Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) governs state court adoption and foster care proceedings involving Indian children, requiring placement of an Indian child according to the Act’s hierarchical preferences absent a finding of “good cause” to depart from them, 25 U.S.C. 1915(a), (b). Indian families or institutions from any tribe (not just the tribe to which the child has a tie) outrank unrelated non-Indians or non-Indian institutions. The child’s tribe may alter the prioritization order. The preferences of the Indian child or her parent generally cannot trump those set by statute or tribal resolution. In involuntary proceedings, the Indian child’s parent or custodian and tribe must be given notice of any custody proceedings, and the right to intervene. ICWA requires a party seeking to terminate parental rights or to remove an Indian child from an unsafe environment to satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services; a court cannot order relief unless the party demonstrates, by a heightened burden of proof and expert testimony, that the child is likely to suffer serious harm. A biological parent who voluntarily gives up an Indian child cannot necessarily choose the child’s placement. The tribe has a right to intervene and can enforce ICWA’s placement preferences. States must keep certain records and transmit specified information to the Secretary of the Interior.The Supreme Court concluded that ICWA is consistent with Congress’s Article I authority and that conflicting state family law is preempted. Requirements concerning “active efforts” to keep Indian families together do not command the states to deploy their executive or legislative power to implement federal policy. The provisions apply to “any party” who initiates an involuntary proceeding–private individuals, agencies, and government entities. Legislation that applies “evenhandedly” to state and private actors does not typically implicate the Tenth Amendment. ICWA’s requirement that state agencies perform a “diligent search” for placements that satisfy ICWA’s hierarchy also applies to both private and public parties. Congress can require state courts to enforce federal law and may impose ancillary record-keeping requirements related to state-court proceedings without violating the Tenth Amendment.The Court did not address an equal protection challenge to ICWA’s placement preferences and a non-delegation challenge to the provision allowing tribes to alter the placement preferences, citing lack of standing to raise the challenges. View "Haaland v. Brackeen" on Justia Law

Jay Wright appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to his ex-wife, Kristie Parish. Wright and Parish were married in 2002 and divorced in 2019. Before they were married, Wright and Parish, as single persons, purchased two adjacent parcels of real property in Island Park, and their ownership of the property did not change following their marriage. A magistrate court presided over their divorce proceedings and the distribution of their community property. The magistrate court classified as community property certain loan payments and improvements that had been made for the benefit of the Island Park Properties but specifically declined to divide the properties because the court concluded the properties were separate property and that it “lack[ed] authority to divide the property.” The magistrate court concluded that Wright and Parish “apparently” owned the properties as tenants-in-common, each with a fifty percent interest, though it never made a definitive ruling on each party’s interest, concluding only that they were “joint owners[.]” Roughly one year after the magistrate court entered its final judgment for the divorce, Wright filed suit seeking a partition of the Island Park Properties and for Parish to deed them to him, arguing in part that his ownership interest in the properties exceeded the fifty percent determination that the magistrate court had ostensibly made. In response, Parish moved for summary judgment, arguing that Wright’s claim that he was entitled to a greater ownership interest was precluded by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The district court granted Parish’s motion for summary judgment after determining that the issues in Wright’s complaint had already been litigated in the prior divorce proceedings. As a result, the district court concluded that the proceeds from the sale of the properties should be equally divided between Wright and Parish. Wright appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court determined the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Parish, and remanded the case for the trial court to consider whether Wright could produce evidence to overcome the rebuttable presumption of equal ownership in the properties. View "Wright v. Parish" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting Mother's motion for default and making final a temporary child support order from 2018, holding that the district court erred.In this appeal, Father challenged a district court order granting Mother's motion for default and making final a 2018 temporary child support order, arguing, among other things, that the district court violated his right to due process by granting Motion's motion for default before the closing of his twenty-day response window under Wyo. R. Civ. P. 6(c)(2). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Father timely filed his notice of appeal, and therefore, this Court had jurisdiction; (2) the district court violated Father's right to due process by granting Mother's motion before Father's opportunity to respond expired; and (3) the district court abused its discretion by making the 2018 temporary child support order the final order without obtaining sufficient financial information under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 20-2-308. View "Tucker v. Tucker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition precluding the circuit court from enforcing its September 30, 2022 order denying the Delaware Tribe of Indians' motion to transfer the underlying abuse and neglect proceedings to the District Court of the Delaware Tribe pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901 to -1963, holding that the circuit court erred in denying the motion to transfer this action to the tribal court.The Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) filed a second amended abuse and neglect petition alleging that Father abandoned I.R. Father, who claimed to be a member of the Tribe, later indicated his desire to voluntarily relinquish his parental rights. The Tribe successfully moved to intervene in the proceedings, after which the court concluded that the ICWA was not applicable to these proceedings. The court thus denied the Tribe's motion to transfer this action to the tribal court. This petition seeking a writ of prohibition followed. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the circuit court (1) erred in determining that the ICWA was inapplicable to this case; and (2) clearly erred in determining that good cause existed to deny transfer of this matter to the tribal court. View "State ex rel. Del. Tribe of Indians v. Honorable Nowicki-Eldridge" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the order of the trial court finding that Mother failed to comply with her service plan and that termination of Mother's rights was in her children's best interest, holding that the trial court's findings were supported by legally sufficient evidence.Mother's parental rights were terminated pursuant to Tex. Fam. Code 161.001(b)(1)(O), under which termination may be ordered if the parent as failed to comply with a court-ordered service plan "as a result of the child's removal from the parent...for the abuse or neglect of the child." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's findings that Mother's acts and omissions, which rendered her an unfit parent, were within the statutory definition of "abuse or neglect." View "In re A.A." on Justia Law

