Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Linda Davis and Matthew Davis executed a property settlement agreement prior to their divorce providing that Matthew maintain his life insurance policy and keep Linda as the beneficiary. The decree of dissolution entered by the circuit court failed to incorporate the agreement. The omission went unnoticed until after Matthew died. Prior to his death, Matthew changed the beneficiary on his life insurance policy to Karen Davis, his then-wife. Linda, upon learning of Matthew’s death, filed a proof of claim against his estate, alleging breach of the agreement. Karen, as executrix of Matthew’s estate, denied the claim. Karen then filed this action seeking the policy proceeds. Linda intervened as a third party plaintiff. The circuit court ruled against Linda. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.180(4) essentially voided the agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a settlement agreement involving property division that was not incorporated or referenced in the final decree of dissolution may be enforced through an independent contract action. View "Davis v. Davis" on Justia Law

In the dependency, neglect, and abuse actions and subsequent termination of parental rights (TPR) actions underlying this appeal, the family court held the Cabinet for Health and Family Services in contempt for disregarding the rule requiring a prehearing conference request to accompany the filing of a TPR petition and finding contemptuous a case workers’ failure to file a statutorily required report. The Supreme Court vacated the family court’s ruling and remanded for the family court to explain how it believes the Cabinet committed rule and statutory violations and why that violation should be deemed willful disobedience of the court, holding (1) constitutional protections apply to most criminal contempt proceedings; (2) the procedures employed in this contempt case did not accord with those the United States Supreme Court has indicated are due; and (3) the family court’s contempt findings appear to be unsupported. View "Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. J.M.G." on Justia Law

The Cabinet for Health and Family Services petitioned the family court to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of Mother with respect to her four children. The family court terminated the parental rights of Mother to each child. The court of appeals reversed and vacated the termination orders, concluding that the family court erroneously applied Family Court Rule of Practice and Procedure (FCRPP) 7(1) under the circumstances of this case and that the error was not harmless. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the family court erred in its application of FCRPP 7(1) and that the error was not harmless. View "Commonwealth v. S.H." on Justia Law

Wife filed a domestic violence petition against Husband. Following a hearing, the family court entered a domestic violence order (DVO) against Husband, finding by a preponderance of the evidence that acts of domestic violence or abuse had occurred and may occur again. Husband appealed, arguing that the family court erroneously relied on domestic violence “lethality factors” rather than the standard set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.702 and 403.750 when entering the DVO. The court of appeals affirmed the DVO. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the family court adhered to the proper standard and that its reference to lethality factors did not indicate otherwise. View "Pettingill v. Pettingill" on Justia Law

In this divorce action between Michael and Mary Bell, the trial court set the amount of Michael’s monthly child-support obligation by deducting unreimbursed business expenses from Michael’s gross income rather than making an appropriate adjustment in the guideline award as allowed by Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.212. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by deducting Michael’s unreimbursed business expenses from gross income because Michael was not self-employed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in order to deduct unreimbursed business expenses from gross income, a trial court must find the parent is self-employed; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in this case by deviating from the statutory method of determining gross income when calculating child support. Remanded. View "Bell v. Bell" on Justia Law

Appellant and her former husband filed competing domestic violence petitions against each other. Emergency protective orders were entered against each. Shortly after entry of the orders, Judge Larry Thompson recused from both cases. Judge Julie Paxton subsequently dismissed both of the domestic violence orders. Later, Appellant petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus against David Deskins, the circuit court clerk who entered the dismissal of the orders into the record, former Trial Commissioner Fred Hatfield, and Judge Thompson, contending that Judge Thompson was never removed from the case, and therefore, the orders entered by Judge Paxton were void ab initio. The court of appeals denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant was not entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel Deskins to remove the order from the court record; and (2) the petition for writ of mandamus against Judge Thompson and Commissioner Hatfield was properly denied. View "Mischler v. Pike County Family Court (Thompson)" on Justia Law

Mother stipulated that she abused or neglected her children, including thirteen-year-old Kenny. The family court committed Kenny to the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, and Kenny was placed in a therapeutic foster home. After the Cabinet determined that the goal of permanency would be adoption, Father filed a motion to obtain custody of Kenny. The family court denied the motion and subsequently terminated the parental rights of Father. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) Father was entitled to have an independent determination that Kenny was an abused or neglected child as specific to Father’s conduct and not based on Mother’s abuse or neglect; and (2) insufficient evidence supported the family court’s finding that terminating Father’s rights was in Kenny’s best interest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the family court made individualized findings that Father abused or neglected Kenny; (2) the family court’s findings were supported by substantial evidence; and (3) Father failed to show that the family court abused its discretion in terminating his parental rights. View "Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. K.H." on Justia Law

After the mother (“Mother”) of two minor children died, Appellants, Mother’s nephew and his wife, were awarded emergency custody of the children. Appellants subsequently sought permanent custody of the children. The circuit court awarded Appellants custody. The children’s biological father (“Father”) appealed. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment on the grounds that Appellants lacked standing, but the court did not address the issue of Father’s fitness as a parent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellants did in fact have standing to pursue the custody action under the comports of Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.800, et seq. Remanded. View "Coffey v. Wethington" on Justia Law

Father and Mother had one child when they divorced. In its initial custody order, the family court granted the parties joint custody of the child, designated Mother as the primary residential custodian, and set child support and established a visitation schedule. A final decree of dissolution of marriage was entered three months later that incorporated by reference the initial custody order. Twenty-five months after the initial custody order but only twenty-two months after entry of the final judgment awarding joint custody, Father filed a motion to modify child custody so as to grant him sole custody of the child. After a hearing, the family court granted Father sole permanent custody of the child. The court of appeals vacated the trial court's order on the ground that the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to Petrey v. Cain because Father's motion was made less than two years after the entry of the final decree awarding custody and was supported by only one affidavit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that subject matter jurisdiction of this matter was not contingent upon compliance with the affidavit requirement of Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.340. Remanded. View "Masters v. Masters" on Justia Law

When Dorinda and Joseph, the parents of two children, decided to divorce, they entered into a temporary agreement entered by the trial court setting forth terms dealing with the custody and support of the two children. The agreement designated Dorinda as the custodial parent and determined the proportional share of support Joseph would pay to her. Nothing in the agreement took into account the amount of time the children were to spend with each parent. Joseph later filed a motion to modify child support based on the significant amount of time the children spent in his physical custody. The trial court concluded that the current situation remained in the children's best interests and ordered that the child support remain at the amount the parties agreed to in the temporary order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) while the trial court's consideration of parents' visitation or time-sharing arrangement in deciding the amount of child support to be paid is permitted, it is not mandatory; and (2) the trial court's failure to factor time-sharing into its decision in this case was not in error. View "McFelia v. McFelia" on Justia Law