Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

When Sean and Dee Anna Ryan divorced, they agreed to sell two properties they owned and divide the proceeds, subject to a proviso that neither party was required to accept a sale yielding net proceeds below specified minimums. When the properties could not be sold at or above the specified minimums, Dee Anna refused to waive the proviso. Sean filed a motion for relief from judgment, seeking a court order that the properties be sold at prevailing fair market value and the private agreement be declared of no further force and effect. The trial court denied Sean's request. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) general rules applicable to contract construction dictated that Dee Anna was not required to agree to sell the properties for net proceeds less than the amounts set forth in the parties' agreement; and (2) Sean was not entitled to relief under Trial Rule 60(B), under which a court may relieve a party from a judgment. View "Ryan v. Ryan" on Justia Law

In this case, after two hearings, the trial court issued a number of post-dissolution orders. Relevant to this appeal were the trial court's specific findings related to the emancipation of a child and the requirement of a parent to contribute toward the child's post-secondary educational expenses. The court of appeals (1) reversed on the issue of emancipation, determining that the trial court clearly erred in concluded that the child was emancipated as of a certain date under Ind. Code 31-16-6-6(a); and (2) reversed the trial court's finding that Father was not responsible for educational expenses regarding the child after hearing testimony from Father, Mother, and the child. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court of appeals on the emancipation issue and remanded to the trial court to determine the proper date of the child's emancipation; and (2) reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court's ruling on post-secondary educational expenses. View "Hirsch v. Oliver" on Justia Law

The Department of Child Services (DCS) filed a petition alleging T.N. was a child in need of services (CHINS) and requested that T.N. be removed from Father's care. Father objected to removal. A fact-finding hearing was subsequently held, at which time Mother notified the tribal court that she was prepared to make an admission to the CHINS allegations. Father objected. The tribal court told Father he could offer his objections at a contested dispositional hearing. The trial court then found T.N. to be a CHINS. Father appealed. The court of appeals reversed, finding the trial court violated Father's due process rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that for the reasons explained in In re K.D., also decided on this day, the trial court erred in not conducting a fact-finding hearing that was requested by Father, and thus, the court violated Father's due process rights.

Mother and Stepfather lived with Mother's two children. The Department of Child Services (DCS) filed a petition alleging that K.D. and K.S. were children in need of services (CHINS). Mother admitted the children were CHINS, but Stepfather denied the allegations. After Stepfather requested a fact-finding hearing, the trial court converted the contested fact-finding hearing scheduled for Stepfather into a contested dispositional hearing. After the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court found the children were in need of services. The court of appeals reversed, finding that Stepfather was denied due process by not receiving a fact-finding hearing. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thereby vacating the court of appeals, and held that a parent who requests a contested fact-finding hearing has a due process right to that hearing, and whenever a trial court is confronted with one parent wishing to make an admission that a child is in need of services and the other parent wishing to deny the same, the trial court shall conduct a fact-finding hearing as to the entire matter. Remanded.

For his failure to pay child support for his two daughters, a jury found Defendant guilty of two counts of nonsupport of a dependent child, each a class D felony, plus two additional counts of nonsupport of a dependent child while owing over $15,000 in child support, each a class C felony. The trial court entered judgment only as to the two class C felonies. Defendant appealed, contending that the two class C felonies should have merged into one conviction under Indiana double jeopardy jurisprudence. The court of appeals vacated one of Defendant's class C felony convictions but affirmed the trial court in all other respects. The Supreme Court granted transfer and held that applicable law permitted a separate Class D felony conviction for nonsupport of each dependent child, but only one such offense could be enhanced to a class C felony where the unpaid support for one or more of such children is $15,000 or more. Remanded for the entry of judgment as follows: one class C felony as to the nonsupport applicable to one of the dependent children and one class D felony as to the nonsupport of the other dependent child.

Mother's parental rights to her Child were terminated by the juvenile court after Mother's incarceration. The court of appeals affirmed. Mother appealed, alleging several due process violations on the part of the Department of Child Services (DCS). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) if any error existed in DCS's failure to locate Mother, which resulted in Mother's absence from the termination hearing, it did not substantially increase the risk of error in her termination proceeding; (2) a misrepresentation by DCS on an affidavit, in this limited instance, did not violate Mother's due process rights; (3) a delay from DCS in serving Mother with a Child in Need of Services petition upon locating Mother was inappropriate, but a reversal was not warranted in this case because the dilatory action did not result in fundamental error or deprive Mother of due process; (4) whether an incarcerated parent is permitted to attend a termination hearing is within the sound discretion of the trial court judge, and therefore, Mother's due process rights were not violated by her absence from the trial; and (5) the evidence in this case supported the trial court's findings that termination of the parent-child relationship was in Child's best interests.

A jury found Richard Barnes guilty of battery on a police officer and resisting arrest. The Supreme Court affirmed Barnes's conviction. Subsequently, Barnes petitioned for rehearing, which the Supreme Court granted. At issue in the appeal was whether the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury that Barnes, a suspected spouse abuser, had the right to get physical with the police officers if he believed their attempt to enter his residence was legally unjustified. The Court continued to affirm Barnes's conviction, holding that the Castle Doctrine, which authorizes a person to use reasonable force against another person to prevent the unlawful entry of his dwelling, is not a defense to the crime of battery or other violent acts on a police officer.

Appellant Randy Horton was convicted of nine counts of child molesting and was sentenced to an executed term of 324 years in prison. Horton appealed his conviction on grounds that the trial court improperly admitted certain evidence at trial. Horton also appealed his sentence on grounds that it constituted an abuse of the trial court's discretion to sentence him to such a lengthy term and that the term was inappropriately long given his character and the nature of his offenses. The court of appeals rejected these claims and affirmed in all respects. On appeal, the Supreme Court revised Horton's sentence to an aggregate executed term of 110 years, finding that Horton's lack of any other adult criminal history, coupled with the fact that his only juvenile adjudication was for truancy, warranted credit as a mitigating circumstance. Remanded.

On the day W.H. was born, seventeen-year-old J.M. signed an affidavit of paternity acknowledging W.H. was his child. More than a decade later county prosecutors sought a support order on behalf of the child's mother. J.M. filed a motion to set aside the paternity affidavit, which the trial court denied, holding his absence at a previous child support hearing ratified his signing of the affidavit. On appeal, the court of appeals held the trial court abused its discretion in denying J.M.'s motion and concluded that a material mistake of fact existed at the time J.M. executed the paternity affidavit. The court directed that the paternity affidavit be set aside and vacated the trial court's order adjudicating J.M. as the legal father and the order of support. On transfer, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision as to paternity and remanded the case to give J.M. the opportunity to challenge the paternity affidavit in the manner outlined in Ind. Code 16-37-2-2(h).

After being charged with two counts of child molesting, defendant Ronald Fromme asked the circuit court to require Crisis Connection, an organization that provides services to victims of sexual abuse and domestic violence, to provide him with all of its records relating to the alleged victims. Crisis Connection argued that the state victim advocate privilege gave it authority to refuse the request. The circuit court ordered Crisis Connection to deliver the records to the court for its in camera review before turning them over to Fromme. Upon review, the court of appeals concluded that he privacy interest asserted by Crisis Connection was not strong enough to bar the in camera review. On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the appellate court and reversed the order of the trial court, holding the state's compelling interest in maintaining the confidentiality of information gathered in the course of serving the needs of victims of violence and abuse was not outweighed by Fromme's right to present a complete defense. Accordingly, Fromme did not have a constitutional right to an in camera review of the records. In the absence of a violation of Fromme's constitutional rights, the Court applied the victim advocate privilege.