Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

In this action involving a district court's division of Jon Holliday's retirement account in a divorce proceeding with Tamara Holliday the Supreme Court held that Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-2403(c)'s tolling provision prevents a divorce decree dividing the parties' interests in a retirement account with the Kansas Public Employees Retirement System (KPERS) from becoming dormant until benefits become payable to the plan member.In 2009, Jon and Tamara divorced. The district court divided Jon's not-year-payable retirement account with KPERS equally between them and directed Tamara to prepare a qualified domestic relations order to "effectuate" the division. In 2021, Jon brought this action claiming that Tamara's judgment from the divorce had gone dormant because she had not sent a copy of it to KPERS as instructed and requesting that the court extinguish Tamara's interest in the account. The district court denied relief, but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-2403(c) tolled the dormancy period until Jon's benefits from his KPERS account became payable. View "In re Marriage of Holliday" on Justia Law

In proceedings involving divorce and domestic-violence-civil-protection-order (DVCPO) cases that had been pending for more than five years the Supreme Court denied M.D.'s motion to enforce this Court's writ of procedendo but granted his alternative request to declare M.A.D. a vexatious litigator under Sup. Ct. Prac. R. 4.03(B), holding that M.A.D. had persistently engaged in frivolous conduct in the Supreme Court without reasonable cause.Previously, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and granted M.D. a writ of procedendo ordering Judge Reeve Kelsey to rule on pending motions and to proceed promptly to final hearings in the underlying cases. M.D. moved to enforce the writ or, alternatively, to declare M.A.D. a vexatious litigator. The Supreme Court denied the motion to enforce but granted M.D.'s request to declare M.A.D. a vexatious litigator under Rule 4.03(B), holding that M.A.D.'s filings were calculated attempts to prevent Judge Kelsey's compliance with the previously-issued writ of procedendo. View "State ex rel. M.D. v. Kelsey" on Justia Law

Swan and Hatchett are the parents of triplets born in 2016. They share custody. At a hearing addressing child support, Swan testified from a profit and loss statement that he had prepared for his self-employment as a tax preparer, real estate broker, mortgage broker, and appraiser, that his net income as of August 2017 was $40,498. The trial court found Swan’s bookkeeping poor, and after adding back certain deductions Swan had taken, calculated Swan’s income as $110,940 per year. The trial court ordered Swan to pay child support of $2,350 per month, retroactive to the beginning of 2017. Hatchett was not working. The trial court did not impute income to her due to insufficient information. In September 2018, Swan requested changes to the order, including ordering Hatchett to seek work and waiving interest on certain arrears. The court ordered Hatchett to undergo a vocational evaluation paid for by Swan. The parties stipulated that Swan was “entitled to a hardship when calculating child support.”The trial court denied his request to reduce the amount of child support and awarded Hatchett $10,000 in need-based attorney’s fees. The court of appeal reversed. The trial court erred by ignoring Swan’s evidence of his income, that he had a new child, and that Hatchett’s income had increased. The trial court’s refusal to consider Swan's evidence of his income for child support purposes conflicted with its finding that he could pay Hatchett’s attorney’s fees. View "Swan v. Hatchett" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's pro se petition for a writ of prohibition challenging the trial court's rulings in criminal cases and a separate civil case, holding that Petitioner failed to show cause why he should not be pro se barred for his repeated misuse of the Court's limited resources.Petitioner, an inmate whose most recent conviction was for possession of a controlled substance, began filing petitions in the Supreme Court in 2018 pertaining to several different criminal cases and a dependency case regarding his children. Petitioner filed the instant prohibition petition challenging the trial court's denial of a motion and seeking to dismiss the case. The Supreme Court denied the petition and directed Petitioner to show cause why he should not be barred from filing further pro se requests for relief. The Supreme Court then sanctioned Petitioner, holding that Petitioner had abused the Court's limited judicial resources. View "Hill v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals determining that the juvenile court had subject-matter jurisdiction over this case, rejecting Father's statutory interpretation argument about the interplay between the child protection and predatory offender registration statutes, and affirming the termination of Father's parental rights by the juvenile court, holding that Father was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.While Father was incarcerated for an offense that arose out of the same circumstances as an offense enumerated in the predatory offender registration statute Mother gave birth to H.Q., who was adjudicated as a child in need of protection or services. The juvenile court terminated Father's parental rights to H.Q. because of his conviction. The court of appeals affirmed the juvenile court's termination of Father's parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the juvenile court did not err in determining that clear and convincing evidence supported the statutory ground for termination in Father's case. View "In re Welfare of Child of S.B.G." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the surviving parents of their deceased daughter, brought an action to nullify their daughter’s marriage to defendant, Eden Kol, based upon the allegation that their daughter and defendant entered into the marriage for the sole purpose of evading federal immigration laws to obtain permanent resident status for defendant. Defendant filed an exception of no cause of action, alleging the petition failed to state a cause of action for nullification of marriage under the Louisiana Civil Code. The trial court granted the exception, and the court of appeal affirmed. Finding no reversible error, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Wederstrandt v. Kol" on Justia Law

