Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Judy Chatfield Terrell and Dale Terrell were divorced in 2010. Husband was awarded primary physical custody of the parties' minor daughter and Wife was awarded visitation rights. The Supreme Court granted Wife's application for appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 34 (4), arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Husband primary custody. Finding no reversible error or abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Terrell v. Terrell" on Justia Law

Elisha Franklin and Elijah Franklin were divorced in 2011. Husband was awarded primary custody , and Wife was awarded visitation. Wife was ordered to pay $1,518 per month in child support, and found that the parties had agreed to a final division of marital assets prior to the final divorce hearing. Husband filed a Motion for Disposition of Real Property, representing that, although the parties had previously agreed to sell their marital residence, the parties had been unable to agree on a date upon which Wife would move out of the residence in order to allow for the house to be sold. Wife filed a motion for new trial, and Husband filed a contempt motion based on Wife's failure to pay child support. Later, Wife filed a motion for reconsideration and a contempt motion based on Husband's alleged violation of the visitation provisions of the trial court's Final Decree. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Wife's contempt motion and granted Husband's contempt motion, requiring Wife to pay $4,555 in child support. In a separate ruling, the trial court ordered that the proceeds of the sale of Husband and Wife's house be equally divided between them. The Supreme Court granted Wife's application to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 34 (4), and after careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's finding as to Wife's gross monthly income and remand the case to the trial court to make a proper finding based on the evidence. The Court affirmed the remainder of the trial court's challenged rulings on appeal. View "Franklin v. Franklin" on Justia Law

This case concerned one of the exceptions to the Georgia Tort Claims Act known as the "discretionary function" exception. The guardians of two infant boys sued the Department of Human Services (DHS), alleging that the Clayton County Department of Family and Children Services (DFCS) was negligent in several respects in its investigation of a report that the boys were neglected by their parents. On motion of DHS, the trial court dismissed the lawsuit, finding that the “discretionary function” exception properly applied, but the Court of Appeals disagreed, and it reversed the dismissal. The Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to consider whether the "discretionary function" exception applied in this case, and concluding that it did, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Georgia Dep't. of Human Svcs. v. Spruill" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the trial court's termination of a family violence permanent protective order (PPO) issued against William Lovell in favor of Lynda Mandt. After a hearing, the trial court entered a written order terminating some aspects of the PPO, while leaving others including a requirement that Lovell stay away from Mandt, in place. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's termination of the PPO. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine under what circumstances, if any, a trial court could terminate a permanent protective order pursuant to OCGA 19- 13-4.1 A restrained party who seeks termination of a permanent protective order must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a material change in circumstances has occurred, such that the resumption of family violence is not likely and justice would be served by termination of the order. In reviewing cases like this one, a court should look to the totality of the circumstances, which may include the present nature of the parties' relationship, proximity of shared residences and any shared parental responsibilities; the restrained party's history of compliance with the protective order and history of violence generally both before and after its issuance; the restrained party's efforts to undergo family violence therapy or similar counseling and rehabilitation; the age and health of the restrained party; any undue hardships suffered as a result of the order; and the existence and nature of any objections the victim has to termination of the protective order. View "Mandt v. Lovell" on Justia Law

Gregory Crook (Father) and Janet Crook (Mother) were divorced in 2011. The final judgment and decree of divorce, which expressly incorporated the parties' settlement agreement, awarded the parties joint legal custody of their two minor children; it designated Father as the primary physical custodian, and provided that, with the exception of specified holiday and summer visitation, the children would live with each parent on alternating weeks. The Decree included a deviation from the statutorily prescribed amount of child support based on the parents' agreement that "neither party shall pay child support to the other," which deviation the superior court found to be in the children's best interests. A few months later, Mother filed a petition for modification of child custody, asking, inter alia, that she be given primary physical custody of the children and that there be an award of child support commensurate with the established statutory guidelines. Father moved to dismiss. The superior court entered a final order granting Wife's petition for modification; the parties retained joint legal custody, but Wife was given primary physical custody and Husband was awarded limited, but escalating visitation. With respect to child support, the court expressly determined the total basic child support obligation, but made no findings as to each parent's "adjusted child support obligation" or each parent's "presumptive amount of child support." The Supreme Court granted Mother's application for discretionary appeal to determine whether the superior court erred in applying a "parenting time deviation" to Father's "presumptive amount of child support" on the cited bases of "shared custody" and "history of the parties." Because the superior court awarded a discretionary downward deviation in the amount of child support, but failed to comply with the appropriate statutory requirements, the final order must be reversed and the case remanded to the superior court for further proceedings. View "Crook v. Crook" on Justia Law

