Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves the termination of a father's parental rights to his four minor children. The children were adjudicated as children in need of care (CINC) and placed in foster care due to the mother's suspected drug use, the family's unstable living situation, and noncompliance with a medical safety plan for one child's special needs. Over three years, the father relied on the mother as the primary contact with agencies and maintained that she would be the primary caretaker upon reintegration. However, the mother was repeatedly incarcerated, failed drug tests, and submitted falsified documents. The father, although appropriate during visits, was not engaged in the reintegration process and failed to meet the goals of his court-ordered reintegration plan.The Johnson District Court extended the parents' reintegration plans three times without sufficient progress and terminated parental rights after two failed attempts to place the children in Missouri, where the parents had bought a home. The Court of Appeals affirmed the termination decision for both parents. The father petitioned for review, questioning whether the district court properly considered his unfitness separate from the mother's and whether the termination was an abuse of discretion.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and found no error. The court held that the father was unfit by clear and convincing evidence due to his failure to engage in the reintegration process, reliance on the mother despite her issues, and failure to provide a sustainable childcare plan. The court also found that the father's unfitness was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, given the three-year period without significant progress. The court concluded that termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the children, considering their need for permanency and the father's inability to provide a stable and safe environment. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of both the Court of Appeals and the district court. View "In re D.G." on Justia Law

A father, H.S., was in federal custody during a hearing to terminate his parental rights to his child, A.S. He attended the hearing via Zoom, while the hearing was otherwise conducted in person. The father argued that his limited ability to participate in the hearing amounted to a due process violation.The Leavenworth District Court held a permanency hearing and concluded that reintegration was no longer a viable plan for A.S., and that permanent custodianship or adoption was in the child's best interests. Subsequently, the State moved to terminate the parental rights of both parents. During the termination hearing, the father attended remotely but was unable to testify or meaningfully participate. The district court found the father unfit and terminated his parental rights. The father appealed, claiming insufficient evidence and a due process violation. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, rejecting the father's claims.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and focused on the due process claim. The court held that the father's due process rights were violated because he was not given the opportunity to testify, communicate with counsel, or otherwise fully participate in the hearing. The court emphasized that a parent's right to make decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of their child is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found that the risk of erroneous deprivation of this interest was high due to the procedures used, and that the State's interests did not justify the limitations placed on the father's participation.The Kansas Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the district court, and remanded the case for a new termination hearing that ensures the father's due process rights are protected. View "In re A.S." on Justia Law

Carol Sue Burris was convicted of mistreatment of a dependent adult and the second-degree reckless murder of her husband, Michael Burris, who suffered from dementia and other significant health issues. Carol, as Michael's sole caregiver, was found to have neglected his care and prevented others from helping him. Michael subsequently died of pneumonia with severe emaciation as a significant underlying factor.Carol appealed her conviction, arguing that her conviction for reckless but unintentional second-degree murder should be reversed, as it was based solely on a failure of care—that is, on things she did not do rather than affirmative acts she did. Her argument was premised on the idea that she had no duty to act—to provide the care at issue—under these facts.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas affirmed the lower court's decision, stating that Carol owed a clearly defined legal duty of care to her husband, based on their marital relationship, her voluntary assumption of Michael's care, and her role as Michael's sole caregiver under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5417. The prosecutor's comments during closing arguments were found not to be in error, and thus, Carol's convictions were upheld.The court held that a person may be held criminally liable for a failure to act if that person owes a legal duty of care, which can arise out of either common law or legislative enactment. A legal duty of care is imposed at common law when a person is in a special relationship with another, such as marriage, or when a person has voluntarily assumed the care of another and has prevented others from rendering aid. K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5417 imposes a legal duty of care on the primary caregivers of dependent adults. View "State v. Burris" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court ruling that R.R.'s best interests would be served as naming T.R. the legal father, holding that the district court did not misapply the Kansas Parentage Act (KPA), Kan. Stat. Ann. 23-2201 et seq. in this case.Under the KPA, when competing statutory presumptions of parentage exist based on genetics, adoption, and other circumstances, the court is to decide parentage based on the presumption yielding "the weightier considerations of policy and logic, including the best interests of the child." T.T. sought paternity rights to R.R., his biological son who was conceived and born to Mother during her marriage to T.R. The district court held that T.R. had the weightier presumption and that the relevant factors weighed in favor of T.R. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court applied the correct legal standard; and (2) the district court properly weighed the parties' competing presumptions of paternity by following the KPA's statutory scheme and the guidance set forth in Greer v. Greer, 324 P.3d 310 (Kan. 2014). View "In re Parentage of R.R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals panel reversing the ruling of the district court denying Lisa Webster's request to clarify an order made during her divorce proceedings that she receive a share of Jon's Army Reserve and National Guard retirement pay based on the months of their marriage, holding that the relief from judgment statute, Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-260, was not applicable.When Jon retired about fifteen laters following the parties' divorce Lisa submitted the court's division order to the federal office administering Jon's retirement benefits, but the office told Lisa that it needed more detail to calculate Lisa's share. Lisa filed a motion seeking clarification of the order, which the district court denied. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the division order was not a final judgment subject to the dormancy statute. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, holding (1) the division order was a final judgment subject to the dormancy statute; and (2) section 60-260 was not applicable because Lisa's request for clarification did not require substantive change to the original property division. View "In re Marriage of Shafer" on Justia Law

