Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Two women were married, divorced, and later remarried. During their relationship, one partner conceived two children using sperm donors, and both women jointly raised the children. After their separation, the biological mother filed for dissolution of marriage, initially stating there were no children of the marriage. The other partner countered, asserting that both children were part of the marriage and sought a parenting plan, later petitioning for a determination of parentage under Montana’s presumptive parentage statute. Both parties presented evidence at trial regarding their respective roles in the children’s lives, with testimony from family, friends, and professionals about their parenting and the children’s best interests.The District Court of the Second Judicial District, Butte-Silver Bow County, held a bench trial and, after hearing evidence, amended the pleadings to consider whether the non-biological parent could be awarded a parental interest under Montana’s third-party parental interest statute (§ 40-4-228, MCA). The court found that both parties had impliedly consented to try this issue, as evidence relevant to the statute was presented without objection. The District Court concluded that the non-biological parent had established a child-parent relationship, that the biological mother had engaged in conduct contrary to the parent-child relationship, and that it was in the children’s best interests to continue their relationship with the non-biological parent. The court entered a parenting plan accordingly.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in amending the pleadings to conform to the evidence and properly awarded a third-party parental interest under § 40-4-228, MCA. The Supreme Court found the District Court’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and that the statutory requirements for awarding a third-party parental interest were met. View "In re Marriage of Rehbein and Paddock" on Justia Law

A child was removed from her parents’ care shortly after birth due to concerns about neglect. The mother, who has cognitive disabilities, was unable to provide basic care, resulting in the child’s hospitalization for weight loss. The father, who also has an intellectual disability, did not live with the mother and child and was unable to take custody when the child was discharged from the hospital. Both parents were found responsible for neglect, and the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) was awarded legal custody. The parents were ordered to meet certain conditions, including maintaining safe housing, engaging with mental health providers, and participating in parenting education, while DCYF was required to provide supportive services.The Circuit Court–Concord Family Division held periodic review hearings, finding the parents in only partial compliance with the orders. The mother struggled to care for the child outside of supervised settings and failed to secure appropriate housing. The father also lacked housing and did not fully engage with required services. After twelve months, the court determined that neither parent had corrected the conditions leading to the neglect finding and established adoption as the permanency plan. DCYF then petitioned to terminate both parents’ rights. The trial court granted the petitions, finding that DCYF made reasonable efforts to assist both parents and that termination was in the child’s best interest.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It held that non-compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) cannot be asserted as a defense in a termination of parental rights proceeding. The court also found that the evidence supported the trial court’s findings regarding the mother’s failure to correct the neglect conditions, DCYF’s reasonable efforts, and the determination that termination was in the child’s best interest. The orders terminating parental rights were affirmed. View "In re K.O." on Justia Law

After a divorce in 2021, the parties were subject to separate court orders regarding custody and visitation of their minor child, DM. The mother was granted primary custody, with a planned 15-month transition to shared custody, which required reunification therapy for the father and DM. However, shared custody was never achieved, and DM remained in the mother’s primary care. In 2023, the mother petitioned to modify custody, visitation, and child support, arguing that the father had abandoned efforts to communicate with DM and that shared custody was not feasible due to his residence in Arizona. She also sought to adjust child support to reflect her continued primary custody.The District Court of Teton County held a bench trial to consider the mother’s petition. The court found that the circumstances had not materially changed since the original custody order, even though the order was not being followed. The court determined that DM’s welfare was unchanged, noting that DM continued to excel academically and socially, and that the estrangement between father and son persisted as it had at the time of the divorce. The court also found that the mother had not presented evidence of new efforts to foster the father-son relationship or that her relocation had impacted DM’s welfare. Consequently, the court denied the petition for modification of custody and child support.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case for abuse of discretion. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding no material change of circumstances affecting the child’s welfare. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision, concluding that the failure to comply with the custody order did not, in this instance, constitute a material change warranting modification. View "Cornell v. Mecartney" on Justia Law

A married couple with two children entered into a legal separation after signing a settlement agreement that addressed property division, child custody and support, and alimony. The agreement was incorporated into a legal separation decree by the District Court for Scotts Bluff County, which found the agreement fair and not unconscionable. The husband did not appeal this decree. Several months later, the wife filed for dissolution of marriage, and both parties again signed a settlement agreement, which referenced the prior separation decree as resolving all substantive issues. After the husband discovered an undisclosed retirement account, the parties agreed to modify the equalization payment to the wife, and the court approved this modification.The first dissolution decree was entered before the statutory 60-day waiting period had elapsed, rendering it void. The wife moved for a new dissolution decree, and the court entered an operative dissolution decree after the waiting period, incorporating the prior agreements and the modified equalization payment. The husband, now represented by counsel, sought to vacate both the separation and dissolution decrees, arguing the separation decree was void for lack of a required written certification that the parties would live separate and apart, and that the agreements were unconscionable. He also argued that the dissolution decree was barred by issue preclusion and that the settlement agreements should be set aside.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the absence of a written certification under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-361.01 was not a jurisdictional defect and did not render the separation decree void. The court further held that the separation decree was a final, appealable order, and because it was not timely appealed, its terms could not be collaterally attacked except under limited circumstances such as fraud or gross inequity, which were not present. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s approval of the settlement agreements and affirmed the judgment. View "Benda v. Sole" on Justia Law

