Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Hawaii Supreme Court
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Petitioner's ex-wife, Respondent, brought a Haw. Rev. Stat. 586 petition alleging domestic abuse of the couple's daughter. The family court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) against Petitioner. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) determined, inter alia, that the family court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the TRO. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the ICA and order of the family court, holding (1) parents have a constitutional right to discipline children inhering in their liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children, under the due process clause of the Hawaii Constitution; (2) a parent may raise the right of parental discipline in a Haw. Rev. Stat. 586-5 show cause hearing in opposition to the continuation of a TRO issued under chapter 586 on allegations of domestic abuse; (3) in such circumstances trial courts shall consider whether the discipline is reasonably related to the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the minor in determine whether the parent's conduct constituted abuse or proper discipline; and (4) generally a non-custodial parent retains the right to discipline a child when the child is under his or her supervision.

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Father and Mother were divorced pursuant to a divorce decree that ordered Father to pay child support for each child as long as they continued post-high school education, until graduation, or until the child attained the age of twenty-three. The family court later granted Mother's post-decree motion seeking an order reestablishing educational support for the parties' twenty-five year-old daughter, who was legally blind and pursuing a college education. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) remanded. At issue on appeal was whether Haw. Rev. Stat. 580-47(a) authorized a family court to order educational support for a disabled but competent child age twenty-three or older when the family court's 2004 Child Support Guidelines provided that such support may be continued only until the child reaches age twenty-three. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA and affirmed the family court, holding (1) to the extent that the 2004 Guidelines purport to set an age limitation on the family child's authority to continue educational support for an adult child, they are invalid as they exceed the statutory mandate of section 580-47(a); and (2) section 580-47(a) does not impose an age limit for educational support of a child age twenty-three or older.

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After Bonnie Kakinami filed a complaint for divorce from Aaron Kakinami, the family court granted Aaron's motion to continue the trial. Eighteen months after she filed for divorce, Bonnie filed a motion to bifurcate. The family court granted her request. During the hearing on the motion, the family court found Bonnie was entitled to divorce and entered a divorce decree that dissolved the marriage and made certain orders regarding division of property and debts. The court reserved the division of property and debts not decided by the divorce decree until the trial. Later, the family court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law, finding that the court had good cause to bifurcate the divorce. The intermediate court of appeals concluded that the family court did not abuse its discretion by bifurcating the proceedings and entering the divorce decree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the family court was correct to apply the good cause standard for bifurcating the divorce proceedings, and (2) the family court did not abuse its discretion by finding that good cause existed to bifurcate the proceedings in this case.

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After the family court granted Geraldine Civtznovich-Dubie and George Dubie a divorce, George was killed. Geraldine then filed a motion to vacate the divorce decree or to set aside the corresponding property division, arguing that her marriage to George was void ab initio because George's previous marriage had not ended in a valid divorce. The family court denied Geraldine's motion, and Geraldine appealed. The intermediate court of appeals denied the motion, holding that Geraldine was estopped from challenging the validity of George's prior divorce and thereby was estopped from challenging the family court's subject matter jurisdiction to enter the divorce decree between Geraldine and George. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the appellate court did not err in affirming the family court's order but that its reasoning was erroneous in part. The Court concluded that jurisdiction cannot be created by estoppel, and therefore a party cannot be estopped from challenging the family court's subject matter jurisdiction. The Court then affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, holding that the divorce decree was not void under Hawaii Family Court Rule 60(b)(4).

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Respondent Cedric Kikuta was convicted by a jury for assault in the third degree after a physical altercation with his stepson. Respondent appealed, arguing that the court erred in failing to instruct the jurors on the parental discipline defense and on whether the assault in the third degree occurred during the course of a scuffle, or affray, entered into by mutual consent. The court of appeals (1) held that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the parental discipline defense and (2) chose not to address Respondent's argument regarding a mutual affray instruction. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court regarding the parental discipline defense but vacated the judgment as to the lack of disposition regarding a mutual affray instruction. The Court held that (1) an instruction on the parental discipline defense is not per se precluded by the fact that substantial bodily injury occurred; (2) an instruction on the parental discipline defense must be given if there is some evidence to support each element of the defense; and (3) a mutual affray instruction must be given where there is some evidence the injury was inflicted during a fight entered into by mutual consent.