Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Brandon and Brandi Kelly married on April 20, 2015, and had a child on June 9, 2015. Brandon filed for divorce on May 30, 2017. This appeal primarily concerned their disputes regarding the division of property and attorney fees. Prior to marriage, Brandon and Brandi entered into a prenuptial agreement (“the PNA”) seeking to establish their rights to various items of property. Brandi and Brandon were represented by separate counsel during the negotiation and execution of the PNA. Before signing the PNA, Brandi reviewed Brandon’s 2014 tax return. Brandi’s attorney requested changes to the PNA’s definitions of separate and community property, which were made. Brandi expressly waived her right to review other financial documentation concerning Brandon’s assets and signed the PNA. During the pendency of the divorce action, and relevant to this appeal, Brandon filed four motions for partial summary judgment and Brandi filed two motions for partial summary judgment, each of which required interpretation of various provisions of the PNA. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part, certain district court decisions with respect to the parties' PNA. The Supreme Court found the district court erred (1) in affirming the magistrate court’s decision that the PNA barred Brandi from requesting attorney fees for child custody, visitation and support matters; (2) in affirming the magistrate court’s summary judgment decision concluding that Brandon’s payments from EIRMC were his separate property; and (3) when it failed to vacate the award of attorney fees to Brandon for his contempt motions, but did not err when it affirmed the magistrate court’s other deductions from Brandi’s separate property award. View "Kelly v. Kelly" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was a question of the due process rights of an unwed biological father who had established a relationship with his two-month-old child through frequent visits before the child’s maternal grandfather filed a petition to adopt the child. Under Idaho Code sections 16-1504 and 16-1513, the magistrate court determined that the grandfather’s filing of the adoption petition permanently and irrevocably barred the father from establishing paternity or objecting to the adoption. The Idaho Supreme Court vacated the magistrate court's decision because the father’s relationship with his child may have been sufficient to confer parental rights protected by the due process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and the statutes relied upon in the magistrate court’s decision unconstitutionally risk termination of these rights without due process. View "Jane Doe I & John Doe I" on Justia Law

In 2017, Dennis and Linda Nelson, the maternal grandparents of C.E., S.E., and A.E., filed a petition at magistrate court relying on Idaho Code section 32-719 to establish visitation rights after Stephanie and Brian Evans, the granddaughters’ parents, terminated contact between the children and the grandparents. Although the magistrate court initially dismissed the petition in its entirety, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, concluding that “Idaho Code section 32-719 does not restrict when a grandparent may petition a court for visitation rights” and that “there [wa]s a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Evanses’ decision to terminate all contact between the Nelsons and their children was in their children’s best interests.” On remand to the magistrate court, the Evanses moved for a determination that Idaho Code section 32-719 unconstitutionally interfered with their fundamental parental rights. The magistrate court denied the motion, and the matter proceeded to trial. After a three-day trial, the magistrate court found that, while the Evanses were fit parents, their decision to terminate all contact between the children and the grandparents was not in the best interests of the children. However, the magistrate court also found that Linda’s actions on the whole had not been in the best interests of her granddaughters and that her actions had undermined the Evanses efforts to parent their children. The magistrate court nevertheless imposed a visitation schedule. The magistrate court ordered that the Nelsons attend counseling to address the issues it identified before the Nelsons could exercise their visitation award. This appeal followed. The Idaho Supreme Court found that “[p]arents have a fundamental right to maintain a familial relationship, and to the ‘custody, care and control’ of their children; this right is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. ... Because section 32-719 does not limit standing or provide meaningful guidance for how to apply the best interests test, it is not narrowly tailored. As a result, section 32-719 does not pass constitutional muster. We hold that Idaho Code section 32-719 is facially unconstitutional." The magistrate court's visitation order was reversed and the case was dismissed without remand. View "Nelson v. Evans" on Justia Law

