Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Idaho Supreme Court - Civil
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Appellant the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes intervened in the adoption proceedings of a minor child (Child). While the adoption itself was not at issue on appeal, disputes that arose during the adoption proceedings were. Respondents Jane and John Doe (Does) initiated adoption proceedings for Child after the rights of Child’s parents were terminated. Because Child might have qualified for protection under the laws protecting an Indian child’s welfare, the Tribes were given notice and intervened in the adoption proceeding. The trial court appointed an independent attorney for the child whose costs were to be split by the Tribes and the Does. Discovery disputes arose during the proceedings, and the trial court issued sanctions against the Tribes. The trial court found the facts before it insufficient to establish that Child was an Indian child, and thus concluded that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did not govern the proceeding. Despite this conclusion, the court applied the ICWA’s placement preferences out of concern for Child’s best interests. The Does prevailed in the adoption, and the court granted them attorney fees as the prevailing party. The Tribes contested the discovery rulings, sanctions, failure to find Child an Indian child, and the grant of attorney fees against them, claiming sovereign immunity and a misapplication of the law. The Idaho Supreme Court did not reach the issue of the trial court’s failure to find that Child was an Indian child because it concluded any error was harmless. However, the Court found that trial court’s order compelling discovery was an abuse of discretion. The trial court’s order preventing the Tribes from processing or filing any enrollment for tribal membership on behalf of Child was also an abuse of discretion. Further, the additional order granting attorney fees in the Does’ favor as the prevailing party violated the Tribes’ sovereign immunity. The Court reversed on these latter issues and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "John Doe v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes" on Justia Law

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Roger Gordon brought an action against Shannon Hedrick to establish custody and a parenting time schedule for M.H., a minor child. Gordon and Hedrick were in a relationship that began sometime in early 2010 and lasted approximately three years. The two were never married. Hedrick became pregnant around the time that the relationship began. In November of 2010, Hedrick gave birth to M.H. The following day Gordon signed a Voluntary Acknowledgement of Paternity (VAP) affidavit attesting that he was the biological father of M.H. Hedrick also signed the VAP, which stated Gordon “is the biological father of this child” and “I acknowledge that the man named above is the biological father of my child. I consent to the recording of his name, date, and place of birth on the birth certificate of the above-described child.” Following M.H.’s birth, Gordon, Hedrick, and M.H. lived together until Gordon and Hedrick’s relationship ended on February 28, 2013; the next day Gordon filed a complaint to establish custody of M.H. and a parenting time schedule. Hedrick answered and counterclaimed for legal and physical custody of M.H. As part of her counterclaim, Hedrick alleged Gordon “frequently stated he doubts he is the child’s parent. Genetic testing of the parties and child should be done to confirm parentage before entry of further orders.” Gordon denied this allegation. The magistrate court granted Hedrick’s motion and ordered genetic testing, the results of which showed there was a 0.00% probability that Gordon was M.H.’s biological father. Based on the test results, Hedrick moved for summary judgment, asking the magistrate court to dismiss Gordon’s complaint and strike his name from M.H.’s birth certificate. At a hearing on the motion, Gordon argued that he was a de facto custodian under the De Facto Custodian Act. Hedrick responded that Gordon could not be a de facto custodian because he was not related to M.H. within the third degree of blood relation. The magistrate court entered its order dismissing the action, changing M.H.’s name, and directing that Gordon’s name be removed from the birth certificate. Gordon moved for reconsideration which was denied. On appeal, the district court reversed, holding that Hedrick could not demonstrate a “mutual mistake of fact” which the district court found was required to rescind a VAP under Idaho Code section 7-1106(2). Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Gordon v. Hedrick" on Justia Law

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The minor at issue here, H.T., was the child of John Doe II and Jane Doe. John Doe II and Jane Doe were married around March of 2002 and were divorced early the following summer. H.T. was born in 2002. John Doe II was incarcerated in 2003, when H.T. was about sixteen months old. John Doe II would be eligible for parole in December, 2028. In 2005, Jane Doe met John Doe I. They married in 2008. John Doe I was employed by the United States Air Force and has been with the Air Force for the past eighteen years. Jane Doe also served in the Air Force. H.T. resided with John Doe I and Jane Doe, who were stationed overseas. John Doe II appealed the termination of his parental rights to H.T. The magistrate court terminated John Doe II’s parental rights and allowed John Doe I to adopt H.T. John Doe II argued that John Doe I lacked standing to petition for termination of his parental rights and the magistrate court’s decisions were not supported by clear and convincing evidence. “The fundamental divergence between the trial court’s oral pronouncement and written decision require us to vacate the order terminating John Doe II’s parental rights. Our decision today is not intended to suggest that there is no basis for terminating John Doe II’s parental rights or that John Doe I should not be permitted to adopt H.T. Instead, this decision is entirely driven by a fundamental failure by the trial judge to fulfill his duties in such a case.” The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the magistrate court and remanded for the magistrate to prepare new findings of fact and conclusions of law. View "John Doe I v. John Doe II" on Justia Law

