Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

John Doe was involved in a fight with his sixteen-year-old daughter, C.G., resulting in C.G. sustaining a concussion and cervical strain. The magistrate court entered a civil protection order., which it subsequently modified. John Doe appealed, arguing that the magistrate court erred when it determined that there was an “immediate and present danger of domestic violence” warranting issuance of the protection order and that the court abused its discretion when it specified that the protection order would be in effect for a year. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Jane Doe (2016-01) v. John Doe" on Justia Law

Jane Doe (“Mother”) appealed a magistrate court’s judgment terminating her parental rights as to her children, D.M., A.M., J.S., A.L., and R.L. She argued that the State failed to produce clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption that she could parent her children. Specifically, Mother argued that: (1) the last eight months of her participation in the case plan contravene a finding of neglect; and (2) the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (“IDHW”) failed to help reunify the family. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "H&W v. Jane Doe (2016-11)" on Justia Law

The issues in this appeal related to a Property Settlement Agreement (PSA) and judgment of divorce that were both signed in April 2012. This dispute was initiated in the magistrate division of the district court in October of 2013, when Sondra Kantor filed a motion to incorporate the parties’ PSA into the parties’ judgment of divorce. Rejecting Robert Kantor’s argument that it lacked jurisdiction to merge the PSA and judgment of divorce, the magistrate court entered a supplemental decree of divorce that incorporated the terms of the parties’ PSA. Sondra then initiated contempt proceedings against Robert. After Robert unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the contempt charges for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the parties reached a stipulated resolution of the contempt proceedings which resulted in a judgment that Robert was in contempt. The stipulation permitted Robert to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. Robert appealed and the district court affirmed the judgment of contempt. The Supreme Court reversed. "The district court’s decision is less understandable. Although the original decree of divorce explicitly stated that the PSA was a 'separate agreement,' the district court inexplicably found this provision to be 'inherently ambiguous as to the question of merger.' The district court did not identify the source of this 'inherent' ambiguity, and we can find nothing in the judgment that renders it ambiguous as to whether the PSA was merged." The Court concluded the Supplemental Decree was void because the magistrate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to merge the PSA into its earlier judgment. Therefore, the district court erred by affirming the magistrate court’s order denying Robert’s motion to dismiss. Therefore, the Court reversed the decision of the district court and remand with instructions to vacate the magistrate court’s contempt judgment. View "Kantor v. Kantor" on Justia Law

This was an appeal of the district court’s dismissal of Sondra Kantor's claim that Robert Kantor breached a Property Settlement Agreement (PSA) as a sanction, its grant of summary judgment against her, and its award of attorney fees to Robert. This case initially related to the parties’ efforts to sell the community residence which was the subject of Section 5 of the PSA (the property). In late September of 2012, the parties contracted to sell the property in a short sale for $2.4 million in a cash transaction scheduled to close within 30 days, contingent upon Bank of America’s approval of the short sale. The parties were asked to sign a document that extended the period for the contingency to be satisfied to October 5, 2012. Sondra evidently perceived this as an opportunity to apply leverage to secure Robert’s compliance with other terms of the PSA, and she sent him an email indicating that she would not extend the contingency until a number of demands were satisfied. In March, Robert moved for partial summary judgment, seeking a declaration that Sondra had breached the PSA by failing to timely sign the extension document and dismissal of Sondra’s counterclaims for breach of contract and fraud. Robert’s motion was heard on June 24, 2013. The district court granted summary judgment dismissing Sondra’s breach of contract (Count I) and fraud (Count III) counterclaims and held that Sondra was obligated to sign the short sale extension document. Robert had argued that the attorney fees he had incurred were damages resulting from Sondra’s failure to sign the short sale extension. This action then morphed into a dispute over Robert’s efforts to obtain a loan modification from Bank of America. Months later, Robert moved that Sondra be declared in contempt for her actions frustrating his ability to secure the modification. The district court recognized that it had issued an order of "dubious legality" that could not be enforced by way of contempt, yet insisted that if it were not honored the district court would sanction Sondra without notice or an opportunity to be heard. Appeals of the various district court orders followed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. First, the Court determined the district court erred by re-writing the parties' agreements when it required Sondra to convey her interest in the property to Robert. Furthermore, the Court concluded the district court abused its discretion by dismissing Sondra's case as a sanction. Sondra did not show the district court erred in its grant of summary judgment. The Supreme Court did not reach either party's arguments regarding attorney fees. On remand, a new judge was assigned to preside over further proceedings, and no costs or fees were awarded. View "Kantor v. Kantor" on Justia Law

Jane Doe I (Mother) and John Doe I (Father) each appealed the magistrate court’s judgment terminating their parental rights as to their two minor children, L.W. and J.W. Mother argued the magistrate court erred in several respects, including that it wrongfully terminated her parental rights because the State’s petition for termination was not filed in accordance with Idaho law and because the children had not been in Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (IDHW) custody for a mandatory period of fifteen months before the petition was filed. Mother also argued that the magistrate erred in finding that the children were neglected; that it was in the Mother’s best interests to have her parental rights terminated; and that Mother was unable to discharge her parental responsibilities. Father incorporated Mother’s arguments on appeal into his own appeal, and added that the court erred in determining that Father was unable to discharge his parental responsibilities. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Jane Doe / John Doe" on Justia Law