John Doe (Father) appealed a magistrate court’s decision to terminate his parental rights to his three children: John Doe I (age 12), Jane Doe (age 11), and John Doe II (age 7). The children and their biological mother (Mother) lived in Idaho when the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (the Department) petitioned to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Mother eventually voluntarily stipulated to the termination of her rights. Father resided in Tennessee during these proceedings and could not be located by the Department for several months. The Department amended its original petition in Idaho to establish jurisdiction over Father. The Department then moved to obtain authorization to serve the petition on Father by publication in the Tennessee city where Father resided. The magistrate court granted the Department’s request. Ultimately, Father was located in Tennessee and accepted personal service. The Department then filed petitioned to terminate his parental rights. Father participated in the termination trial via Zoom from Tennessee. Throughout the proceeding, Father’s internet connection proved to be unreliable, and he was repeatedly disconnected from the proceeding. Father rejoined the proceeding when the connection was reestablished. Father moved to continue the trial because of the connectivity issue, which the magistrate court denied, noting that it had given the parties the option of joining the proceedings remotely, but that they were required to ensure they had a reliable internet connection. Following the trial, the magistrate court terminated Father’s parental rights based on the grounds of abandonment, neglect, and the inability to discharge parental responsibilities. Father appealed. Finding no reversible error in the magistrate court's judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed it. View "IDHW v. John Doe" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the dismissal of a stepfather’s petition for custody and support of a child filed three years after the stepfather and mother divorced. The stepfather based his petition on the underlying divorce and the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Stockwell v. Stockwell, 775 P.2d 611 (1989). The magistrate court ultimately dismissed the stepfather’s petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, reasoning that the stepfather, who never adopted the child, had brought a common law custody claim under Stockwell, which was specifically prohibited in Doe v. Doe, 395 P.3d 1287 (2017). The Idaho Supreme Court agreed with the magistrate court’s decision and affirmed the judgment of dismissal. View "Glatte v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Lisa and Mark Weaver married in 2016, and had one minor child, A.W., born January 2017. In November 2020, The parties agreed between themselves to split physical custody of A.W. on a roughly 60/40 basis, with Mark having three out of every four weekends. Through court-ordered mediation, the parties resolved all issues relating to their divorce except for “physical custody, visitation, and child support.” Pertinent to this appeal, Mark argued a 50/50 split would be in A.W.’s best interest because it would allow A.W. to have more time with her father and give her more “stability and structure” compared to the temporary custody arrangements the parties had been using. Lisa’s major concern with Mark’s proposed arrangement was the time it would require A.W. to be in daycare when Lisa could provide care for A.W. at home. The magistrate court issued an oral ruling at the conclusion of trial that split physical custody of A.W. between the parties on a roughly 60/40 basis. The magistrate court indicated that its decision did not give either Lisa or Mark exactly what they wanted, but was what the magistrate court believed to be in A.W.’s best interest. Lisa moved the magistrate court for permission to appeal its custody order directly to the Idaho Supreme Court, which was granted. On appeal, Lisa argued the magistrate court abused its discretion in ordering a division of custody in which one parent had custody on almost every weekend. The Supreme Court concurred the magistrate court abused its discretion in awarding Mark physical custody of A.W. on almost every weekend, finding the court acted outside the bounds of its discretion and misapplied relevant legal standards in failing to adequately consider the statutory factor concerning A.W.’s interactions and interrelationships with her parents once A.W. started school. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Weaver v. Weaver" on Justia Law

Mother and Father married in 2016. In May 2020, Child was born in Utah County, Utah. Following Child’s birth, Mother and Father lived in Utah with Child until July 21, 2020, when Mother and Child relocated to Rigby, Idaho, without Father. Since July 21, 2020, neither Child nor Mother returned to Utah, although Father continued to live there. Father maintains that Mother expressed an intent to return to living in Utah by September 2020 and actively participated in searching for apartments with Father in Utah after she and Child moved to Idaho. Mother disputes that she ever expressed an intention to return to Utah after July 21. In October 2020, Father petitioned for divorce from Mother in Utah; the same day, he filed a motion for temporary orders seeking custody and visitation rights to Child. The Idaho magistrate court’s decision in this case indicated that Mother answered the Utah proceeding on December 10. Then, in February 2021, Mother petitioned for divorce from Father in Jefferson County, Idaho. After Father was served with Mother’s petition on February 12, he retained Idaho counsel to specially appear and contest Idaho jurisdiction. Subsequently, Father filed a motion to dismiss Mother’s petition for divorce for lack of jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, arguing that the Utah court had “home state” jurisdiction. The Utah court held oral argument on Father’s motion for temporary custody orders and Mother’s motion to transfer jurisdiction and issued its written order on April 12. Pertinent to this matter, the Utah court concluded that Utah was not an inconvenient forum and that Mother had stipulated in her answer that jurisdiction was proper in Utah. In May, the Idaho magistrate court heard oral argument on Mother’s motion to accept jurisdiction and Father’s motion to dismiss. Following the hearing, the Idaho magistrate court informally conferred with the Utah court about which state was the “more proper” home state, and concluded that the Utah court was the more appropriate jurisdiction to be the home state under the UCCJEA. The magistrate court entered a judgment on May 28, dismissing the Idaho proceeding. Mother appealed dismissal of her proceedings. But the Idaho Supreme Court determined the Idaho magistrate court did not err in denying Mother's motion to accept jurisdiction and dismissing her petition for divorce. View "Swanson v. Swanson" on Justia Law

