, Judge Larry Thompson recused from both cases. Judge Julie Paxton subsequently dismissed both of the domestic violence orders. Later, Appellant petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus against David Deskins, the circuit court clerk who entered the dismissal of the orders into the record, former Trial Commissioner Fred Hatfield, and Judge Thompson, contending that Judge Thompson was never removed from the case, and therefore, the orders entered by Judge Paxton were void ab initio. The court of appeals denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant was not entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel Deskins to remove the order from the court record; and (2) the petition for writ of mandamus against Judge Thompson and Commissioner Hatfield was properly denied. View "Mischler v. Pike County Family Court (Thompson)" on Justia Law

Mother stipulated that she abused or neglected her children, including thirteen-year-old Kenny. The family court committed Kenny to the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, and Kenny was placed in a therapeutic foster home. After the Cabinet determined that the goal of permanency would be adoption, Father filed a motion to obtain custody of Kenny. The family court denied the motion and subsequently terminated the parental rights of Father. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) Father was entitled to have an independent determination that Kenny was an abused or neglected child as specific to Father’s conduct and not based on Mother’s abuse or neglect; and (2) insufficient evidence supported the family court’s finding that terminating Father’s rights was in Kenny’s best interest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the family court made individualized findings that Father abused or neglected Kenny; (2) the family court’s findings were supported by substantial evidence; and (3) Father failed to show that the family court abused its discretion in terminating his parental rights. View "Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. K.H." on Justia Law

After the mother (“Mother”) of two minor children died, Appellants, Mother’s nephew and his wife, were awarded emergency custody of the children. Appellants subsequently sought permanent custody of the children. The circuit court awarded Appellants custody. The children’s biological father (“Father”) appealed. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment on the grounds that Appellants lacked standing, but the court did not address the issue of Father’s fitness as a parent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellants did in fact have standing to pursue the custody action under the comports of Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.800, et seq. Remanded. View "Coffey v. Wethington" on Justia Law

Father and Mother had one child when they divorced. In its initial custody order, the family court granted the parties joint custody of the child, designated Mother as the primary residential custodian, and set child support and established a visitation schedule. A final decree of dissolution of marriage was entered three months later that incorporated by reference the initial custody order. Twenty-five months after the initial custody order but only twenty-two months after entry of the final judgment awarding joint custody, Father filed a motion to modify child custody so as to grant him sole custody of the child. After a hearing, the family court granted Father sole permanent custody of the child. The court of appeals vacated the trial court's order on the ground that the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to Petrey v. Cain because Father's motion was made less than two years after the entry of the final decree awarding custody and was supported by only one affidavit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that subject matter jurisdiction of this matter was not contingent upon compliance with the affidavit requirement of Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.340. Remanded. View "Masters v. Masters" on Justia Law

When Dorinda and Joseph, the parents of two children, decided to divorce, they entered into a temporary agreement entered by the trial court setting forth terms dealing with the custody and support of the two children. The agreement designated Dorinda as the custodial parent and determined the proportional share of support Joseph would pay to her. Nothing in the agreement took into account the amount of time the children were to spend with each parent. Joseph later filed a motion to modify child support based on the significant amount of time the children spent in his physical custody. The trial court concluded that the current situation remained in the children's best interests and ordered that the child support remain at the amount the parties agreed to in the temporary order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) while the trial court's consideration of parents' visitation or time-sharing arrangement in deciding the amount of child support to be paid is permitted, it is not mandatory; and (2) the trial court's failure to factor time-sharing into its decision in this case was not in error. View "McFelia v. McFelia" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted review of this case to consider how to interpret Kentucky's grandparent-visitation statute consistently with the constitutional principles articulated in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision, Troxel v. Granville, and whether the trial court in this case appropriately interceded to grant the grandmother visitation with the child despite the objection of the child's mother. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's grant, holding (1) a grandparent petitioning for child visitation contrary to the wishes of the child's parent can overcome the presumption that a fit parent is presumed to act in the best interest of the child only with clear and convincing evidence that granting visitation to the grandparent is in the child's best interest; and (2) the trial court here, in granting visitation to the grandmother, relied on pre-Troxel case law that inappropriately placed grandparents on equal footing with parents when determining visitation. Remanded. View "Walker v. Blair" on Justia Law

This case interpreted Ky. Rev. Stat. 620.050, which provides civil and criminal immunity to the reporters of suspected child dependency, neglect, and abuse. On the basis of that immunity, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellants, Norton Hospitals, Neonatal Intensive Care Experts II, and Dr. Ketan Mehta, in a civil suit filed by Brandi Peyton for medical malpractice, negligence, and emotional distress, among other claims. Peyton alleged negligence in generating, interpreting, and reporting toxicology reports that showed Peyton had a high blood alcohol concentration the evening before giving birth to a baby. The court of appeals reversed, opining that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to who initiated the toxicology screening, which, in the court's view, affected the availability of immunity under sections 620.050(1) and 620.050(14). The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) the trial court did not err in finding that there was no issue of material fact as to whether Appellants acted in good faith under Ky. Rev. Stat. 620.030 in reporting the toxicology reports; and (2) Appellants were therefore entitled to immunity under section 620.050(1) as a matter of law. Remanded. View "Norton Hosps., Inc. v. Peyton" on Justia Law

Upon the dissolution of the marriage of Rachel Ford and Keith Perkins, the circuit court determined that money held in an individual retirement account (IRA) maintained by Keith was marital property and ordered the funds to be divided equally between Keith and Rachel. The court of appeals agreed that the IRA was marital property but reversed the circuit court on the issue of allocating the asset between the parties equally, and remanded with instructions to award Keith 100 percent of the IRA. The Supreme Court vacated the part of the circuit court's judgment dividing the asset and the opinion of the court of appeals, as the circuit court failed to make necessary findings of fact prior to dividing the asset under Kan. Rev. Stat. 403.190. View "Ford v. Perkins" on Justia Law