Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

This case arose after a divorce decree between Husband and Wife. After a hearing, the trial court entered a final order granting primary physical custody of the children to Husband and visitation to Wife. Thereafter, Wife filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied. Wife then appealed this ruling, contending, among other things, that the trial court erred by relying on evidence adduced at the temporary hearing. The court held that the record and the trial court's final order explicitly showed that the trial court relied on evidence from the temporary hearing to reach its final decision regarding custody of the children and there was no indication that the parties were notified in advance that this was going to happen. As a result, pursuant to Pace v. Pace, the court reversed the trial court's final order and remanded for further proceedings.

Wife appealed the trial court's orders subsequent to a divorce decree, contending that the trial court erred by retroactively reducing husband's alimony obligation and by failing to grant wife attorney fees. The court held that the trial court erred by modifying husband's alimony obligation pursuant to Hendrix v. Stone. The court held, however, that the trial court's decision to have each party pay his or her own attorney fees stands because wife waived her right to pursue this argument. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Wife appealed a final judgment of divorce, contending that, in awarding primary physical custody of the parties' two children to husband, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider evidence of alleged family violence perpetrated by husband against her and that the trial court erred by failing to enter written findings of fact explaining its reasons for granting primary physical custody to husband. The court held that the trial court did not fail to consider the evidence of family violence and that the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in awarding physical custody of the children to husband, with wife having joint legal custody and extensive visitation. The court also held that wife could not complain about the trial court's child support calculations where she specifically asked that court to use her child support worksheet. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Wife was granted an appeal from the superior court's denial of her motion for new trial, as amended, following its entry of a final judgment and decree of divorce and order of custody (decree). Wife appealed the decree's awards of custody, child support, and equitable division on the basis that the evidence at trial did not support them. The court held that, contrary to wife's contention, the court did not terminate her cross-examination of the guardian ad litem. The court also held that there was ample evidence to support an award of custody to the grandparents based on the best interest of their grandson. Although the court found wife's exact amount of income difficult to discern, it determined from all relevant circumstances, including her expenses and the fact that husband did not work when he lived in the home, that she must have had a minimum income of $5,000 a month and was capable of earning substantially more than that. Finally, there was no merit to wife's remaining complaint that the superior court erred by ordering her to pay $20,000 to husband as an equitable division of property. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Caveators Celia Beth Simmons (Beth) and Lisa Kay Norton (Lisa) appealed from the grant of summary judgment to the propounder of the will of their father, Charles Powell Norton (Charles). Beth and Lisa contended that the superior court erred in granting summary judgment on their claim that the will was the product of undue influence on the part of their brother, Samuel. The court held that there was simply no evidence that Samuel exerted any influence over Charles in the making of the will and it was therefore not error to grant summary judgment.

Husband and Wife entered into a Prenuptial Agreement before their marriage in 1990. The parties divorced twenty years later, and following a hearing, the trial court agreed to enforce the Prenuptial Agreement and incorporated it into the parties' Final Decree. Wife appealed, primarily contending that the trial court erred in enforcing the Prenuptial Agreement. The court held that the evidence supported the trial court's conclusions that full financial disclosures were made to Wife before she agreed to sign the Prenuptial Agreement and that the agreement was not unconscionable. Furthermore, Wife had not shown that the increase in Husband's net worth over time presented a change of circumstances that would make enforcement of the agreement unfair and unreasonable. The court also held that Wife was also incorrect in her assertion that the trial court erred by entering its Final Decree despite pending counterclaims by Wife where the record revealed that all Wife's counterclaims dealt with matters that were specifically covered by the Prenuptial Agreement. The court dismissed Wife's remaining claim and affirmed the judgment.

Wife and Husband were divorced and in the Final Decree, Wife was awarded primary physical custody of the parties' two minor children, and was also awarded child support. Husband appealed, contending that these rulings were in error. The court held that there was evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that Wife should be awarded primary physical custody of the parties' children and therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The court also held that the trial court did not err in determining the child support obligation where the trial court properly ascertained the reasons for Wife's occupational choices and the reasonableness of these choices. The court further held that Husband's argument that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to abate his child support obligation or award him child support during summer visitation was without merit.

Wife appealed the trial court's final divorce decree, contending that the district court erred in enforcing a postnuptial agreement and in determining that child custody was governed by the postnuptial agreement. The court held that the trial court's authority to find full and fair disclosure from wife's extensive familiarity with husband's business dealings and personal financial condition was not altered, but was further supported, by the affirmation in the agreement that each party had "knowingly and voluntarily chosen to forego" formal discovery, investigation, and analysis of the other party's financial condition "and accept the provisions of this agreement on [the] basis of information acquired prior to this date without further such discovery." The court also held that the trial court did not base its custody decision solely on the postnuptial agreement, but expressly and properly based that decision on its alternative application of the "best interests" standard pursuant to OCGA 19-9-3. Therefore, pretermitting the postnuptial agreement's relevance and the applicability of OCGA 19-9-5, the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's custody award.

Husband challenged a divorce decree and the trial court's post-decree order denying his motion for a copy of the trial transcript. The court held that the trial court erred in denying the transcript motion and the court should not resolve the challenges to the divorce decree without the transcript. Accordingly, the court reversed the transcript order and remanded the case.

The court granted wife's non-frivolous application for discretionary appeal of the parties' final judgment of divorce. Wife contended, inter alia, that the trial court abused its discretion by entering its decree nunc pro tunc so as to eliminate a "transition period" from supervised to unsupervised visitation that the trial court had orally announced it was providing for the welfare of the couple's children. The court held that, under the unique circumstances of the case, the parties' minor children qualified here as innocent third parties whose interests were adversely affected by the entry of the visitation provision nunc pro tunc because that action eliminated a provision expressly meant for the children's best welfare. Accordingly, the court held that the trial court abused its discretion when it made the visitation period nunc pro tunc to April 13, 2010. The court held that it was unnecessary to address wife's remaining enumerations of error.