Mandy and Dan Valentine divorced in 2015. In 2017, Mandy petitioned the magistrate court for an order modifying the child custody and support provisions of the divorce decree. The magistrate court did not modify the custody provisions in the decree but concluded that substantial and material changes in circumstances existed to justify modifying the child support order. Mandy appealed several aspects of this ruling to the district court. The district court, sitting in an appellate capacity, affirmed in part and reversed in part the magistrate court’s order. On appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, Mandy challenged the district court’s conclusion that her student loans and several other sources of income could be combined to calculate her income under the Idaho Child Support Guidelines. Dan cross-appealed, challenging the district court’s conclusion that the magistrate court abused its discretion in calculating his pro rata share of childcare expenses. The Supreme Court determined that while the district court correctly interpreted the Idaho Child Support Guidelines to require the inclusion of gross and, if applicable, potential income in the calculation of Guidelines Income, it erred in concluding that the magistrate court’s failure to make a finding that Mandy was voluntarily unemployed or underemployed before imputing potential income to her was harmless. Second, the district court erred in determining that the magistrate court abused its discretion in ordering Dan to pay his pro rata share of childcare expenses after subtracting the amount of Idaho Child Care Program benefits Mandy received from the total costs. View "Valentine v. Valentine" on Justia Law

Terry and Xiomara Robirds married in Taos, New Mexico in 2004. Prior to the marriage, Terry worked for Halliburton and ConocoPhillips. He participated in employer sponsored retirement plans with both employers. In 2007, Terry and Xiomara purchased a residence in Rigby, Idaho. Xiomara’s name was not listed on the warranty deed, and she executed a quitclaim deed to Terry on June 4, 2007. The seller issued a warranty deed to Terry on June 6, 2007. Xiomara filed for divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences in September 2016, and Terry counterclaimed on the same grounds. Xiomara was not proficient in English. The parties attended mediation with a Spanish speaking mediator for Xiomara and reached a partial agreement as to custody, support, and visitation for their only child, but did not resolve the issue of property distribution. Then prior to trial, the parties reached a settlement regarding property division. The record was not clear as to whether Xiomara had an interpreter during the negotiations that resulted in the Property Settlement. Xiomara claimed she did not. Terry averred a Spanish speaking mediator was assigned but did not specifically allege that an interpreter was present during the negotiations which led to the Property Settlement. The divorce decree, entered August 2017 (“Decree”), incorporated the Property Settlement as Exhibit B. Terry appealed the district court’s decision on intermediate appeal, which affirmed the decision of the magistrate court to: (1) set aside a stipulated judgment regarding property distribution; and (2) characterize all of Terry’s retirement accounts as community property, to be divided equally as of the date of divorce. On appeal, Terry argued that the district court erred in affirming the magistrate court’s rulings and in failing to award Terry attorney fees on intermediate appeal. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirm the district court. View "Robirds v. Robirds" on Justia Law

After Anne Herr petitioned for divorce from John Herr, John asserted that two investment accounts opened during the marriage were his separate property. The magistrate court disagreed, finding that separate and community property had been commingled in the accounts, triggering the presumption that all assets in the accounts were community property. Because John did not present an argument to rebut this presumption, the magistrate court ordered the accounts divided equally between the parties. The district court affirmed the magistrate court’s decision on intermediate appeal. John argued to the Vermont Supreme Court that the district court’s decision should be reversed because evidence sufficient to trace his separate property was admitted at trial. The Supreme Court affirmed because John was obligated to present an argument at trial to rebut the presumption that the assets were community property, not merely to provide evidence from which an argument could have been made. View "Herr v. Herr" on Justia Law