Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

This case concerns a social worker’s duty to inquire whether a child involved in a dependency proceeding “is or may be an Indian child” under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), a duty commonly referred to as the “initial inquiry.” At issue in this appeal was whether the initial inquiry encompassed available extended family members in every proceeding where a child is removed from home or in only those cases where the social worker takes temporary custody of the child without a warrant under exigent circumstances. Here, the child was initially taken into the custody of the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the department) by protective custody warrant before being detained by the juvenile court and later removed at disposition. Reunification efforts failed, and the juvenile court ultimately terminated parental rights and freed the child for adoption. Relying on In re Robert F., 90 Cal.App.5th 492 (2023) the department argued that because the child wasn’t initially removed from home without a warrant, the duty to interview available to extended family members never arose. The Court of Appeal concluded there was only one duty of initial inquiry, and that duty encompasses available extended family members no matter how the child is initially removed from home. Applying a narrower initial inquiry to the subset of dependencies that begin with a temporary removal by warrant frustrates the purpose of the initial inquiry and “den[ies] tribes the benefit of the statutory promise” of Assembly Bill No. 3176 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.). Because the department in this case failed to ask the child’s available extended family members whether the child had any Native American ancestry, the Court conditionally reversed the order terminating parental rights and remanded for the juvenile court to direct the department to complete its investigation. View "In re Delila D." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from a privately compensated temporary judge’s ruling that Plaintiff’s former husband, provided an accounting as to certain stock that was the subject of a marital settlement agreement (MSA). Among other things, Plaintiff contends Judge Johnson erred in issuing her ruling because she had withdrawn her request for an order for an accounting of her stock interest before the ruling.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court held that Plaintiff’s notice withdrawing her accounting RFO was effective when made on June 26, 2020. Judge Johnson’s ruling granting Chris’s restoration RFO tacitly supports our holding. That is, if Plaintiff’s withdrawal of her accounting RFO had not been effective when made, Judge Johnson would not have later had to order that RFO restored. Plaintiff’s ex-husband does not cite any case that holds that a party needs a trial court’s approval to withdraw a motion. Because Plaintiff withdrew her accounting RFO, Judge Johnson did not have jurisdiction to rule on it. Her ex-husband’s restoration RFO did not restore her withdrawn accounting RFO and Judge Johnson’s jurisdiction because her ex-husband filed it after April 1, 2020, the date Judge Johnson’s appointment terminated under the parties’ stipulation. View "Marriage of DeWolfe" on Justia Law

Niagara County’s Child Protective Services successfully petitioned in Niagara County Family Court to strip Plaintiff of her parental rights over her minor son. Plaintiff appealed the Family Court’s decision. While that appeal was pending, she brought suit in federal court against officials and entities involved in terminating her parental rights. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s suit pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.   The Second Circuit vacated the judgment insofar as the district court denied Plaintiff’s motions for leave to amend and for additional time to serve defendants. The court held that the RookerFeldman doctrine does not apply when an appeal remains pending in state court. Rooker-Feldman applies only after the state proceedings have ended. View "Hunter v. McMahon" on Justia Law

