Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Georgia Supreme Court
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Husband Ronald Friday appealed the trial court's order on a petition for contempt and a petition for modification of child support in his divorce. The Decree provided for an equitable division of the parties’ retirement assets. And, those assets awarded to Husband included the retirement accounts that were the subject of the trial court's order regarding a QDRO. Thus, ordering that Husband pay child support arrearages from his retirement accounts via a QDRO was a reapportionment of the retirement accounts, constituting a modification of the final decree, and was error. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed that portion of the trial court's order. View "Friday v. Friday" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court granted appellant Angela Buckner's (Wife) application for discretionary review of the trial court's order denying her motion to set aside the consent final judgment of divorce filed by appellee Mark Buckner (Husband) and denying her motion to rescind or reform the settlement agreement the parties signed. The parties appeared for a final hearing on their divorce proceeding but continued to negotiate in an attempt to reach a settlement. On that day, the parties memorialized an agreement by using a letter that had been prepared by Husband’s counsel as a prior settlement offer and modifying it with handwritten notations in the margins and handwritten terms on additional pages. The document was then signed by both parties and their counsel, and counsel announced to the court that the parties had reached an agreement and executed a settlement memorandum. The settlement document was filed with the clerk but not read into the record. Wife would later file a motion to set aside the terms of the settlement memorandum on the ground that the order was signed by mutual mistake, and did not represent a meeting of the minds. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed that part of the trial court’s order that denied Wife’s motion to set aside the settlement agreement, but reversed the trial court in denying her motion to set aside the "Consent Final Judgment and Decree." The Court also vacated the final judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Buckner v. Buckner" on Justia Law

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Bruce and Latosha Rose were married in 2003. They had one child who was born in 2007. The couple lived in Gwinnett County and the child attended school there until 2012 when the couple separated. Wife moved to Henry County and took the child with her. Shortly thereafter, she filed for divorce. A temporary order was entered giving her primary physical custody and stipulating that the child would attend school in wife's school district. The parties were given joint legal custody and directed to confer with one another on all matters pertaining to the well-being of the child. A final hearing was held later that year at which husband sought primary physical custody. Husband expressed his concern for the child's education in Henry County; took issue with the quality of the meals wife gave to the child (wife fed the child fast and processed, pre-packaged food, "far too often"); that wife was unable to spend time with the child weekdays (her work schedule required the child to attend an after school program) whereas he works from home several days a week; and that the child behaved better in his presence than in the presence of wife since moving to Henry County. The trial court did not make findings of facts and conclusions of law and awarded primary physical custody to husband. Wife sought discretionary review by the Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error or abuse of the trial court's discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed that court's decision. View "Rose v. Rose" on Justia Law

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In 2005, David and Yvonne Barker divorced. Seven years later, David filed a petition in a Gwinnett County court to enforce certain provisions of the original decree by contempt and to modify certain other provisions of the original decree. The Gwinnett County court, however, dismissed his petition for want of personal jurisdiction, noting that Yvonne moved from Georgia several years ago, and therefore out of the court's jurisdiction. David appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that since 2010, Georgia law has provided that a Georgia court may obtain jurisdiction over a nonresident if she had "been subject to the exercise of jurisdiction of a court of this state which has resulted in an order of alimony, child custody, child support, equitable apportionment of debt, or equitable division of property if the action involves modification of such order and the moving party resides in this state or if the action involves enforcement of such order notwithstanding the domicile of the moving party." View "Barker v. Barker" on Justia Law

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The parties in this case challenged an order awarding attorney fees under OCGA 9-15-14 for post-divorce litigation. Because the trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion for fees and did not make the required findings specifying the improper conduct justifying the fee award, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Williams v. Becker" on Justia Law

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Following the trial court's denial of his motion to set aside a ruling finding him to be in contempt of a divorce decree, Alvah Crutchfield appealed, arguing the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Crutchfield challenged venue, not subject matter jurisdiction, and that he affirmatively waived any objections on the face of the record. View "Crutchfield v. Lawson" on Justia Law

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When Jay Kaminsky and Diana Entrekin divorced in 2009, they agreed to a parenting plan by which they would share joint legal custody of their son, but Kaminsky alone would have physical custody of the child. The parenting plan also addressed the possibility that Kaminsky might not survive the minority of the child, expressing that Toby Kaminsky Friedman (paternal aunt of the child) have physical custody in the event Kaminsky died. That parenting plan was approved by the court and made a part of the final decree of divorce. Kaminsky died in 2013. In the days following his death, various members of his family (including Friedman) took custody of the child, and they refused to give the child over to Entrekin. Entrekin filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that she was entitled to custody of the child. Around the same time, Friedman filed her own petition for custody of the child. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, awarded temporary custody of the child to Friedman, and allowed supervised visitation with the child to Entrekin. Entrekin appealed the denial of her petition for habeas corpus. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of that petition. View "Entrekin v. Friedman" on Justia Law

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Husband and wife were divorced in 2012. Several months later, the wife filed a petition for contempt, alleging the husband failed to turn over certain jewelry she claimed should have been divided pursuant to the parties' divorce decree. The husband counterclaimed for contempt, arguing that the wife failed to comply with the decree's parenting and visitation provisions, and failed to reimburse him for repairs to the marital home. The trial court refused to hold either party in contempt. Acknowledging husband's admission that he already had sold some of the items he was supposed to return, the court further ordered that "[i]n the event [husband] is unable to return all pieces of jewelry, but returns selective items, said items shall be appraised by a mutually agreed upon certified appraiser and the amount of the appraisal shall be subtracted from the amount [husband] owes ($40,000) to [wife] for reimbursement of the jewelry." The court also directed the parties to submit a list of disputed expenses for repairs to the marital home. On appeal, the husband argued the trial court's order directing him to return the jewelry and for an accounting of the repairs constituted an improper modification of the parties' divorce decree. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision with regard to the withholding of the husband's share of the net proceeds of the sold jewelry until he returned the jewelry to the wife or provided her adequate compensation: "[a]lthough the trial court had broad authority to enforce and seek compliance with it original decree ... it could not do so by imposing upon husband a pre-condition to hie receipt of the net proceeds that did not exist in the original decree." The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "Doritis v. Doritis" on Justia Law

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After this divorce proceeding returned to the trial court on remand from "Horn I," the Husband filed a motion to recuse the assigned trial judge, and another judge from the circuit was assigned to hear the recusal motion. After a hearing on the recusal motion, but prior to the entry of a written order, the new judge held a hearing on a contempt motion that had been filed in the case before the recusal motion. The new judge issued an order holding the Husband in contempt. The judge later entered an order recusing the judge originally assigned to the case. The Supreme Court granted the Husband's application to appeal the contempt order, and it vacated that order because the judge assigned to decide the recusal motion lacked authority to act on unrelated matters in the case. View "Horn v. Shepherd" on Justia Law

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This case involved the trial court's attempts to compel appellant Ronald Massey to comply with the terms of the parties' 2005 divorce decree and a series of later contempt orders obtained by appellee Angela Massey. In this appeal, Husband challenged the last two 2012 contempt orders; Husband's claims regarding a June 27 contempt order were barred by the dismissal of his previous appeal from that order. However, Husband was correct that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter an October 16 contempt order because his previous appeal was still pending with the Supreme Court on that date. Therefore the Supreme Court dismissed Husband's attempted second appeal of the June 27 contempt order and vacated the October 16 contempt order. View "Massey v. Massey" on Justia Law