Karim Ziyad and Fatima El-Amin were divorced in 2009, and Ziyad was awarded a certain residential property. To hold El-Amin harmless from the indebtedness on that property, Ziyad was ordered to refinance the debt in his own name within six months or to sell the property to pay off the debt. He failed to do either of these things, and so, in 2012, El-Amin filed a motion for contempt. After a hearing, the trial court found Ziyad in contempt, ordered him to put the property up for sale without delay. In addition, the court ordered Ziyad to make payments toward the principal of the debt until the property was sold or the debt was otherwise repaid. Ziyad appealed, contending that the trial court improperly modified the final decree when it ordered him to pay down the principal. The Supreme Court disagreed with his contention, and affirmed the trial court's order. View "Ziyad v. El-Amin" on Justia Law

Appellant Charles Williamson (Father) and appellee Susan Williamson (Mother) were divorced in March 2009. Father filed a petition to modify child custody, visitation, and child support. After a bench trial, the court issued a final order. Using the statutory support guidelines as the basis of its modification, the trial court found that the presumptive amount of child support paid by Father would be $1,359 and by Mother would be $233. The court then said that the "guidelines would be unjust and inappropriate considering the relative ability of each parent to provide support because of the disparate incomes of the parties," and that the best interest of the children would be served by a deviation from the presumptive amount to "allow Mother resources to maintain adequate housing and necessities while the children are in her care." Father filed a motion for reconsideration of the final order, which was denied. Father appealed to the Court of Appeals, which then transferred the application to the Supreme Court. Father argued the trial court misapplied the child support guidelines in arriving at its modification order. The Supreme Court found that Father's argument that the trial court erred in calculating the child support obligation was well-founded, and reversed the child support portion of the final order. The case was remanded for child support to be determined correctly. View "Williamson v. Williamson" on Justia Law

Stacy Rutter surreptitiously installed several video surveillance devices in the marital home. Prior to divorce proceedings, Stacy's husband, Charles, moved to exclude any video recordings derived from the use of the surveillance devices on the ground they were made in violation of OCGA 16-11-62 (2). The trial court denied the motion to exclude, relying upon the "curtilage" exception set forth in the statute, but certified its ruling for immediate review. The Court of Appeals granted husband's application for interlocutory review and affirmed, holding subparagraph (2) (C), set forth in House Bill 1576, survived the subsequent enactment and approval of Senate Bill 316, which did not contain a similar subparagraph. In so doing, the appellate court reasoned that the two pieces of legislation were not repugnant. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals to determine which of the two pieces of legislation survived to become law. The Court concluded that subparagraph (2) (C) did not survive the subsequent amendment to OCGA 16-11-62 and therefore the Court of Appeals' judgment should have been reversed. View "Rutter v. Rutter" on Justia Law

By the terms of the original decree of divorce, James and Julie Taylor were to share joint legal custody of their two children. James was to have primary physical custody of the children, and Julie was to pay a certain amount each month to James as child support. Less than three months after the entry of the original decree, James filed a petition to modify it, alleging that circumstances had changed, and seeking sole legal custody of the children, as well as more child support. The trial court granted the modification, awarded sole legal custody to James, and increased the amount that Julie was to pay James as child support. The trial court also awarded James attorney fees. In Case No. S13A0911, Julie appealed modification of the decree; in Case No. S13A0912, Julie appealed the award of attorney fees. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed both cases. View "Taylor v. Taylor" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, the trial court entered a final judgment and decree of divorce for the parties. The jury found that Husband's gross monthly income was $10,833.00 and found that Wife's gross monthly income was zero. These findings resulted in a presumptive child support amount of $1,663 per month for the parties' two minor children who lived with Wife. Upon calculating the presumptive amount of child support, Wife made an additional argument to the jury, requesting an upward deviation of the presumptive child support amount. The jury deliberated further and made an upward deviation of $337 such that the final child support award was $2,000 per month. Wife moved for a new trial, contending the verdict was unsupported by the evidence because the jury failed to include income from fringe benefits Husband received from his employer in its finding of Husband's gross monthly income. She argued the jury's failure to include income from fringe benefits in its finding of Husband's gross monthly income resulted in an erroneous calculation of the presumptive child support amount. After a hearing, the trial court denied Wife's motion for new trial and the Supreme Court granted Wife's application for discretionary review pursuant to Rule 34 (4). Upon careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Wife's motion for new trial. View "Breedlove v. Breedlove" on Justia Law