Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals denying Elderserve, Inc.'s petition for a writ of mandamus directing the family court to grant its motion to amend an annulment petition to include a petition for dissolution of the marriage of Charles Brooks and Taylor Toney, holding that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to amend.On Brooks' behalf, Elderserve sought to amend the annulment petition to include a petition for a dissolution of the marriage of Brooks and Toney. In denying the motion to amend, the family court cited the prohibition in Johnson v. Johnson, 170 S.W.2d 889 (Ky. 1943), against guardians initiating an action for divorce on behalf of their wards. Elderserve then sought the writ of mandamus at issue. The court of appeals denied the writ, also relying on the holding in Johnson. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court's denial of the motion to amend the annulment petition was not in error because Johnson was good precedent at the time the court entertained Elderserve's petition; (2) changes to the Kentucky guardianship statutes since Johnson's rendering no longer justify its complete prohibition of guardian-initiated divorces. The opinion then described legal steps a guardian must follow before it can petition for a divorce of its ward. View "Brooks v. Honorable Tara Hagerty" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's petition for grandparent visitation on grounds that Appellant lacked standing to seek formal visitation after the adoption of his grandchild had been finalized, holding that the stepparent exception set forth in Hicks v. Enlow, 764 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1989), should be applied to grandparents under the facts appearing in this matter.Appellant was the paternal grandfather of Child. Child's maternal grandmother petitioned the family court to adopt Child with the consent of Mother, who also consented to the termination of her parental rights. Before the adoption was finalized, Father passed away. Thereafter, the family court granted the adoption petition. Appellant subsequently petitioned the family court for grandparent visitation pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 405.021, the grandparent visitation statute. The family court dismissed the petition, finding that Appellant lacked standing to seek visitation under section 405.021 because his grandparent rights terminated upon finalization of the adoption. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 405.021 does not contemplate the situation at hand; and (2) the public policy considerations of the stepparent exception articulated in Hicks extend equally to an intra-family grandparent adoption, such as the one in this case. View "Blackaby v. Barnes" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the order of the family court in this divorce action, holding that the family court miscalculated the combined monthly income for purposes of setting child support.On appeal, Appellant challenged the family court's classification and division of marital property, calculation of maintenance, and calculation of child support. The court of appeals affirmed the family court's decision in its entirety. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding (1) the family court erred in classifying Appellee's restricted stock units and thus miscalculated the combined monthly income in setting child support; and (2) the family court did not abuse its discretion by not considering Appellee's income as an independent factor for increasing directed maintenance or computing Appellant's reasonable needs. View "Normandin v. Normandin" on Justia Law

In this dependency, abuse, and neglect proceeding, the Supreme Court held that Ky. Rev. Stat. 620.100(1)(b) does not entitle an indigent parent to state-funded expert assistance in dependency, neglect, and abuse (DNA) cases but that, under certain circumstances, parents are entitled to reasonably necessary expert assistance under the due process provisions of the Kentucky and United States Constitutions.The Cabinet for Health and Family Services filed DNA petitions on behalf of Parents' children based on risk of harm. The family court determined that Mother and Father were indigent, but when counsel for both parties requested funds to hire a medical expert the court denied the request. The court then found that Parents' three children were neglected or abused. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that section 620.100(1)(b) grants indigent parents a right to funding for reasonably necessary expert assistance. The Supreme Court reversed insofar as the court's holding relied on Ky. Rev. Stat. 620.100 but affirmed the court's reversal of the family court on constitutional grounds, holding that whether due process requires a court-appointed expert is best left to the judgment of the trial court. The Court remanded the case for new DNA proceedings with instructions for the family court to analyze the need for expert assistance prior to adjudication. View "Commonwealth, Cabinet For Health & Family Services v. K.S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the family court denying Appellant's petition for a writ of prohibition to stay a child custody order entered by the circuit court pending her appeal, holding that the court of appeals correctly held that the extraordinary relief of a writ of prohibition was not warranted.The trial court ordered that Appellant's two minor children relocate from their residence with Appellant in Mississippi to live with their father in Kentucky. In her petition for writ of prohibition, Appellant argued, among other things, that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the relocation order. The court of appeals denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant was not entitled to a first-class writ because the trial court acted within its jurisdiction; and (2) Appellant was not entitled to a second-class writ because Appellant had an opportunity for recourse through her direct appeal. View "Lawson v. Woeste" on Justia Law