Chelsea Reed obtained a divorce from Zane Reed on the ground of adultery, terminating their five-year marriage. They had twin daughters who were about three years of age. Chelsea was awarded primary physical custody of the twins, and Zane was awarded visitation. Years later, Zane moved to modify the divorce decree when Chelsea petitioned to move out of state to Montana and take the children with her. The trial court found it was in the children's best interests if they remained with their mother and move to Montana. Zane was allowed three days each month, a week during Christmas vacation, and two weeks in the summer months as visitation. Zane appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Reed v. Reed" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from a magistrate court’s judgment terminating the parent-child relationship between Appellant Jane Doe (Doe) and her child, M.R. Doe turned eighteen while in foster care, aging out of the system. Doe gave birth to M.R. in 2011 and began living with M.R. in a separate residence on her parents’ property. In August of 2012, Doe was arrested for aggravated assault. M.R. was sixteen months old at the time of Doe’s arrest. Upon her incarceration, Doe “signed over temporary guardianship” of M.R. to her parents. Doe was eventually sentenced to serve five years, with two years fixed, and the court retained jurisdiction. Doe was unsuccessful on her rider, and in June of 2014 the district court relinquished jurisdiction because of Doe’s “aggressive behavior” while in prison. Doe testified that the earliest date that she might be released was May of 2017. At that time, M.R. would be six years old. He had not been in Doe’s care since her arrest. In October of 2014, M.R. came into the care of the Department of Health and Welfare because of physical abuse of another child in Doe’s parents’ home. On November 12, 2015, the Department filed a Petition for Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship. Following a hearing on March 21, 2016, the magistrate court found that the Department had met its burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, two grounds upon which termination could be granted: (1) neglect, due to Doe’s failure to comply with her case plan; and (2) Doe’s incarceration for a substantial portion of M.R.’s minority. The magistrate court further found, again by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Doe’s parental rights was in M.R.’s best interests. Doe timely appealed. The Supreme Court found that substantial and competent evidence supported the magistrate court’s finding that termination was in M.R.’s best interests. However, the Court found that the magistrate court’s decision that Doe had been and was likely to be incarcerated for a substantial period of M.R.’s minority applied an erroneous legal standard. The judgment terminating Doe's parental rights was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Jane Doe (2016-14)" on Justia Law

In 2006, John Doe (“Father”) and Mother were the parents of three minor daughters who were approximately 5, 6, and 7 years of age. A federal grand jury in Idaho issued an indictment charging Father with hiring someone from out of state to kill Mother. The indictment alleged that Father had agreed to pay that person $10,000. A jury found Father guilty, and the federal court sentenced him to 120 months in the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons and three years of supervision following his release from prison. The federal court also sentenced him to a fine of $17,500. Following Father’s arrest and incarceration, Mother had sole custody of their three minor daughters. By 2013, the girls were 12, 13 and 14. Mother was having psychological issues and tried to take her own life; the eldest daughter also had attempted suicide. The State intervened and filed for protection under the Child Protective Act. The Department of Health and Welfare recommended the girls remain in shelter care due to an unstable home environment; Father wanted the girls placed with his adult son in Arizona. Ultimately, termination of Father's parental rights was recommended and granted. Father appealed, arguing the evidence of abandonment and neglect was insufficient to support termination of parental rights. Finding no reversible error in this respect, the Supreme Court affirmed the termination of Father's parental rights. View "Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare v. John Doe (2016-09)" on Justia Law

Respondents Jane Doe I (“Intended Mother”) and John Doe I (“Intended Father,” collectively with Intended Mother, “Intended Parents”) were a married couple living in Alaska. In May, 2014, Intended Parents contracted with Jane Doe (“Gestational Carrier”) living in Idaho, to carry an embryo made from Intended Father’s sperm and a donor egg. After the baby was born, Gestational Carrier and her husband, John Doe (“Husband”), moved for a declaratory judgment that Intended Parents are the parents of the resulting child (“Child”). The district court refused. It reasoned that declaratory judgment was not available to determine the parentage of Child because Idaho law already provides a statutory means by which parties can become parents when using a gestational surrogate: the termination of that gestational surrogate’s parental rights and the adoption of the child. The district court also found that the surrogacy agreement entered into between the parties was void as against public policy to the extent that it sought to contractually assign parentage. Finding that the district court did not err in refusing to grant declaratory relief, the Idaho Supreme Court did not address whether the underlying surrogacy contract was in violation of public policy. View "In The Matter of The Declaration of Parentage" on Justia Law

Appellant Lori Ann Wilson was divorced from respondent David King in Colorado in 2003. The divorce decree specified that Wilson was entitled to part of King’s military pension. King began receiving military pension payments in 2013 but has not paid Wilson her decreed share of those payments. Wilson sued King in Idaho, seeking an order establishing the sum certain owed to her from King’s military pension. King, did not live in Idaho, and opposed Wilson’s motion by asserting that Idaho courts lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The magistrate court held that it had personal jurisdiction over King and entered an order establishing the sum certain owed. King appealed, and the district court reversed. Wilson appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, finding King was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Idaho. View "Wilson v. King" on Justia Law