Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the family court issued pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws 15-7-7(a)(3) terminating Father's parental rights to his son, J.B. holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.The Department of Children, Youth, and Families filed a petition in the family court to terminate the parental rights of Father based on two grounds of unfitness. After a trial, the trial justice found clear and convincing evidence that Father was not a fit parent who could care for J.B. immediately and that it was in J.B.'s best interests to terminate Father's parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that competent evidence supported the findings of the trial justice that Father was an unfit parent pursuant to section 15-7-7(a)(3) and that termination of Father's parental rights was in J.B.'s best interests. View "In re J.B." on Justia Law

Victoria Fietzek and Henry Fietzek cross-appealed a divorce judgment. Victoria argued the district court erred in: (1) its Ruff-Fischer analysis; (2) the distribution of the marital estate; (3) the valuation of the assets; (4) finding Henry did not commit economic waste; (5) limiting the duration of spousal support; and (6) in not awarding attorney’s fees to her. Henry argued only that the district court erred in the duration and amount of spousal support awarded to Victoria. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s Ruff-Fischer analysis, the court’s findings of fact in regard to the equitable distribution of the martial estate, the court’s finding that Henry did not commit economic waste, and the court’s denial of attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court reversed the order for spousal support and remanded for the district court to make additional findings regarding spousal support and, if necessary, reconsider the allocation of property. View "Fietzek v. Fietzek" on Justia Law

After the Carter County, Oklahoma District Court adjudicated S.J.W. (child) as deprived, Parents-appellants appealed. S.J.W., through child's attorney, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. S.J.W. claimed the Chickasaw Nation had exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) based on the plain language in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because S.J.W. resided within the Chickasaw reservation, notwithstanding the fact that S.J.W. was an Indian child and member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation. Parents raised two issues to the Oklahoma Supreme Court: (1) whether Oklahoma courts have subject matter jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian child's deprived case arising in Carter County, which was completely within the external, territorial boundaries of the Chickasaw reservation; and (2) if the court did have jurisdiction, whether a delay in the adjudication hearing deprived Parents of their due process rights. With respect to the first issue, the Supreme Court held the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate S.J.W. deprived. Pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b), the State of Oklahoma shared concurrent territorial jurisdiction with an Indian child's tribe when the Indian child is not domiciled or residing on the Indian child's tribe's reservation. "In our dual federalism system, an Oklahoma district court's subject matter jurisdiction may be limited by the Oklahoma or U.S. Constitution. U.S. Const., amend. X; Okla. Const. art. I, §§ 1, 7(a)." In addition, the Supreme Court found no violation of the Parents' right to due process of law as any delay was not "arbitrary, oppressive or shocking to the conscience of the court," and Parents had a meaningful opportunity to defend throughout the proceeding. View "In the Matter of S.J.W." on Justia Law

Petitioners Grant and Kalan Lloyd sought to adopt minor child L.B.L. without Mother Sara Pollard's consent. The District Court found that Child was eligible for adoption without Mother's consent. Mother appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court. "Ideally, the child's best interests run together with the parent's. In practice these principles seldom conflict, because a trial court may usually give equal effect to both. Sometimes, this can only be done by ensuring the parent's due process rights are protected, then considering which outcome is in the child's best interests." Here, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found that the Court of Civil Appeals specifically acknowledged the best interests of the child standard, but allowed it to be outweighed by other considerations in reaching its conclusion. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals opinion, affirmed the trial court, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of the Adoption of L.B.L." on Justia Law

