Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Child K.T. was born June 2016. Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Families (CYF) first became involved with her when she tested positive for cocaine at birth; CYF had been involved with Mother since 2009 regarding an older child. Prompted by continued housing instability, a report of intimate partner violence between Mother and Child’s biological father, and Mother’s failure to follow through with service referrals, CYF sought a finding of dependency in early 2017. For more than two years, while Child remained in a foster home, and prior to CYF filing for termination, Mother was inconsistent with participation in CYF’s recommended services. The orphan court ultimately concluded “terminating the parental rights of Mother does not serve the needs and welfare of the child.” A majority of the Court of Appeals determined the record supported the trial court’s “evaluation of the bond that clearly exists between Mother and Child, and its determination that this bond was worth preserving[,]” and the court was thus within its discretion to deny termination. In this discretionary appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the court that denied CYF’s petition for involuntary termination of a mother’s parental rights gave “primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child” as required by 23 Pa.C.S. §2511(b). More specifically, the Court considered whether the court evaluating the parent-child bond must determine whether the bond was necessary and beneficial to the child, and severing the bond would cause the child to experience extreme emotional consequences, rather than a mere “adverse” impact. Upon review, the Supreme Court found error and thus (1) vacated the appellate court's orders and (2) remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "In the Int. of: K.T." on Justia Law

Gabriel Asumeng appealed a judgment dividing the marital estate and awarding Vivian Asiama primary residential responsibility of the parties’ children. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not clearly err by awarding Asiama primary residential responsibility; however, the court erred in its distribution of the marital estate. View "Asiama v. Asumeng, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal from a decision of the court of appeals requiring Adoptive Parents to provide notice to biological Father of the temporary custody of Child, rending the trial court's temporary custody order void for lack of personal jurisdiction, holding that this Court lacked appellate jurisdiction.After Child was placed full-time with Adoptive Parents, Adoptive Parents petitioned to adopt child and separately moved for temporary custody. Father was not served the petition or motions. After a hearing, the superior court granted Adoptive Parents temporary custody, determining that it was in Child's best interests while the adoption petition was pending. Father later filed a motion to set aside the order of custody on the grounds that he was not given notice. The trial court denied the motion. Adoptive Parents appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the superior court's order granting temporary custody was not a final judgment because it neither disposed of all claims for all parties nor stated that there was no just reason for delay. View "P.L. v. A.H." on Justia Law

S.B. (father) appealed from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights over his daughter H.B. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26. Father contends only that the juvenile court erred in finding the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) inapplicable based on the record of inquiry made by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) with H.B.’s extended family members.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the Department inquired about Indian ancestry with representatives from both sides of two generational levels of H.B.’s family. It contacted every person its interviewees identified as a likely source of information about ancestry. The juvenile court had an adequate basis on which to conclude the Department fulfilled its inquiry obligations under section 224.2, subdivision (b), and that neither the Department nor the court had reason to know or believe that H.B. is an Indian child. Under the court’s deferential standard of review, the juvenile court did not need the Department to contact every unnamed extended family member that had attended a court hearing, regardless of difficulty in doing so, to reach its conclusion. View "In re H.B." on Justia Law

Nicole Fitzpatrick obtained a dissolution of her marriage to Jeremy Fitzpatrick. The couple had minor children and significant marital assets, including real property, bank accounts, investments, and personal possessions. Among these were investments in oil and gas assets. The issue this case presented for the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s review centered on the Court of Civil Appeals decision regarding the division of the oil and gas assets. During the course of the marriage, Husband pursued a mutual goal of investments in oil and gas assets through two different ventures. He inextricably tied the Bakken and Energy deals and encumbered marital assets. The trial court found that all the A and B units of both the Bakken and Energy properties were acquired during the marriage through joint efforts of both parties, and were marital property subject to division. Because part of the properties' value lay in their future growth, the trial court considered the most equitable form of property division. The court ordered that future distributions and proceeds flowing from both sets of A and B units were to be held in constructive trust for both parties' benefit, and for Husband to distribute her equal marital share to Wife. COCA reversed the trial court's decisions regarding the Energy A and B units, finding that the trial court should have determined the units' value and set a valuation date. COCA also found that the trial court's use of a constructive trust for the Energy units was not proper. However, COCA did not disturb the trial court's use of a constructive trust with regard to the Bakken units. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s authority to distribute the assets although they could not be valued at the time of the divorce decree; the Court concurred with the trial court’s imposition of a constructive trust to ensure protection of the assets’ future value. View "Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick" on Justia Law