In this dispute over a modification of the parenting schedule for two minor children the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision finding that the family court's admission and reliance upon certain statements by the court-appointed Friend-of-Court investigator (FOC) was harmless error, holding that the family court did not commit prejudicial error in admitting and considering the FOC's statements.Father filed a motion for modification of the parenting schedule requesting that he become the primary residential custodian of the parties' two children. At a bench trial, the FOC testified as to her observations and findings from her previous investigation and report. The family court ordered that the children remain living with Mother. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) hearsay statements contained within an FOC's investigative report that do not fall within a recognized hearsay exception are nonetheless admissible as evidence in a domestic custody proceeding where the notice and procedural requirements comply with Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.300(3); and (2) a family court's appointment of an FOC to investigate and generate a report under section 403.300 amounts to a determination that the FOC is sufficiently qualified to offer opinion evidence concerning the fitness of a parent and child's custody arrangements. View "Greene v. Boyd" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals ruling that the family court abused its discretion by granting Father visitation with his child, holding that substantial evidence supported the family court's findings of fact.In a dissolution of marriage action, the family court granted Mother temporary sole custody of the parties' child. Father later filed a motion to modify the established custody order, arguing that it would be in the child's best interest to have visitation with him. The family court judge granted Father's motion to gradually establish visitation. Mother moved the family court to alter, amend, or vacate its order. The family court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the family court did not abuse its discretion by finding that an incremental visitation and reunification plan between Father and the child was in the child's best interest. View "B.S.S. v. K.S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing a portion of an order of the family court that modified the parties' timesharing arrangement and recalculated child support, holding that the court of appeals erred.The family court issued an order modifying the parties' timesharing arrangement and holiday schedule and recalculating child support. The court of appeals affirmed the modification of the holiday scheduled but otherwise reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals as to the issues before the Court, holding (1) the court of appeals incorrectly interpreted and applied Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.270 and Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.320; (2) the family court did not err in modifying the timesharing schedule; and (3) the family court did not err in calculating child support based on the parties' stated salaries and in declining to impute income to Wife for gifts received from her parents. View "Layman v. Bohanon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the family court naming Terry Garvin and Donna Krieger K.R.K.'s de facto custodians and awarding them sole permanent custody, holding that the court of appeals erred in holding that individuals who are members of an unmarried couple cannot both be deemed as a child's de facto custodians.The family court named as K.R.K.'s de facto custodians Terry, K.R.K.'s maternal grandfather, and his long-term girlfriend, Donna, with whom he cohabited, and awarded them sole permanent custody. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the family court erred in naming more than one individual as K.R.K.'s de facto custodian. Specifically, the court held that because Terry and Donna were unmarried, they could not qualify as a single unit for purposes of Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.270. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Terry and Donna were not precluded form being K.R.K.'s de facto custodians simply because they were an unmarried couple. View "Krieger v. Marvin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals vacating and remanding the family court's decision determining that K.S.'s son was a neglected child and terminating K.S.'s parental rights, holding that the family court's decision was supported by clear and convincing evidence.In vacating the family court's judgment terminating the parental rights of K.S. the court of appeals concluded that the evidence was insufficient to prove the child was neglected because K.S. never had the opportunity to parent the child independently where the child had always been committed to the custody of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred to the extent it held there must be actual past or present abuse or neglect for a trial court to make a finding of abuse or neglect because proof of a potential threat of abuse or neglect is sufficient to support such a finding; and (2) the family court's decision to terminate K.S.'s parental rights was supported by the record. View "Commonwealth v. K.S." on Justia Law