Miguel D. (Father) left his eight-year-old daughter, M.D., alone inside a locked apartment that had no electricity, an empty non-operable refrigerator, and no edible food. After waking up to find her father and his truck gone, M.D. climbed through a kitchen window to look for him and was found wandering the apartment complex. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a dependency petition alleging Father failed to adequately supervise and protect M.D., and willfully or negligently failed to provide her with adequate food and shelter. The juvenile court found the petition true, took jurisdiction, and removed M.D. from Father’s custody while he was offered reunification services. On appeal, Father argued the Court of Appeal had to reverse the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order because Welfare and Institutions Code section 300(b)(2) prohibited the juvenile court from assuming jurisdiction over a child “solely” due to a parent’s indigence or poverty. He further argued the Court should reverse the dispositional order because the Agency failed to demonstrate there were no reasonable means to protect M.D. without removing her from Father’s custody. Because the record did not support either contention, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re M.D." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Respondents' motion to dismiss the underlying complaint seeing writs of procedendo and mandamus to compel Respondents to proceed to a hearing on an ex parte motion seeking temporary custody of minor children, holding that dismissal was warranted.Specifically, the Supreme Court (1) sua sponte dismissed the claims against Sherrick; (2) dismissed the mandamus claim as to all Respondents based on Relator's failure to properly caption her complaint; and (3) dismissed the procedendo claims against all Respondents because none of the Respondents were properly named as defendants. View "Page v. Geauga County Probate & Juvenile Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the circuit court that it did not have statutory authority to terminate Father's parental rights against his wishes in the absence of an adoption, holding that S.D. Codified Laws 25-5A cannot be used to involuntarily terminate a parent's rights without a corresponding adoption.Mother filed a petition under chapter 25-5A seeking the involuntary termination of Father's parental rights, arguing that the termination was in the best interests of the parties' children and that Father's consent to the termination could not be waived. The circuit court denied the petition after an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in determining that chapter 25-5A cannot be used to involuntarily terminate a parent's parental rights. View "In re Interest of I.A.D." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the probate and family court judge denying M.H.'s motion to intervene in an action brought by J.M. against C.G. seeking custody and expanded parenting time and affirmed the judgments dismissing two other actions brought by M.H., holding that there was no clear error.In 2016, J.M. had executed a voluntary acknowledgment of parentage as to Amelia. In 2020, J.M. brought an action seeking legal custody and expanded parenting time. M.H., Amelia's putative biological father, moved to intervene in the action as Amelia's putative biological father. M.H. filed complaints in both equity and under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209C to establish his paternity of Amelia. The lower judge dismissed both complaints and denied the motion to intervene. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) to the extent M.H. challenged the VAP on the basis of fraud, his claim was time barred; and (2) there was no reason to address the constitutionality of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209B. View "J.M. v. C.G." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the sanctions order entered by the trial court against Joseph Monroe for pursuing a shareholder-derivative suit against his wife, Lisa Monroe, the majority shareholder of a closely held corporation, holding that the sections order violated Rule 1:1.Lisa and Joseph were the married co-owners of MEPCO Materials, Inc. One week after Joseph, as the then-sole director, filed for divorce he caused MEPCO to filed a civil action against Lisa for conversion and breach of fiduciary duty. After Joseph resigned his position at MEPCO he sought to convert the action to a shareholder-derivative action. The granted the motions, converted the suit to a derivative action, and then dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Thereafter, the trial court granted Lisa's motion for sanctions and ordered Joseph to pay $70,097 to MEPCO and Lisa. The Supreme Court vacated the order granting sanctions, holding (1) Joseph had standing to appeal the sanctions award; but (2) the sanctions order violated Rule 1:1 because it was not timely entered. View "Monroe v. Monroe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals upholding the district court's award of attorney fees based on conduct that occurred outside the context of litigation, holding that the district court exceeded the scope of its inherent authority when it awarded attorney fees.In this case arising from a post-dissolution, mediated settlement agreement between Appellant and Respondent regarding the treatment of a college savings account. The agreement required that the account be awarded to the parties' daughter when she turned twenty-one years old, but when their daughter reached that age Appellant took no action to transfer the account. Ultimately, after intervention on the part of the district court, the transfer became effective. Respondent moved for conduct-based attorney fees under Minn. Stat. 518.14. The district court granted the motion.. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court exceeded the scope of its inherent authority in awarding attorney fees because the award was not necessary to the performance of a judicial function. View "Buckner v. Robichaud" on Justia Law

In an appeal by allowance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether a proposed adoption by a mother’s long-term partner, in conjunction with the termination of the biological father’s parental rights, constituted “cause” to excuse the relinquishment requirement of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2903 with respect to the mother under Section 2901. The Court found that, in order to seek termination of Father’s parental rights and the proposed adoption by Partner under Section 2901, Mother had to demonstrate cause as to why she could not satisfy the statutory requirement, i.e., why she and Partner cannot marry, and then establish why the relinquishment requirement under Section 2711(d) was satisfied under the facts of her case. As the orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights without first evaluating whether Mother established cause under Section 2901, and given that Mother did not provide evidence pertaining to this “cause” analysis, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s order remanding to the orphans’ court for consideration of whether Mother could establish cause, as defined in this opinion, to excuse the relinquishment requirement under the facts of this case. View "In Re Adopt. of: M.E.L." on Justia Law