Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose from the dismissal of a petition for adoption filed by Jane Doe, the long-time domestic partner of Jane Doe I. Jane Doe I is the legally recognized parent of the two children subject to the adoption: John Doe and John Doe I. The magistrate court dismissed on the grounds that "petitioner must be in a lawfully recognized union, i.e. married to the prospective adoptee's parent, to have legal standing to file a petition to adopt that person's biological or adopted child." The magistrate dismissed the petition "sua sponte, without any motion or opposition to the Petition, without prior notice to any of the affected parties, without inviting legal briefing, without any apparent consideration of the Pre-Adoptive Home Study and without hearing." A Final Judgment was entered the same day. Jane Doe moved for reconsideration, but before a ruling on that motion was made, I.A.R. 12.2 compelled her to file a Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court violated Jane Doe's rights to due process by dismissing the petition without the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner. Furthermore, the Court found that Idaho's adoption statutes unambiguously allow a second, prospective parent to adopt, regardless of marital status. Therefore, the Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Adoption of John Doe" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a termination of parental rights based on a Consent in Abeyance. The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (IDHW) filed a Petition for the Termination of Parental Rights after a prolonged child protection proceeding involving John Doe and his two children, S.M. and C.M. In the Consent, Doe agreed to the conditional termination of his parental rights in exchange for the magistrate court vacating the hearing set on the termination petition and having his children returned to his care on an extended home visit. Doe was subsequently arrested and the magistrate court entered a judgment terminating Doe’s parental rights to both children on the grounds that Doe had signed the Consent and failed to substantially comply with its terms. Doe appealed. The Supreme Court held that Idaho does not recognize conditional consent to the termination of parental rights, and a termination of parental rights based on conditional consent is invalid. The magistrate erred by involuntarily terminating Doe’s parental rights without a showing by clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination. Accordingly, the Court vacated the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "RE: Termination of Parental Rights" on Justia Law

A magistrate court dismissed a petition filed by the maternal grandmother of a child born out of wedlock in which the grandmother sought to terminate the parental rights of the biological father and to adopt the child. After the magistrate court entered an order granting the petition, the biological father intervened and successfully moved to set aside the order. The grandmother’s petition was ultimately dismissed, and she appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate court. View "Jane Doe (13-23) v. John Doe" on Justia Law

Rita Turner petitioned the magistrate court for a protection order for her and her son against her then-husband Robert Turner. The magistrate court found that there was reasonable cause to believe that bodily harm might result to Rita and her son and issued a 90-day order. Robert appealed to the district court, which affirmed the magistrate court’s decision. Robert then appealed that decision. Because Robert failed to develop an argument, offered scarce citation to authority, and ignored the aspects of the law unfavorable to him, the Supreme Court concluded he brought this appeal frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. View "Turner v. Turner" on Justia Law

Mother Jane (2013-14) Doe appealed the termination of her parental relationship with her son JLS. Mother left JLS in the care of family members, who then placed JLS with Mr. and Mrs. Doe. The Does petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights on the grounds of abandonment. Following trial, the magistrate court granted that petition. Finding that the magistrate court's decision was supported by substantial, competent evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed that court's judgment terminating Mother's parental rights. View "John Doe V. Jane Doe (2013-14)" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a divorce and custody dispute between Christopher Hopper and Suzanne Swinnerton. In 2005, Christopher filed suit on his own behalf, as well as that of his son and parents, against his wife, Suzanne, her parents, her Montana attorney, and other individuals, alleging a variety of tort claims. The district court dismissed all claims on summary judgment. Christopher appealed on behalf of all Appellants. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hopper v. Hopper" on Justia Law

Defendant-Respondent-Appellant Stephen Adams appealed a district court judgment that upheld a magistrate judge's order that dismissed his motions to modify child custody and child support. Defendant's had been held in contempt for failing to make one child support payment. He was unable to purge the contempt by paying all delinquent child support payments for reasons he said were beyond his control. A court can impose a criminal contempt sanction in nonsummary contempt proceedings only if the contemnor has been afforded the federal constitutional rights applicable to criminal contempt proceedings. The magistrate held that it could refuse to hear the Father's motions because he was unable to purge the contempt and could not prove that his inability was due to circumstances beyond his control. The district court held that refusal to hear the Father's motions was a permissible criminal contempt sanction. Idaho Code section 7-610 does not authorize denial of access to the courts as a criminal contempt sanction. Therefore, the district court erred in affirming the magistrate's order on the ground that it was a permissible criminal contempt sanction. The Supreme Court held that the district court erred in affirming the magistrate court's order. In addition, the Supreme Court held that refusal to hear a motion and dismissal of a motion that the contemnor did not purge the contempt violates Article I, Section 18 of the state constitution. The district court was reversed and the case remanded. View "Slane v. Adams" on Justia Law

John Doe was in prison when his son was born. The baby's mother was living with another man, and gave the boy the boyfriend's surname. The baby was abused while in her care; the Department of Health and Welfare took the child into custody. The boyfriend was listed as the putative father in a Child Protective Act (CPA) proceeding; after a DNA test, Doe was substituted as the putative father. Prior to the test, Doe had no prior contact with the child. The Department requested termination of Doe's and the biological mother's parental rights. The mother voluntarily consented to the termination. The Department submitted a new petition, requesting for the first time an "Order of Non-Establishment of Parental Rights." The Department averred that Doe was "not the 'parent' of [Son] as [he had] failed to assert any parental rights to [Son] either by statute or by timely establishing some relationship to [Son]." The magistrate judge entered her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Nonestablishment of Paternity. Doe timely appealed. He raised two issues: (1) whether under Idaho Code he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing prior to the "nonestablishment" of his parental rights; and (2) whether his due process rights were violated. The Supreme Court concluded that Doe did not show he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing prior to the "nonestablishment" of his parental rights, or that his due process rights were violated. View "Doe v. Idaho Department of Health & Welfare" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Pedro Pelayo appealed several rulings the magistrate court made in his divorce from Defendant-Respondent Bertha Pelayo. Specifically he challenged the magistrate's ruling with regard to: spousal maintenance awarded to Defendant; calculation of his annual income for child support calculation purposes; and the award of attorney fees. The district court upheld those challenged rulings; Plaintiff then appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding no error or abuse of discretion in the magistrate court's or district court's decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pelayo v. Pelayo" on Justia Law

The parties in this case appealed a magistrate court judgment concerning the division of certain property pursuant to a divorce decree. Appellant, Bill Clark raised three issues on appeal: (1) whether the district court erred in affirming the different methods of valuation the magistrate court used in valuing and distributing Appellee Amy Baruch's 401(k) and the "Schwab 3713" account; (2) whether the court properly characterized the "Veltex" distribution as income presumptively belonging to the community; and (3) whether Amy was entitled to attorney fees on appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) the district court did not err in affirming the different methods the magistrate court used to value and divide Amy's 401(k) and the Schwab 3713 account; (2) the Veltex distribution was properly classified as income and therefore community property; and (2) Amy was not entitled to attorney fees because this appeal was not brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. View "Baruch v. Clark" on Justia Law