Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Jane Doe I (Mother) and John Doe I (Father) each appealed the magistrate court’s judgment terminating their parental rights as to their two minor children, L.W. and J.W. Mother argued the magistrate court erred in several respects, including that it wrongfully terminated her parental rights because the State’s petition for termination was not filed in accordance with Idaho law and because the children had not been in Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (IDHW) custody for a mandatory period of fifteen months before the petition was filed. Mother also argued that the magistrate erred in finding that the children were neglected; that it was in the Mother’s best interests to have her parental rights terminated; and that Mother was unable to discharge her parental responsibilities. Father incorporated Mother’s arguments on appeal into his own appeal, and added that the court erred in determining that Father was unable to discharge his parental responsibilities. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Jane Doe / John Doe" on Justia Law

Chelsea Reed obtained a divorce from Zane Reed on the ground of adultery, terminating their five-year marriage. They had twin daughters who were about three years of age. Chelsea was awarded primary physical custody of the twins, and Zane was awarded visitation. Years later, Zane moved to modify the divorce decree when Chelsea petitioned to move out of state to Montana and take the children with her. The trial court found it was in the children's best interests if they remained with their mother and move to Montana. Zane was allowed three days each month, a week during Christmas vacation, and two weeks in the summer months as visitation. Zane appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Reed v. Reed" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from a magistrate court’s judgment terminating the parent-child relationship between Appellant Jane Doe (Doe) and her child, M.R. Doe turned eighteen while in foster care, aging out of the system. Doe gave birth to M.R. in 2011 and began living with M.R. in a separate residence on her parents’ property. In August of 2012, Doe was arrested for aggravated assault. M.R. was sixteen months old at the time of Doe’s arrest. Upon her incarceration, Doe “signed over temporary guardianship” of M.R. to her parents. Doe was eventually sentenced to serve five years, with two years fixed, and the court retained jurisdiction. Doe was unsuccessful on her rider, and in June of 2014 the district court relinquished jurisdiction because of Doe’s “aggressive behavior” while in prison. Doe testified that the earliest date that she might be released was May of 2017. At that time, M.R. would be six years old. He had not been in Doe’s care since her arrest. In October of 2014, M.R. came into the care of the Department of Health and Welfare because of physical abuse of another child in Doe’s parents’ home. On November 12, 2015, the Department filed a Petition for Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship. Following a hearing on March 21, 2016, the magistrate court found that the Department had met its burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, two grounds upon which termination could be granted: (1) neglect, due to Doe’s failure to comply with her case plan; and (2) Doe’s incarceration for a substantial portion of M.R.’s minority. The magistrate court further found, again by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Doe’s parental rights was in M.R.’s best interests. Doe timely appealed. The Supreme Court found that substantial and competent evidence supported the magistrate court’s finding that termination was in M.R.’s best interests. However, the Court found that the magistrate court’s decision that Doe had been and was likely to be incarcerated for a substantial period of M.R.’s minority applied an erroneous legal standard. The judgment terminating Doe's parental rights was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Jane Doe (2016-14)" on Justia Law

In 2006, John Doe (“Father”) and Mother were the parents of three minor daughters who were approximately 5, 6, and 7 years of age. A federal grand jury in Idaho issued an indictment charging Father with hiring someone from out of state to kill Mother. The indictment alleged that Father had agreed to pay that person $10,000. A jury found Father guilty, and the federal court sentenced him to 120 months in the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons and three years of supervision following his release from prison. The federal court also sentenced him to a fine of $17,500. Following Father’s arrest and incarceration, Mother had sole custody of their three minor daughters. By 2013, the girls were 12, 13 and 14. Mother was having psychological issues and tried to take her own life; the eldest daughter also had attempted suicide. The State intervened and filed for protection under the Child Protective Act. The Department of Health and Welfare recommended the girls remain in shelter care due to an unstable home environment; Father wanted the girls placed with his adult son in Arizona. Ultimately, termination of Father's parental rights was recommended and granted. Father appealed, arguing the evidence of abandonment and neglect was insufficient to support termination of parental rights. Finding no reversible error in this respect, the Supreme Court affirmed the termination of Father's parental rights. View "Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare v. John Doe (2016-09)" on Justia Law

Respondents Jane Doe I (“Intended Mother”) and John Doe I (“Intended Father,” collectively with Intended Mother, “Intended Parents”) were a married couple living in Alaska. In May, 2014, Intended Parents contracted with Jane Doe (“Gestational Carrier”) living in Idaho, to carry an embryo made from Intended Father’s sperm and a donor egg. After the baby was born, Gestational Carrier and her husband, John Doe (“Husband”), moved for a declaratory judgment that Intended Parents are the parents of the resulting child (“Child”). The district court refused. It reasoned that declaratory judgment was not available to determine the parentage of Child because Idaho law already provides a statutory means by which parties can become parents when using a gestational surrogate: the termination of that gestational surrogate’s parental rights and the adoption of the child. The district court also found that the surrogacy agreement entered into between the parties was void as against public policy to the extent that it sought to contractually assign parentage. Finding that the district court did not err in refusing to grant declaratory relief, the Idaho Supreme Court did not address whether the underlying surrogacy contract was in violation of public policy. View "In The Matter of The Declaration of Parentage" on Justia Law

