Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant James Newman (husband) and appellee Judy Newman (wife) were married in May 2007. Just before their wedding, they executed a 20-page type-written prenuptial agreement to which they added a handwritten provision acknowledging "that there [were] certain ambiguities contained [within] the body of this document which each party agrees to clarify and re-write within 30 days of the date of execution hereof." Wife filed for divorce in 2011. After a hearing, the trial court granted wife's motion to enforce the prenuptial agreement and entered a judgment of divorce incorporating its terms. The Supreme Court granted husband's application for discretionary appeal and affirmed the trial court's judgment: "[i]n essence, husband argue[d] that any agreement the parties may have had was voided by the addition of the language indicating their belief that the agreement contained ambiguities and their intent to clarify such ambiguities. Because the language of the prenuptial agreement demonstrate[d] the parties reached a complete agreement regarding the disposition of property in the event their marriage ended in divorce, we conclude the trial court did not err by granting wife's motion to enforce the agreement and incorporating the agreement into the final divorce decree." View "Newman v. Newman" on Justia Law

Appellant Frederick C. Hastings (Husband) appealed a final divorce decree which awarded primary physical custody of his two children to Nichole Hastings (Wife). Husband is the biological father of both children, whereas wife is the adoptive mother of one child and the biological mother of the other. At the time the couple married in August 2006, wife was aware husband's former girlfriend was pregnant. Following the child's birth in October 2006, husband's paternity was established and the couple obtained custody with wife eventually adopting the child. In February 2009, wife gave birth to the couple's second child. Husband filed for divorce in February 2011. Following mediation which resolved most issues between the parties, the trial court held a hearing with respect to the issues of custody and child support. Both parties testified and, after considering the evidence, the trial court found it was in the best interest of the children for wife to be awarded primary physical custody. The court declined to split physical custody of the children between the parents, finding that to do so would cause emotional harm. After awarding joint legal custody, the court awarded child support to wife within the statutory guidelines. Applying the requirements of OCGA 19-7-1 (b.1) to the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that it was in the best interest of the children to remain with wife, or that splitting the siblings would cause emotional harm and was not in their best interests. View "Hastings v. Hastings" on Justia Law

Kurt A. Floyd, Sr. and Livia M. Floyd were divorced in 2008. The decree incorporated the settlement of the parties, in which Kurt and Livia agreed that Kurt would retain title to, and possession of, the marital residence. The decree and incorporated settlement required Kurt to refinance the existing mortgage on the marital residence and to use the proceeds to pay Livia for her share of the equity. If Kurt were unwilling or unable to refinance the marital residence, the decree and incorporated settlement required him, within 90 days of the entry of the decree, to list the marital residence for sale at its fair market value or a price mutually agreeable to the parties. On cross-motions for contempt, the court below found that Kurt violated the terms of the decree in several respects, including by failing to refinance or list the marital residence, and it held Kurt in contempt of the decree. The court directed Kurt to purge his contempt with respect to the marital residence by making a quitclaim deed for the residence in favor of Livia. Kurt appealed the contempt order, as well as the denial of his cross-motion for contempt. Upon review of the decree and incorporated settlement, in addition to the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed the contempt order to the extent that it required Kurt to execute a quitclaim deed in favor of Livia, but it otherwise was affirmed. View "Floyd v. Floyd" on Justia Law

In this divorce case, the husband disputed the validity and enforceability of the parties' self-styled "Premarital Agreement." In 2000, appellant Joanne Fox ("Wife") and appellee Lyle M. Fox ("Husband") divorced after 25 years of marriage. The divorce decree and incorporated settlement agreement required Husband to pay Wife monthly child support of $500, as well as monthly alimony of $1,500 for one year, $2,000 for the next three years, and $1,500 thereafter until Wife was 59 years old. When the parties remarried, the Husband's child support and alimony obligations were extinguished. In February 2010, Wife again filed for divorce, and sought to enforce the Premarital Agreement as a legally binding prenuptial agreement from her first marriage, citing a provision in the agreement that she claimed entitling her to continued support payments. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order ruling, among other things, that the Premarital Agreement, reviewed as a whole, was a "made in contemplation of marriage" but did not fit the statutory definition of a prenuptial agreement, and that it therefore was void because it was not attested by at least two witnesses as required by OCGA 19-3-63. After the trial court granted a certificate of interlocutory review, the Supreme Court granted Wife's interlocutory appeal. Husband argued, among other things, that the agreement was actually a "marriage contract . . . made in contemplation of marriage," not one that contemplated legal issues and rights of the parties upon divorce. The Court found that the parties' "Premarital Agreement," viewed as a whole, was not a binding prenuptial agreement made in anticipation of divorce, and the trial court therefore correctly denied its enforcement due to noncompliance with the attestation requirement of OCGA 19-3-63. View "Fox v. Fox" on Justia Law