In this divorce proceeding, the Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the trial court granting Father the exclusive right to determine the primary residence of the couple's four children, holding that the trial court erred in failing to conduct an interview of the parties' thirteen-year-old daughter, M.N., and the error was harmful.Under Tex. Fam. Code 153.009(a) parents in a divorce or custody proceeding may request either an interview of the children by the judge or a jury trial but not both. Mother demanded a jury trial but later withdrew her demand to take advance of section 153.009(a)'s mandate that the trial court interview M.N. The court, however, declined to conduct the interview on the ground that Mother had not filed a written motion. In the final divorce decree the parties were appointed joint managing conservators of the children and Father was granted the right to determined the children's primary residence. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court erred by declining to undertake its mandatory obligation to interview M.N.; and (2) the error was not harmless because it resulted in the loss of a jury trial on disputed fact questions. View "In re J.N." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the circuit court terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father after issuing a ruling adjudicating them as abusive and neglectful, holding that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction.The conduct leading to the subject abuse and neglect petition occurred while a Pennsylvania family was at a relative's home in West Virginia. The circuit court exercised temporary emergency jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody and Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act and temporarily removed the children from the care of their parents. The circuit court adjudicated Parents as abusive and neglectful before contacting Parents' home state of Pennsylvania about jurisdiction. The circuit court entered the adjudicatory order after Pennsylvania declined jurisdiction. The court then entered its order terminating Parents' parental rights. The Supreme Court vacated the order, holding that the limitations of the circuit court's temporary emergency jurisdiction did not permit it to entertain an adjudication of the abuse and neglect petition unless and until Pennsylvania declined jurisdiction. View "In re A.T.-1" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court denying Petitioners' motion to intervene in this abuse and neglect case involving their niece, G.G., holding that the circuit court did not err in denying the motion.The West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources instituted an abuse and neglect proceeding against G.G.'s mother and father. Ultimately, G.G.'s biological father voluntarily relinquished his parental rights, and G.G.'s mother's parental rights were involuntarily terminated after a hearing. Thereafter, Respondents, G.G.'s foster parents, filed a motion to intervene in the abuse and neglect proceedings seeking to adopt G.G. Petitioners then filed their motion to intervene, seeking permanent placement of G.G. The circuit court granted Respondents' motion and denied Petitioners' motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no basis to set aside the circuit court's determination. View "In re G.G." on Justia Law

Audrey Charlton appealed a magistrate court’s judgment modifying the residential custody of the parties’ minor children to give their father, Russell Pottenger, primary physical custody and awarding Charlton physical custody on alternating weekends during the school year and one-half of each summer vacation. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded the magistrate court erred when it failed to address Charlton’s primary ground for modification in its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Therefore, the Court vacated the magistrate court’s judgment modifying custody and its findings of fact and conclusions of law, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pottenger v. Charlton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals dismissing as untimely Mother's appeal from the juvenile court's termination of the parental rights of Mother and Father, holding that Mother's time to file a notice of appeal was extended in this case.After a hearing, the juvenile court terminated entered an order terminating Father's and Mother's parental rights to their two children. Father timely filed his notice of appeal, but the court of appeals determined that Mother's appeal was not filed within fifteen days of the termination order, as required by Utah R. App. P. 52(a). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that Utah R. App. P. 52(c), together with Father's appeal, extended Mother's time to file a notice of appeal. View "In re C.D.S." on Justia Law