Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Manoucher Jahanbin (husband) appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to set aside the final judgment and decree in a divorce action brought by Zahra Rafieishad (wife). Husband contended that the trial court erred in finding service upon him was perfected. The parties met in their native Iran, but were married in Atlanta, Georgia, shortly after moving here in 2007. After living together in Georgia for several years, husband began traveling internationally and spending time in Iran while wife remained in the marital residence in Atlanta. Wife filed for divorce; after attempts to have husband served personally in Iran were unsuccessful, the trial court entered an instructing wife to utilize the provisions of OCGA 9-11-4 (f)(3)(B)(iii)(II) and deliver the summons and complaint to the clerk of court, who was "directed to mail the correspondence" to husband's residence in Tehran, Iran. However, upon providing the correspondence to the clerk of court, the clerk instructed wife's attorney to complete the registered mail receipt in Farsi and to transact the mailing herself. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the requirements of OCGA 9-11-4 (f)(3)(B)(iii)(II) were not met and reversed: "[w]hile this Court recognizes the difficulties incumbent in the fact that mail sent to a foreign country may require the address to be written in a foreign script, OCGA 9-11-4 (f)(3)(B)(iii)(II) does not permit the clerk of court to direct someone else to address and dispatch the mail for service of process." View "Jahanbin v. Rafieishad" on Justia Law

Aaron and Michelle Black were married in 1996, and later divorced in Houston County. Michelle appealed the final divorce decree, contending that the trial court was without jurisdiction to grant a divorce, that it erred when it refused to stay its proceedings in favor of pending divorce proceedings in New York, and that it erred in its final decree with respect to an equitable division of marital property, child support, and a provision that was intended to enable Michelle to retain her health insurance. Upon review of the decree and the trial court record, the Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred with respect to a deviation from the presumptive amount of child support to account for the payment of life insurance premiums, and the Court also agreed that the trial court erred in its framing of the provision to enable Michelle to retain her health insurance, so it vacated those portions of the decree and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court found no other error and otherwise affirmed the final decree of divorce. View "Black v. Black" on Justia Law

Sandra M. Singh (Wife) and Zachary Hammond (Husband) were divorced in 2005. The parties had two children together, and pursuant to the final divorce decree, were awarded joint legal custody of the children, with Husband being awarded primary physical custody. In 2009, Wife filed an action seeking child support and a modification of custody. The parties eventually agreed to allow Wife to have primary physical custody of the children, and in late 2011, the Superior Court ruled that Wife should be awarded child support. However, as part of its order, the trial court also ruled that, "[a]s long as [Wife] receives child support payments from [Husband], she shall not apply for any financial assistance for the children from the government." Wife appealed to the Supreme Court, asking whether the trial court erred in ruling that as long as Wife received child support payments from Husband, she should not apply for any financial assistance for the children from the government. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling with respect to its calculation of Husband’s gross monthly income, but reversed the trial court’s ruling with respect to its calculation of Wife’s gross monthly income and its prohibition against Wife’s application for financial assistance as long as she received child support. View "Singh v. Hammond" on Justia Law

Leon East and Donia Stephens divorced in 2002. They entered a settlement which was incorporated into their divorce decree. By their settlement, East and Stephens agreed that Stephens would have custody of their two children, and East would pay weekly child support and would reimburse Stephens for certain miscellaneous expenses that she incurred for the benefit of the children, including "one-half of the minor children’s school expenses. East later petitioned for a modification of the decree, and the trial court granted that petition in part in March 2011. The order of modification said nothing expressly about miscellaneous expenses, but it specified that any and all other provisions of the incorporated settlement "not modified herein shall remain in full force and effect." Following the modification, Stephens moved to have East held in contempt for, among other things, his failure to pay half of miscellaneous expenses that she incurred on behalf of the children. The trial court held East in contempt for that failure, as well as other failures to meet his court-ordered obligations. The court specifically rejected East’s contention that the March 2011 modification discontinued and superseded his obligation in the 2002 decree and incorporated settlement to pay half of the miscellaneous expenses. East appealed the trial court's contempt order, contending that he could not be held in contempt for failing to pay miscellaneous expenses for the children when the modification order directed him to pay the presumptive child support amount and made no deviation for miscellaneous expenses. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with East and reversed the final contempt order to the extent that East was held in contempt for failure to pay a portion of the miscellaneous expenses that Stephens incurred for the benefit of the children. View "East v. Stephens" on Justia Law

Michael and Kelly Goodell divorced in 2006 by a Final Judgment and Decree which incorporated a settlement agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, Michael was required to pay Kelly alimony until she remarried. Michael also voluntarily agreed to make payments for the benefit of Kelly's two children from a previous marriage, after she remarried. Kelly remarried in 2008, and Michael began making payments to her children. Kelly died one year later, and Michael stopped making payments to her children. The administrator of Kelly's estate filed a contempt action against Michael for non-payment, contending that the payments were part of the property division in the divorce, and as such, survived Kelly's death. The trial court agreed with Kelly's estate; Michael thereafter appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the payments were a voluntary contractual obligation to be construed in the same manner and with the same rules of construction as other contractual agreements. The payments remained Michael's responsibility, and accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Goodell v. Oliver" on Justia Law

In 2005, Robert Hanna and Kelli Ford were divorced in Gwinnett County. Hanna later moved to DeKalb County, and in 2011, Ford filed a petition in DeKalb County to modify their divorce decree with respect to child support and visitation. At the same time, Ford also filed a motion in DeKalb County for contempt, alleging that Hanna had failed to pay child support due under the decree. Hanna moved to dismiss the motion for contempt for want of jurisdiction, and the DeKalb County court granted his motion, citing the general rule that contempt of a decree ordinarily can be punished only by the court that rendered the decree. The DeKalb County court distinguished "Buckholts," reasoning that Buckholts was limited to counterclaims for contempt. Ford appealed, contending that the DeKalb County court had jurisdiction to entertain her motion for contempt. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed, and reversed the dismissal of the motion for contempt. View "Ford v. Hanna" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court granted an application for certiorari from the Court of Appeals' decision in "In re: W.L.H.," (723 SE2d 478 (2012)) to determine whether a child in a deprivation action had standing to appeal when the child was represented by counsel and the child's guardian ad litem chose not to appeal. "Because the guardian ad litem is the legal protector of a child's best interests in deprivation proceedings, we find that a child lacks standing to appeal a deprivation ruling except through a guardian ad litem." View "In the Interest of W.L.H." on Justia Law

Thomas Vines appealed a trial court's order that denied his motion to modify the terms of his visitation rights with his daughter and that granted Anita Vines' counterclaim for contempt and request for attorney fees. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vines v. Vines" on Justia Law

Russell James Wright and Debra Sue Hall were married in 1997 and divorced in 2000 under a divorce decree that required Wright to pay monthly alimony. In 2012 Wright filed a motion to set aside their divorce decree on the ground that Hall had committed fraud in marrying him when she was not divorced from her first husband. The trial court denied the motion, and the Supreme Court granted Wright's application for discretionary appeal to consider whether the trial court erred. Because Georgia law does not confer validity on an otherwise void marriage for the purpose of requiring the payment of alimony unrelated to the protection of children, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision. View "Wright v. Hall" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted appellant Andrew Bishop's application for discretionary review of the final judgment and decree of divorce that awarded sole legal and physical custody of his two-year-old daughter to appellee Erika Baumgartner ("Mother") and gave no visitation to Bishop ("Father"). The sole issue on appeal was whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying visitation to Father. Since evidence in the record supports the trial court's exercise of its discretion, the Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying visitation rights to Father. View "Bishop v. Baumgartner" on Justia Law