Erma David Baker (Husband) and Ivy Baker Schrimsher (Wife) were divorced in November 1998 by final judgment and decree. A settlement agreement incorporated into the final judgment and decree required Husband to refinance in his name the mortgages for the marital home and the auto loan for a 1998 Ford Explorer, and required Husband to assume payment on all indebtedness on each piece of property within sixty days. If Husband failed to refinance the vehicle in his name, he was required to transfer ownership, title, and interest in the vehicle to Wife. As to the marital residence, Husband was required to list the property for sale if he vacated it within the sixty-day timeframe. As to both properties, Husband was required to hold Wife harmless and indemnify her from any liability for any indebtedness. Husband failed to meet these obligations and, in March 2002, a default judgment was entered against Wife for the auto loan in the amount of $12,328.84 and, in June 2009, a payment demand letter was sent to Wife from the mortgage company seeking to collect the outstanding balance of $25,177.44 which was due on the second mortgage. Wife filed a contempt action in March 2009 and Husband moved to dismiss arguing that, with the passage of almost ten years, the final judgment was dormant and that Wife was barred by laches. The trial court held a hearing and denied the motion to dismiss. The trial court found Husband in willful contempt and ordered him to pay Wife $37,506.28, the total amount of indebtedness for both properties. Husband then moved for a new trial which, after a hearing, the trial court also denied. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the trial court erred when it denied Husband’s motion to dismiss and when it required Husband to pay the full amount of outstanding debt. Because there was no error, the trial court's judgment was affirmed. View "Baker v. Schrimsher" on Justia Law

Husband and wife were divorced in 2009. They had two children. The decree awarded joint custody to the parties, with primary physical custody to wife. Thereafter, husband filed a contempt action, and also sought a psychological custody evaluation of wife. Wife was living in Forsyth County at that time, and she was served at her residence in that county. Almost four months later, wife filed a “motion to dismiss.” She did not challenge personal jurisdiction or venue in that motion. Thereafter, husband appended a motion for change of custody to the contempt action. However, the parties entered into a settlement agreement to resolve the custody and contempt issues, which was announced in open court. The parties abided by the settlement agreement for about eight months. Then wife moved to invalidate the agreement and to dismiss the change of custody action, arguing it should have been filed in Fulton County because she moved there at some point while the case was pending. The trial court denied wife’s motions, finding that she waived personal jurisdiction and venue defenses. It also awarded husband physical custody of the children, denied wife visitation rights with the children until she underwent and paid for a psychological custody evaluation, and ordered wife to pay child support in the amount of $704 per month. Finally, the trial court found wife in contempt for failing to pay child support in the amount of $3,168 and uncovered medical expenses for the minor children in the amount of $331. Wife appealed, but finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Andersen v. Farrington" on Justia Law

This divorce action involved the termination of the parental rights of the husband, who was the child's legal father for 13 years. The husband was appealing the superior court's order severing his rights as legal father and granting the biological father's petition to legitimate. Gwendolyn and William Brine were married in August 1997, just weeks after a relationship between Gwendolyn and Brian Shipp ended. The child was born in May 1998, and Brine was listed on the birth certificate as the father. Approximately 18 months later, Shipp saw Gwendolyn and asked whether he could be the father. She said that she was married and the child was not his. For the next ten years, Shipp made no more inquiries and took no further action concerning the child's paternity. He saw the child occasionally as a family friend, but did not attempt to develop a father-son relationship or provide any substantial financial or emotional support. In August 2010, a year after William filed for divorce, Gwendolyn informed Shipp that she thought he was the child's biological father; subsequent DNA testing confirmed that fact. In February 2011, Shipp moved to intervene in the divorce action and filed a petition for legitimation. Following a hearing, the superior court found that Shipp had not waived or abandoned his opportunity interest in developing a relationship with the child and that it was in the child's best interest to grant the legitimation petition. As part of the divorce decree, the superior court terminated William Brine's rights as the legal father, granted Shipp's petition to legitimate, and awarded Shipp primary physical custody of the child. William Brine filed an application for discretionary appeal, which the Supreme Court granted as having possible merit. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to terminate the legal father's parental rights, the Court reversed that decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Brine v. Shipp" on Justia Law

Wife appealed from the trial court's finding that husband's alimony obligation was for permanent periodic alimony. The court held that the trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that husband's alimony obligation was for permanent alimony that terminated upon the wife's remarriage. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's erroneous ruling with respect to husband's alimony obligation and remanded the case to the trial court for a proper consideration of wife's motion for contempt. View "Hardigree v. Smith" on Justia Law

The court granted wife's application for discretionary appeal from the final judgment and decree of divorce. At issue was the equitable division of a closely-held non-profit corporation. The court concluded that the superior court functioned as the finder of fact, and as such, it was authorized to give credit and weight to the disputed evidence in favor of husband. The court also concluded that wife's complaints that the superior court erred in failing to consider her request for attorney fees and to award them to her because husband refused to comply with discovery and/or there was substantial disparity in the parties' financial circumstances was unavailing. View "Jones-Shaw v. Shaw" on Justia Law

Husband and wife were divorced pursuant to a final judgment and decree entered after wife failed to appear for a scheduled final hearing to determine child custody. After the trial court denied wife's motions to set aside, for new trial, and for reconsideration, she filed an application for discretionary appeal. The court held that the trial court was authorized to strike wife's pleadings; wife's failure to appear was not excused; the record did not support wife's claim of wilful participation in the proceedings; the court need not address wife's contentions that she was denied her right to a jury trial or to present and object to the introduction of evidence because the trial court was authorized to strike her pleadings; wife was provided a full hearing on the issue of child custody which she chose not to attend and she failed to set forth a valid due process claim; and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making its property award. View "Pennington v. Pennington" on Justia Law