J.N. was born in August 2013. On the eve of J.N.’s eighth birthday in August 2021, the State filed a petition alleging that J.N. was a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS) due to lack of proper parental care (CHINS- B) after an incident during which mother had dragged J.N. by her arms, causing bruises. The court transferred temporary custody to the Department for Children and Families (DCF). After a series of subsequent incidents at school and home, a trial court issued a disposition order that continued custody of J.N. with DCF, with a goal of reunification with her mother by June 2023. Mother appealed the CHINS disposition, Mother argued the State essentially used a CHINS petition to advance a claim of abuse, and that by accepting that framing, the trial court deprived her of notice and interpreted the statute in a manner that was unconstitutionally over broad. The Vermont Supreme Court determine the trial court’s findings did not fit the theory charged by the State. To the extent the State asked the Supreme Court to affirm the CHINS determination based on a theory of abuse, the Court agreed with Mother that this would create a problem of notice. Accordingly, the disposition was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "In re J.N." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of the juvenile court denying Father's request for an evidentiary hearing on his petition filed under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 388 to reinstate reunification services with Minor, holding that, under the circumstances, it was error to deny Father's request for an evidentiary hearing on his section 388 petition.A few days after Minor's birth, the Alameda County Social Services Agency filed a petition on his behalf under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 300. The juvenile court terminated the reunification services of Father, who had been incarcerated since before Minor was born, and set a Cal. Well. & Inst. Code 366.26 hearing. The day before the hearing, Father filed his section 388 petition, stating that he had not been provided with services despite the court's orders. The court denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the juvenile court erred in denying Father's request for an evidentiary hearing on his section 388 petition. View "In re Damari Y." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court entering an order removing reunification with Parents from the permanent plan as to their two children, holding that competent evidence supported the trial court's findings of fact, and those findings sustained the trial court's conclusions of law.The Catawba County Department of Social Services filed a juvenile petition alleging that Parents' infant daughter had been abused and that both she and Parents' son were neglected. The court adjudicated the daughter as both abused and neglected and the son as neglected. An ensuing permanency planning order made reunification the primary plan. Given the severity of the daughter's injuries and that neither parent had acknowledged responsibility for the injuries, however, the court modified the permanent plan, eliminating reunification from the plan and specifying a primary plan of adoption. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the evidence on the record supported the trial court's findings of fact, which supported the conclusions of law in the permanency planning order; and (2) the court of appeals addressed a constitutional issue that was not preserved for appellate review. View "In re J.M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a parent whose parental rights have been terminated cannot complain for the first time on appeal that the trial court failed to make the "extraordinary circumstances" and "best interest" findings under Tex. Fam. Code 263.401(b).The statute at issue provides that a court may retain a parental rights termination suit if it finds that extraordinary circumstances necessitate the child remaining in the temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services and that continuing that conservatorship is in the child's best interest. The court in this case made only one of the required findings when it extended the dismissal deadline. Mother appealed a subsequent judgment terminating her parental rights. The court of appeals vacated that judgment and dismissed the termination suit, concluding that the trial court lost jurisdiction by failing to make the additional required finding by the dismissal deadline. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the findings requirement is not jurisdictional, and therefore, the court of appeals erred in dismissing the action. View "In re Interest of J.S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court dismissing the underlying abuse and neglect petition against Father and remanded for the circuit court to adjudicate him as a neglectful parent, holding that the circuit court erred in dismissing the abuse and neglect petition.As to the merits of the underlying abuse and neglect allegations, the circuit court denied adjudication, concluding that a prior decision by the Court dictated its decision. The court then "reluctantly" ordered that the State return the child to Father despite his methamphetamine use. The child's guardian ad litem appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for the circuit court to adjudicate Father as a neglectful parent, holding that the case that the circuit court relied on was materially distinguishable from this case and that a parent threatens his child's well-being when he chronically abuses methamphetamine while entrusted as the child's custodian. View "In re S.C." on Justia Law