Appellant Lori Ann Wilson was divorced from respondent David King in Colorado in 2003. The divorce decree specified that Wilson was entitled to part of King’s military pension. King began receiving military pension payments in 2013 but has not paid Wilson her decreed share of those payments. Wilson sued King in Idaho, seeking an order establishing the sum certain owed to her from King’s military pension. King, did not live in Idaho, and opposed Wilson’s motion by asserting that Idaho courts lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The magistrate court held that it had personal jurisdiction over King and entered an order establishing the sum certain owed. King appealed, and the district court reversed. Wilson appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, finding King was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Idaho. View "Wilson v. King" on Justia Law

Jane Doe I was the paternal grandmother of a minor child whose natural parents were unable to provide a stable home environment. Her husband, John Doe I, was the child's paternal step-grandfather. In 2014, they filed a petition seeking to be appointed as co-guardians and co-conservators for the minor child, and on the following day the court granted their petition. Jane Doe II and John Doe II were the maternal great-aunt and great-uncle of the minor child. They also filed a petition seeking to be appointed as co-guardians of the minor child. The issues raised by the competing petitions were tried to the magistrate, and he found that it was in the best interests of the child to grant both petitions in part. The issue regarding the magistrate court’s action in granting part-time co-guardianships was solely one of law. Because the Idaho guardianship statutes did not permit the appointment of part-time co-guardians, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded this case for entry of a new judgment. View "Does I v. Does II - Re Conservatorship of Minor Child" on Justia Law

A magistrate court terminated Appellant Jane Doe’s (“Mother”) parental rights to her nine-year-old child (“Child”) for neglect. Mother argued on appeal of that termination: (1) the magistrate court’s finding of neglect is not supported by clear and convincing evidence; (2) the magistrate court should have rejected the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare’s (“IDHW”) petition to terminate parental rights because IDHW had failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify Mother and Child; (3) the magistrate court abused its discretion when it took judicial notice of findings from a prior proceeding; and (4) the magistrate court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of IDHW’s efforts to determine whether the Indian Child Welfare Act applied to Child. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho Department of Health & Welfare v. Jane Doe (2015-21)" on Justia Law

Appellant Linda Kesting obtained a judgment against Respondent James Kesting for breach of an alimony/spousal support agreement entered into during their divorce. When that judgment was returned without recovery, the magistrate judge issued a Judgment of Qualified Domestic Relations Order (“QDRO”). The subsequent judgment was intended to allow recovery of the unpaid spousal support and associated attorney fees from James’ pension plan. James appealed to the district court, which reversed. The district court concluded that the QDRO was not valid because the spousal support agreement was not merged into the divorce decree and, therefore, the QDRO was not issued pursuant to the State’s domestic relations law as required under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). Linda appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, "disagree[ing] with the district court’s narrow view of domestic relations law. [...] The policies underlying ERISA’s anti-assignment provisions would not be furthered by allowing a person to avoid his or her support obligation because that obligation was agreed to between the parties. [...] Regardless of whether a support obligation was created by court order or provided for by agreement, it was not Congress’s intent that ERISA be used as a tool for a person to evade his or her familial support obligations." View "Kesting v. Kesting" on Justia Law

Parties Rebecca Foreman and Stanley Sweet shared custody of Child. Prior to this modification proceeding, Sweet had primary physical custody of Child and Foreman had custodial time on alternating weekends and holidays. Foreman filed a petition to modify the child custody order seeking primary physical custody, which the magistrate court granted following trial. Sweet moved to amend the judgment or for a new trial and also moved for reconsideration. The court denied the motion for reconsideration. Sweet moved for a direct permissive appeal, which the Supreme Court granted. After review, the Supreme Court concluded this appeal was premature because the magistrate court had not ruled on Sweet’s motion for a new trial. It was procedurally improper for Sweet to move for reconsideration of the magistrate’s findings of fact and conclusions under I.R.F.L.P. 503(b). However, Sweet had previously sought to introduce new evidence under the correct procedural mechanism, a motion for new trial. In his motion for a new trial under I.R.F.L.P. 807(A)(4), Sweet asked the magistrate to conduct a new trial on the issue of Child’s wishes, including an in camera interview of Child. Those wishes included Child’s concerns regarding Foreman’s new living arrangements. The Court denied Sweet’s request to conduct an in camera interview. However, the record does not indicate that the court ever ruled on Sweet’s motion for a new trial. View "Sweet v. Foreman" on Justia Law