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This was an expedited appeal by John Doe (“Father”) from an order terminating his parental rights over his minor child and granting Child’s stepfather’s (John Doe II) (“Stepfather”) Petition to Adopt Child. The magistrate court found that Father had abandoned Child and failed to maintain regular contact with and support the minor child without just cause. Father stopped having contact with Child in April 2007, after Mother changed her contact information. In 2012, Father brought a motion to modify child custody. In response, Mother and her new husband, Stepfather, sought termination of the Father’s parental rights, and Stepfather filed a petition for adoption of the minor child. The magistrate court terminated Father’s parental rights and granted Stepfather’s petition. Father appealed. The Supreme Court held after review that the magistrate court abused its discretion when it found that Father abandoned Child. Termination of Father’s parental rights was not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Based on the facts of this case, termination of Father’s parental rights was premature. View "Re: Termination of Parental Rights (father)" on Justia Law

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There are five children involved in this case: C.C., M.R., G.C., M.C.C., and A.C.C. The children have four different fathers. This appeal is the culmination of several child protection actions involving their mother Jane Doe. The State petitioned to terminate Jane Doe's parental rights as to all children, and Jane Doe appealed the ultimate termination order. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Re: Thermination of Parental Rights (mother)" on Justia Law

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In this case, the district court reversed the order of the magistrate court which granted a motion to renew a judgment for child support. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s holding that the motion to renew the judgment was barred by the statute of limitations. View "Peterson v. Dept of H&W" on Justia Law

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This appeal arose from the dismissal of a petition for adoption filed by Jane Doe, the long-time domestic partner of Jane Doe I. Jane Doe I is the legally recognized parent of the two children subject to the adoption: John Doe and John Doe I. The magistrate court dismissed on the grounds that "petitioner must be in a lawfully recognized union, i.e. married to the prospective adoptee's parent, to have legal standing to file a petition to adopt that person's biological or adopted child." The magistrate dismissed the petition "sua sponte, without any motion or opposition to the Petition, without prior notice to any of the affected parties, without inviting legal briefing, without any apparent consideration of the Pre-Adoptive Home Study and without hearing." A Final Judgment was entered the same day. Jane Doe moved for reconsideration, but before a ruling on that motion was made, I.A.R. 12.2 compelled her to file a Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court violated Jane Doe's rights to due process by dismissing the petition without the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner. Furthermore, the Court found that Idaho's adoption statutes unambiguously allow a second, prospective parent to adopt, regardless of marital status. Therefore, the Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Adoption of John Doe" on Justia Law

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This appeal arose from a termination of parental rights based on a Consent in Abeyance. The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (IDHW) filed a Petition for the Termination of Parental Rights after a prolonged child protection proceeding involving John Doe and his two children, S.M. and C.M. In the Consent, Doe agreed to the conditional termination of his parental rights in exchange for the magistrate court vacating the hearing set on the termination petition and having his children returned to his care on an extended home visit. Doe was subsequently arrested and the magistrate court entered a judgment terminating Doe’s parental rights to both children on the grounds that Doe had signed the Consent and failed to substantially comply with its terms. Doe appealed. The Supreme Court held that Idaho does not recognize conditional consent to the termination of parental rights, and a termination of parental rights based on conditional consent is invalid. The magistrate erred by involuntarily terminating Doe’s parental rights without a showing by clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination. Accordingly, the Court vacated the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "RE: Termination of Parental Rights" on Justia Law

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A magistrate court dismissed a petition filed by the maternal grandmother of a child born out of wedlock in which the grandmother sought to terminate the parental rights of the biological father and to adopt the child. After the magistrate court entered an order granting the petition, the biological father intervened and successfully moved to set aside the order. The grandmother’s petition was ultimately dismissed, and she appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate court. View "Jane Doe (13-23) v. John Doe" on Justia Law

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Rita Turner petitioned the magistrate court for a protection order for her and her son against her then-husband Robert Turner. The magistrate court found that there was reasonable cause to believe that bodily harm might result to Rita and her son and issued a 90-day order. Robert appealed to the district court, which affirmed the magistrate court’s decision. Robert then appealed that decision. Because Robert failed to develop an argument, offered scarce citation to authority, and ignored the aspects of the law unfavorable to him, the Supreme Court concluded he brought this appeal frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. View "Turner v. Turner" on Justia Law