In this action involving a district court's division of Jon Holliday's retirement account in a divorce proceeding with Tamara Holliday the Supreme Court held that Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-2403(c)'s tolling provision prevents a divorce decree dividing the parties' interests in a retirement account with the Kansas Public Employees Retirement System (KPERS) from becoming dormant until benefits become payable to the plan member.In 2009, Jon and Tamara divorced. The district court divided Jon's not-year-payable retirement account with KPERS equally between them and directed Tamara to prepare a qualified domestic relations order to "effectuate" the division. In 2021, Jon brought this action claiming that Tamara's judgment from the divorce had gone dormant because she had not sent a copy of it to KPERS as instructed and requesting that the court extinguish Tamara's interest in the account. The district court denied relief, but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-2403(c) tolled the dormancy period until Jon's benefits from his KPERS account became payable. View "In re Marriage of Holliday" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court and confirmed the existence of a common-law marriage between Margaret Heidkamp and Edward Ritter, holding that the district court's findings were supported by substantial competent evidence and that the court properly applied the rules.After Ritter died at the age of sixty-seven, Heidkamp filed a petition to declare relationship as common-law spouse. After a hearing, the district court concluded that Ritter and Heidkamp "were in a valid common-law marriage under the statute and common law of Kansas as of September 8, 2003" and that the relationship continued until Ritter's death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the conclusion that the components necessary to establish a common-law marriage existed in the relationship between Ritter and Heidkamp. View "In re Common-Law Marriage of Heidkamp & Ritter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's appeal from the denial of her request for custody of N.E., holding that the doctrine of stare decisis warranted this Court's continued adherence to In re N.A.C., 329 P.3d 458 (Kan. 2014), under which an order terminating parental rights is the last appealable order under Kan. Stat. Ann. 38-2273(a), and post-termination orders are not appealable, even if they address custody.Child-in-need-of-care proceedings began when the State took protective custody of N.E. and ended when N.E. was adopted by her foster family. Appellant, N.E.'s grandmother, sought custody of N.E. during the proceedings and appealed the district court's denial of her request. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that section 38-2273(a), as construed under In re N.A.C., barred appellate review of each of the district court orders from which Appellant appealed. View "In re N.E." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed Grandparents' appeal in this case involving a parentage issue and the enforceability of a "co-parenting agreement," holding that the current posture of this case left Grandparents without standing in their personal capacities.Grandparents, as next friends of L.L. and in their personal capacities, filed a petition for determination of paternity and grandparent rights and seeking joint custody of L.L. The district court found that it had jurisdiction of L.L., Grandparents, and Mother and concluded (1) joint legal custody is only between parents and not between a parent and grandparents, and (2) the purported co-parenting agreement did not fit within grandparent visitation rights. The Supreme Court dismissed Grandparents' appeal, holding that Grandparents lost standing when this appeal narrowed down to their personal claim. View "In re L.L." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court dismissing for lack of jurisdiction this case in which Father moved to modify a child support order, holding that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction.Father attempted to register the child support order in this case from Florida in a Kansas district court. Father further moved to modify the amount of the order. The district court imposed a temporary modification order. When it was discovered that Father had failed to include the Florida order with his registration materials, the court voided the registration and modification and dismissed the case, concluding that it never had jurisdiction to modify the order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Father's failure to properly register his order had no effect on the district court's subject matter jurisdiction. View "Chalmers v. Burrough" on Justia Law