Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

In an action for divorce and child support, the court granted this application for discretionary appeal under Supreme Court Rule 34(4). The court held that the final support order issued by the trial court included a specific deviation for extraordinary educational expenses, but the court failed to make the statutorily required written findings necessary to support the deviation. Therefore, the court must reverse the judgment in part and remand the case for a redetermination of the final child support order, with any extraordinary educational expenses deviation to be based on proper written findings. Finally, the court held that Husband's remaining challenges lacked merit and affirmed the the remainder of the trial court's judgment.

This appeal involved a title to a house and lot in a residential subdivision in Forsyth County. The trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and defendants appealed. The court held that the trial court properly rejected defendants' claim of bona fide purchaser status; defendants' argument that the trial court erred in holding that the children acquired a collective two-thirds interest in the property by virtue of the 1998 quitclaim deed from their father was without merit; the trial court properly dismissed defendants' claim for equitable subrogation; the trial court did not err in dismissing defendants' counterclaim for unjust enrichment; and the trial court did not err in dismissing defendants' laches defense. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Wife appealed the trial court's order setting aside its final order based solely on the mistake of Husband's attorney pursuant to OCGA 9-11-60(d)(2). As an initial matter, the court held that this case did present a child custody matter subject to OCGA 5-6-34(a)(11). Thus, the grant of a motion to set aside a child custody case was directly appealable. Further, an action seeking to change visitation qualified for treatment as a "child custody case." Therefore, this case, which included a ruling eliminating Husband's visitation, was a "custody case" subject to appeal. The court also held that the trial court's ruling on Husband's motion to set aside was erroneous under OCGA 9-11-60(d)(2) where Husband did not provide the trial court with an appropriate basis to set aside its final order pursuant to the statutory provision. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed.

Wife appealed the Final Order in her divorce action against Husband on the grounds that the trial court improperly calculated Husband's self-employment income and refused to consider the minor child's cheerleading expenses as a special expense for purposes of deviating from the statutory support guidelines. The court held that the trial court's findings were within its discretion and affirmed the Final Order.

In this divorce case, wife asserted, inter alia, that the trial court erred in calculating wife's interest in husband's pension and in ordering husband to pay wife alimony in the amount of $1,250 per month once husband's pension matured. The court held that it was at wife's urging that the trial court chose to evaluate and "distribute" the pension in this case as alimony. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in choosing to award wife a specific dollar amount, rather than a percentage of the pension benefit, as alimony. Based on considerations of, inter alia, the value of the pension, the overwhelming marital debt, husband's contribution of inherited assets to the marriage, and wife's recent promotion, as well as based on the wide latitude given to the trial court in fixing the amount of alimony, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting alimony at $1,250 per month. The court also held that there was no abuse of discretion in the division of the marital assets; no reversible error in ruling that wife should have the sole right to claim one-half of the mortgage interest; no abuse of discretion in requiring wife to indemnify husband and hold him harmless for debts the trial court ordered her to pay; and no abuse of discretion in awarding wife attorney fees.

The court granted Wife's application for interlocutory appeal to determine whether the superior court erred in denying her motion to dismiss her ex-Husband's petition to modify child support. The court held that it was error to refuse to dismiss the petition because, even assuming arguendo, that the superior court had the authority to modify the dismissal order to provide that it was not an adjudication on the merits, the ruling terminated the Husband's petition for modification. Thus, it was a "final order" and triggered application of the prohibition in OCGA 19-6-15(k)(2). Further, there is no merit to the policy argument that the interest of judicial economy was served by allowing the modification action to proceed.

Larry DeFoor petitioned to establish title against all the world on a piece of property in Ellijay, Georgia. Appellants, certain descendants of Millie DeFoor, the record title holder, answered the petition and denied its material allegations. The court held that the earlier denial of appellants' motion for summary judgment was harmless or moot because the court found evidence sufficient to support the jury's verdict in favor of Larry; Larry did not need to reside on the property in order to establish adverse possession, he only needed to exercise dominion over it; appellants' assertion that Larry could not "tack" his adverse possession to the adverse possession of his father was without merit; the evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to conclude that Larry met his burden to show ouster; it was not error to grant Larry's first motion in limine which sought to exclude certain evidence; and the trial court did not err in refusing to permit appellants to show that Flint Timber agreed to pay Larry for an easement on the property. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Father and Mother's judgment of divorce incorporated by reference a parenting plan and custody order that gave Mother primary physical custody of the parties' daughter, with Father awarded visitation that required supervision when the child spent the night in Father's custody. At issue was whether the judgment contained an improper self-executing modification that was contingent upon a determination to be made by a person other than a judge. The court held that since the provision regarding the termination of supervision of Father's overnight visitation with his child was a material change in visitation that would occur automatically without judicial scrutiny into the child's best interests, it was an invalid self-executing change of visitation that should not have been included in the judgment and decree of divorce. Accordingly, the court reversed that portion of the judgment and decree of divorce and remanded the case.

Appellants are the biological paternal grandparents of a child born to appellee and appellants' son. After Douglas Bailey married the child's mother, he adopted the child in 2006 when appellants' son terminated his parental rights to the child. The court had granted appellant's petition for certiorari and posed the following question: Did the Court of Appeals correctly "conclude that the limiting language of OCGA 19-7-3 (b) - forbidding original actions for grandparent visitation if the parents are together and living with the child - includes adoptive parents"? The court answered the question in the affirmative and upheld the judgment by the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err when it concluded that the term "parents" in OCGA 19-7-3(b) did not exclude an adoptive parent such as Mr. Bailey. The Court of Appeals also did not err when it concluded that the trial court erred when it denied appellees' motion to dismiss.

Husband appealed a trial court's issuance of a final divorce judgment and decree that divided some unimproved real property in Florida and two Morgan Stanley funds equally between the parties and made no disposition of the interests in an apartment complex, thereby leaving each party with his or her own interest. The court held that the two Morgan Stanley accounts were transformed into marital property when Husband gave Wife an ownership interest in the property; the Florida property was transformed into a marital asset where it was deeded to him and his Wife as tenants in common; and in regards to the apartment complex, Wife acquired an ownership interest separate and distinct from Husband's. Finally, the court held that Husband's claims that the trial court abused its discretion by announcing a prejudgment of the case prior to his presentation of evidence was without merit. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.