Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the circuit court finding C.B.’s daughter to be a neglected child pursuant to the Kentucky Unified Juvenile Code and reinstated the orders of the circuit court, holding that substantial evidence supported the lower court’s finding of neglect.In reversing, the court of appeals found that the evidence supporting the circuit court’s orders was speculative and did not rise to the preponderance level and that the child could not be found to be neglected because C.B. had never exercised custodial control or supervision over the child. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the General Assembly drafted Ky. Rev. Stat. 600.020(1)(a) with the intention that a parent does not have to be exercising control or supervision in order to be found to have neglected or abused a child; and (2) the lower court’s finding of neglect was supported by substantial evidence. View "Cabinet for Health & Family Services v. C.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court declining to award post-judgment interest pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 360.040 in this action concerning a divorce judgment.Karen and James Samuel Doyle (Sam) were divorced in 1995. In 1998, the circuit court issued a judgment pertaining to reserved issues of child custody, support, and division of property. The judgment was silent as to interest. When Sam did make an equalization payment to Karen as ordered by circuit court, Karen filed a judgment lien against property owned by Sam, plus interest at the legal rate from 1998. In 2012, Sam moved to prohibit the collection of interest. The court granted the motion on the grounds that the 1998 judgment was unliquidated and the judgment was silent as to interest. Karen appealed, and the court of appeals reversed. On remand, the circuit court again denied an award of interest. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the balance of equities favored the statutory award of interest under the circumstances of this case. View "Doyle v. Doyle" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals in this appeal brought by both parties from a judgment in a paternity action. The Court held (1) a paternity action can be brought by a private attorney, and therefore, the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over this case; (2) attorneys’ fees are not recoverable in paternity actions, and therefore, the court of appeals erred in ruling that Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.220 provided a statutory avenue for attorneys’ fees in this case; and (3) the court of appeals properly concluded that a trial court has the discretionary authority to allow credits of “excess” dependent benefits toward pre-petition liabilities, but rather than simply upholding the district court’s allowance of the credit, the case must be remanded for further factual findings and a renewed determination of whether that credit is appropriate. View "Seeger v. Lanham" on Justia Law

In Kentucky, an attorney’s contingent-fee contracts should be considered marital property to be divided as part of the equitable division of the marital estate, and trial courts must apply the delayed-distribution method to determine the actual distribution of funds.Husband had an active law practice in which he had executed contingent-fee contracts with some clients. When Husband and Wife divorced, the trial court treated the contingent-fee contracts as a component of Husband’s income when received and not as property of the marital estate subject to division. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, holding (1) a contingent-fee contract in existence during the marriage does constitute marital property to be divided in a dissolution proceeding; and (2) trial court shall apply the delayed-division method to determine the distribution to the attorney and non-attorney ex-spouses. View "Grasch v. Grasch" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the issuance of a domestic violence order (DVO) and remanded this case for additional proceedings, holding that the trial court’s receipt of extrajudicial evidence was structural error and that the trial court’s use of extrajudicial evidence from an undisclosed source was improper.Plaintiff petitioned the family court for a DVO against Defendant. The trial judge granted the DVO. Defendant appealed, challenging the trial court’s extrajudicial research concerning his criminal record. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court committed error in conducting the extrajudicial investigation but that the error was harmless. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial judge’s undertaking to obtain and use as evidence extrajudicial information relating to a party in the case caused her disqualification from proceeding further as the presiding judge, and her failure to recuse was structural error undermining the integrity of the resulting DVO. View "Marchese v. Abersold" on Justia Law

In 2011, Husband filed a petition for dissolution of his marriage to Wife. The family court entered a decree of dissolution in 2013 that divided the parties’ marital assets, awarded the parties joint custody of their two children, and ordered Husband to pay maintenance to Wife in the amount of $7,300 per month for a period of nine years. The court of appeals reversed in part, finding that the family court erred by including a portion of the children’s living expenses in its calculation of Wife’s maintenance award and by failing to make findings that justified its award of maintenance for a period of nine years. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the family court’s decision to include the children’s living expenses in its calculation of Wife’s reasonable living expenses was neither clearly erroneous nor an abuse of discretion; (2) the family court acted within its discretion in awarding Wife maintenance for nine years; (3) the court of appeals did not err in affirming the family court’s calculation of Husband’s income; and (4) the court of appeals properly found the family court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wife’s request that Husband pay the entirety of her attorney’s fees. View "Weber v. Lambe" on Justia Law

The circuit court entered an amended decree of dissolution dissolving the marriage of Husband and Wife and dividing the marital property. At issue in this appeal was the monthly disability benefits Husband received from the Connecticut State Employees Retirement System. The trial court determined that, because Kentucky was the domicile of both parties at the time of dissolution, Kentucky law governed the classification and distribution of the benefits. The court of appeals reversed after applying the “most significant relationship” test from Sections 258 and 259 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, concluding that Connecticut had the most significant relationship to the asset and that the classification and distribution of those benefits should be determined under Connecticut law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the classification and division of all property in dissolution cases is governed by the law of forum - i.e., Kentucky. View "Kirilenko v. Kirilenko" on Justia Law

The circuit court dissolved the marriage of Husband and Wife and awarded Wife child support, reserving several other issues, including maintenance and property division, for later disposition. After those issues were decided, Husband appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment in its entirety. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not abuse its discretion in determining that the equity in the residence was marital property; and (2) abused its discretion in designating all household goods and furnishings as marital property and ordering those items divided by a random drawing. View "Barber v. Bradley" on Justia Law

Husband petitioned for dissolution of his marriage from Wife. Previous to filing this action, however, Husband was declared incompetent and Wife was appointed as his guardian and conservator. The trial court dismissed Husband’s petition on the basis that a person who has been declared incompetent cannot bring a legal action in Kentucky. The court of appeals affirmed. Both courts relied exclusively on the 1943 case of Johnson v. Johnson. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there is not a Johnson issue in this case because the guardian was not bringing this action as required by Civil Rule 17.03(1); and (2) it necessarily follows that this case was procedurally flawed. View "Riehle v. Riehle" on Justia Law

Pennie and John DuBarry were divorced in 2013. Pennie was represented by Thomas Stone during the divorce proceedings. The family court entered a decree of dissolution incorporating a property settlement agreement. Stone subsequently filed a motion seeking leave to withdraw as counsel for Pennie and a notice of attorney’s lien and intent to hold property liable, listing the marital residence as the property subject to the lien. John, in turn, asked the court to release the lien, arguing that the lien was improper because he had been awarded the marital residence under the settlement agreement. The trial court granted John’s motion and set aside the lien. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the attorney’s fees lien statute does not apply to property assigned or divided in divorce proceedings; but (2) an attorney may obtain a contractual lien through his contract of employment with a client, and that lien may be upheld against assets held by his client after entry of the decree if the employment contract so provides. View "Stone v. Bubarry" on Justia Law