Appellants (father and mother) challenged multiple circuit court orders finding both parents neglected their children and ordering the children's removal from their home. Appellants were the parents of B.R., S.R., and J.R. Both parents had a significant history with the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF), including reports alleging one or both parents were manufacturing or selling methamphetamines in the home with the children present. In March 2021, based on criminal allegations against mother (relating to her purchase and use of methamphetamine), DCYF filed a motion for ex parte removal of the children from the home. The trial court granted the motion and found that mother’s continued involvement in drug trafficking beginning in 2015, and her risk-taking behavior related thereto, “demonstrate that the children’s health or life are in imminent danger if they are allowed to remain in the parents’ home.” The court awarded DCYF protective supervision of the children. In May 2022, following a dispositional hearing, the court found that return of the children to their home would be contrary to their welfare because neither parent had corrected the behavior that led to the children’s initial removal. Father and mother each appealed separately. The New Hampshire Supreme Court accepted the two appeals and consolidated them. Parents argued both findings were unsupported by the evidence. Father also argued that the court’s orders failed to provide specific written findings as required by RSA 169-C:6-b, III (2022). After review of the circuit court orders, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "In re J.R.; In re S.R.; In re B.R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the family court concluding that a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) entered in 2001, rather than a final order of divorce, must control the division of Husband's retirement benefit, holding that Husband's motion to vacate the QDRO was untimely under W. Va. R. Civ. P. 60(b).The parties in this case were divorced by a final order entered by the circuit court in 2000, and the circuit court entered a QDRO in 2001. In 2020, Husband filed a motion to vacate the QDRO, arguing that Wife was only entitled to the amount contained in the divorce order. The family court denied the motion after determining that the QDRO and final divorce order contained conflicting terms regarding the division of Husband's retirement benefit, and therefore, the QDRO must be enforced. The Supreme Court affirmed after considering Husband's argument pursuant to Rule 60(b), holding that Husband's requested relief was not timely sought. View "Carl A. v. Deborah A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court denying the motion to intervene filed by Red Lack Tribe of Chippewa Indians in this termination of parental rights matter, holding that there was no error.After the juvenile court granted the State's motion to adjudicate Children as minors for purposes of Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a) the State sought certification. The Tribe sought intervention, but the State argued against intervention because Children were not Indian children for purposes of ICWA. The juvenile court granted intervention but then vacated its order granting the Tribe's motion to intervene. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Children were not currently Indian children for purposes of ICWA, and the juvenile court did not err in denying the Tribe's motion to intervene. View "In re Manuel C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court concluding that the parties' signed voluntary declaration of paternity (VDP) should be set aside because of the parties' fraud and a mutual mistake but that Taylor Scott should nevertheless be adjudicated the child's father, holding that there was no error.Sarah Benson and Taylor Scott, an unmarried couple, signed a VDP representing that Scott was the father of Benson's child when both parties know that Scott was not the child's biological father. When Benson later cut off contact between Scott and the child Scott filed a complaint seeking joint legal and physical custody. In response, Benson challenged the VDP. The district court set aside the VDP but concluded that, under the Utah Uniform Parentage Act, Scott should be adjudicated to be the child's father. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in looking to the factors set forth in Utah Code 78B-16-608 to disregard the genetic test results that would have excluded Scott as the child's father. View "Scott v. Benson" on Justia Law

M.C. (mother) appealed the termination of parental rights to two of her children (the children) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She contends that the juvenile court failed to determine whether it had jurisdiction over the children under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (the UCCJEA). The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) responded that by failing to raise the issue, mother forfeited her right to raise it on appeal; alternatively, the Department argued that substantial evidence supports the court’s assertion of jurisdiction in this case. Mother also contended the juvenile court and the Department failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) and related California statutes.   The Second Appellate District concluded the forfeiture doctrine does not bar mother’s challenge to the juvenile court’s compliance with the UCCJEA, and the error requires conditional reversal of the parental rights termination orders with directions to the court to undertake the process that the UCCJEA requires. This disposition will permit mother to raise the unopposed ICWA arguments she makes on appeal. The court explained that here, the usual benefit from the application of the forfeiture doctrine—to encourage parties to bring issues to the trial court—would not be conferred under the facts of this case. Thus, although the Department or mother could have done more to urge the juvenile court to undertake the UCCJEA process, the objective facts supporting the need for such a process were readily apparent from the record. View "In re L.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged federal and wiretap violations and state common law claims against Defendant, her ex-husband, and co-Defendant, his attorney. She alleged that during a child custody proceeding in Nevada state court, Defendant had secretly recorded conversations between her and their child and that co-Defendant had filed selectively edited transcripts of the illegally recorded conversations on the state court’s public docket. The district court concluded that co-Defendant’s alleged conduct involved First Amendment petitioning activity, which is protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The district court entered default judgment against Defendant. The district court awarded Plaintiff $10,000 in statutory damages under the Federal Wiretap Act, but it did not award punitive damages or litigation costs, nor did it discuss or award other categories of damages ostensibly available on her Nevada common-law claims.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s claims against co-Defendant as barred under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and entering default judgment against Defendant. The panel held that co-Defendant violated the Federal Wiretap Act, and it agreed with the district court that the vicarious consent doctrine did not apply and that co-Defendant’s conduct was not protected under Bartnick v. Vopper, which carves out a narrow First Amendment exception to the Federal Wiretap Act for matters of public importance. The panel held that filing illegally obtained evidence on a public court docket is conduct not immunized under Noerr-Pennington, and the Federal Wiretap Act unambiguously applied to co-Defendant’s conduct. Further, the court held that the district court failed to adequately address other categories of damages to which Plaintiff might be entitled. View "LYUDMYLA PYANKOVSKA, ET AL V. SEAN ABID, ET AL" on Justia Law