Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Rebekah McCarty and Kenneth Faried had a daughter together but never married and never cohabitated. McCarty later filed a motion for child support. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court established joint custody and ordered Faried to pay $4,250 a month in child support. The court of appeals, considering the issue a matter of first impression, vacated and remanded the trial court’s award of child support, holding that the amount was arbitrary. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the trial court’s order establishing child support, holding that the order was not arbitrary, unreasonably, erroneous, or an abuse of discretion. View "McCarty v. Faried" on Justia Law

Ian was removed from his mother shortly after his birth, and neither parent was closely involved in Ian’s life. Ian currently resides with Larry Massie, his paternal uncle, and Larry's wife, Christina Massie. Deborah Navy, Ian’s maternal grandmother, instituted a grandparent visitation action. The circuit court denied Deborah’s request for visitation rights. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the circuit court did not consider all of the necessary factors required under Kentucky law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Deborah failed to preserve her argument that the trial court erred in applying the heightened clear and convincing evidence standard under Walker v. Blair; and (2) the trial court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous, nor was its application of those facts to the relevant law. View "Massie v. Navy" on Justia Law

Mother and Father were not married when Mother gave birth to their daughter in 2010. In 2012, Mother filed a motion for child support. After an evidentiary hearing in 2013, the trial court established joint custody and directed Father to pay $4,250 a month in child support. The order made the monthly amount retroactive to 2012 and calculated back child support to be $24,100. The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the trial court’s award of child support, concluding that the trial court abused its discretion by not basing its award on the child’s reasonable needs as set out in the court’s “specific supporting findings” and that some of Mother’s requests for support were speculative. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the circuit court’s orders, holding (1) the Court of Appeals imposed an overly burdensome standard; (2) child support in the amount of $4,250 is reasonable and in the child’s best interest; and (3) the trial court did not err in making the order retroactive. View "McCarty v. Faried" on Justia Law

One year after their son was born with Down Syndrome and other serious health issues Lance Carver filed for divorce from Michelle Carver. The parties settled the division of their property and custody, support and visitation, but neither the decree nor the property settlement agreement stated a specific amount of child support. Michelle later asked the court to set a specific amount according to the statutory guidelines. The Boyd County Domestic Relations Commissioner (DRC) deviated from the guidelines and set Lance’s child support obligation at $60 per month based on his living expenses. The circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the court of appeals’ conclusion that a deviation from the guidelines was appropriate under the facts of this case; but (2) reversed of portion of the opinion holding that the DRC did not abuse her discretion in setting Lance’s child support at $60 per month based on Lance’s living expenses, as the trial court should first ascertain what is a reasonable amount of support for the child and then determine how much of that support should be the responsibility of each parent. Remanded. View "Carver v. Carver" on Justia Law

Amy and Melissa, a same-sex couple, had a child together through artificial insemination. After the couple separated, Melissa married Wesley. Wesley filed a petition for step-parent adoption of the child in the Kenton County Family Court. Amy, in turn, filed a petition for shared custody and visitation in Hamilton County, Ohio. Amy moved to intervene in the Kenton County case and moved to have the adoption action dismissed in light of her pending custody petition. The trial court granted the motion to intervene and dismissed the adoption action. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Amy did not have standing to seek adoption. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court’s decision granting Amy’s motion to intervene in the step-parent adoption proceeding was not clearly erroneous. View "A.H. v. W.R.L." on Justia Law

Linda Davis and Matthew Davis executed a property settlement agreement prior to their divorce providing that Matthew maintain his life insurance policy and keep Linda as the beneficiary. The decree of dissolution entered by the circuit court failed to incorporate the agreement. The omission went unnoticed until after Matthew died. Prior to his death, Matthew changed the beneficiary on his life insurance policy to Karen Davis, his then-wife. Linda, upon learning of Matthew’s death, filed a proof of claim against his estate, alleging breach of the agreement. Karen, as executrix of Matthew’s estate, denied the claim. Karen then filed this action seeking the policy proceeds. Linda intervened as a third party plaintiff. The circuit court ruled against Linda. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.180(4) essentially voided the agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a settlement agreement involving property division that was not incorporated or referenced in the final decree of dissolution may be enforced through an independent contract action. View "Davis v. Davis" on Justia Law

In the dependency, neglect, and abuse actions and subsequent termination of parental rights (TPR) actions underlying this appeal, the family court held the Cabinet for Health and Family Services in contempt for disregarding the rule requiring a prehearing conference request to accompany the filing of a TPR petition and finding contemptuous a case workers’ failure to file a statutorily required report. The Supreme Court vacated the family court’s ruling and remanded for the family court to explain how it believes the Cabinet committed rule and statutory violations and why that violation should be deemed willful disobedience of the court, holding (1) constitutional protections apply to most criminal contempt proceedings; (2) the procedures employed in this contempt case did not accord with those the United States Supreme Court has indicated are due; and (3) the family court’s contempt findings appear to be unsupported. View "Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. J.M.G." on Justia Law

The Cabinet for Health and Family Services petitioned the family court to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of Mother with respect to her four children. The family court terminated the parental rights of Mother to each child. The court of appeals reversed and vacated the termination orders, concluding that the family court erroneously applied Family Court Rule of Practice and Procedure (FCRPP) 7(1) under the circumstances of this case and that the error was not harmless. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the family court erred in its application of FCRPP 7(1) and that the error was not harmless. View "Commonwealth v. S.H." on Justia Law

Wife filed a domestic violence petition against Husband. Following a hearing, the family court entered a domestic violence order (DVO) against Husband, finding by a preponderance of the evidence that acts of domestic violence or abuse had occurred and may occur again. Husband appealed, arguing that the family court erroneously relied on domestic violence “lethality factors” rather than the standard set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.702 and 403.750 when entering the DVO. The court of appeals affirmed the DVO. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the family court adhered to the proper standard and that its reference to lethality factors did not indicate otherwise. View "Pettingill v. Pettingill" on Justia Law

In this divorce action between Michael and Mary Bell, the trial court set the amount of Michael’s monthly child-support obligation by deducting unreimbursed business expenses from Michael’s gross income rather than making an appropriate adjustment in the guideline award as allowed by Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.212. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by deducting Michael’s unreimbursed business expenses from gross income because Michael was not self-employed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in order to deduct unreimbursed business expenses from gross income, a trial court must find the parent is self-employed; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in this case by deviating from the statutory method of determining gross income when calculating child support. Remanded. View "Bell v. Bell" on Justia Law