The putative biological father sought to rebut, pursuant to La. C.C. art. 198, a presumption set forth in La. C.C. art. 185, despite having filed his avowal petition more than one year after the birth of the child and even though no “bad faith” was found on the part of the mother. After years of litigation on preliminary issues, the appellate court reviewed an earlier district court ruling, which found that La. C.C. art. 198 was not unconstitutional, and reversed the district court, concluding Article 198 was unconstitutional as applied. On review, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that under the facts presented here, that the putative biological father had no fundamental constitutional right to parent a child born to a mother, who was married to and living with another man at the time of the child’s conception and birth. Therefore, the Court reversed the appellate court, reinstated the district court judgment holding that La. C.C. art. 198 was constitutional, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Kinnett v. Kinnett" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court finding that Father committed an act of domestic or family violence against Child and that he represented a credible threat to the family's safety and thus granting Mother's petition for an ex parte petition order, holding that the trial court's evidence-based findings supported its judgment.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the evidence presented supported the trial court's finding that Father committed an act of domestic or family violence; and (2) Mother presented probative evidence to support the trial court's finding that Father posed a credible threat to Mother or Child's safety. View "S.D. v. G.D." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the county court in favor of the decedent's brother in this estate case, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the county court erred.Jordon R. Wiggins died, leaving two minor children and an ex-wife. In response to a claim against the estate regarding life insurance coverage that Wiggins was required under the divorce decree to maintain for the children's benefit, Wiggins's ex-wife, as guardian and next friend of the minor children, his brother, and his father, as personal representative of Wiggins's estate, entered into a settlement agreement. Thereafter, the parties jointly filed a petition for a declaration of their rights and obligations under the agreement. The county court ruled in favor of the brother, and the ex-wife appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the cause with directions for the county court to rescind the agreement and conduct further proceedings, holding that a mutual mistake as to the existence of a fact that was a material inducement to the contract is not ground for reformation, although it may be ground for rescission. View "In re Estate of Wiggins" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued a Missouri judge for putting his kids in jail twice, once after a custody hearing and again after ordering law enforcement to pick them up in Louisiana. The complaint alleged that Defendant’s action of placing Plaintiff’s children in jail and then later in a juvenile-detention facility violated their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Defendant argued that he should receive absolute immunity, but the district court disagreed and ruled that the case could proceed. At issue on appeal is whether judicial immunity shields these acts.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court explained that Defendant’s decision to personally escort the kids to jail took what would otherwise be a judicial act too far. Judges have the authority to order an officer or a bailiff to escort an unruly litigant to jail. The court wrote that Defendant crossed the line; however, when he personally escorted the kids to jail, stood there while they removed their clothes and belongings, and personally came back an hour later to release them. Further, the court explained that here, even if Defendant had no “express authority” to issue the pick-up order, he is immune because he had jurisdiction to issue one. He cannot be sued, in other words, no matter how erroneous his interpretation of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act may be. View "D. Bart Rockett v. The Honorable Eric Eighmy" on Justia Law