A newborn child, A.R., was removed from her parents’ custody by the Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS) due to neglect and abuse. Two relatives, a paternal aunt (Aunt Mary) and a maternal grandmother (Grandma Ericka), each sought to care for A.R. Initially, A.R. was placed with Aunt Mary, with Grandma Ericka’s cooperation, and later spent alternating weeks with each relative. After parental rights were terminated, both relatives sought to adopt A.R. DFS recommended placement with Aunt Mary, citing the child’s strong bond with her cousin in that household and the benefits of a “nuclear family” environment, though it acknowledged both homes were loving and appropriate.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada held evidentiary hearings and found that both Aunt Mary and Grandma Ericka were equally capable of providing for A.R.’s needs. The court ultimately placed A.R. with Aunt Mary, giving “due weight” to DFS’s recommendation, and incorporated a post-adoption contact agreement to ensure ongoing contact between A.R. and Grandma Ericka. The court clarified that while it considered DFS’s preference, it retained authority to override that recommendation if it was not in the child’s best interest.Grandma Ericka petitioned the Supreme Court of Nevada for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the district court improperly relied on DFS’s recommendation, failed to make sufficient findings, and prioritized a nuclear family contrary to public policy. The Supreme Court of Nevada denied the petition, holding that the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion. The court reaffirmed that, under Nevada law, the district court must consider but is not bound by the agency’s placement preference, and the child’s best interest remains paramount. The court found the district court’s written findings and process sufficient and consistent with applicable law. View "Destin v. District Court" on Justia Law

A child, B.M., was born to Cheryl Melius and Lakota Songer, who were no longer in a relationship at the time of birth. Cheryl initially had sole custody and did not inform Lakota of the birth immediately. After B.M. was diagnosed with failure to thrive, Cheryl voluntarily placed the child with her brother, Miles, and his wife, Tori (the Meliuses), who were later granted guardianship. Lakota established paternity and sought custody, but the Meliuses initiated a third-party custody action, leading to a combined proceeding. During the litigation, the Meliuses were granted temporary custody, and Lakota was given stepped-up visitation. The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) was found to apply after Lakota disclosed his tribal status.The Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Gregory County, South Dakota, held a trial and found that while the Meliuses had a significant relationship with B.M., they failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that extraordinary circumstances existed to rebut Lakota’s presumptive right to custody under SDCL 25-5-30. The court awarded Lakota sole custody but granted the Meliuses ongoing visitation and ordered Lakota to use a specific daycare provider. The court also assessed attorney fees against Lakota for his late disclosure of tribal status and for contempt related to violating court orders.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the lower court’s finding that the Meliuses did not establish extraordinary circumstances to overcome Lakota’s parental rights and affirmed the denial of non-parent custody. The Supreme Court reversed the award of permanent visitation to the Meliuses, holding that such visitation cannot be granted absent a finding of extraordinary circumstances rebutting the parent’s rights. The Court also reversed the attorney fees related to the tribal status delay, finding the lower court erred in assigning responsibility to Lakota. The issue regarding the daycare provider was deemed moot. The case was remanded to determine attorney fees solely attributable to contempt. View "Melius v. Songer" on Justia Law

The case concerns two young siblings, E.H. and R.H., whose parents brought E.H., a three-week-old infant, to the hospital with a fractured arm. Medical examinations revealed multiple acute fractures on E.H.’s body, which doctors concluded were caused by nonaccidental trauma, likely from shaking or similar abuse. Both parents denied any knowledge of how the injuries occurred and provided no plausible explanation. They were E.H.’s sole caretakers, and there was no evidence that anyone else had access to the child. The Department of Social Services (DSS) intervened, taking both E.H. and his older brother R.H. into custody.The District Court of New Hanover County adjudicated E.H. as abused and neglected and R.H. as neglected, finding that the parents’ inability to explain E.H.’s injuries and refusal to accept responsibility created an injurious environment for both children. The court found that, given the parents’ lack of accountability, there was a substantial risk of similar harm to R.H. The parents appealed. The North Carolina Court of Appeals unanimously upheld the adjudication for E.H. but, in a divided opinion, vacated the neglect adjudication for R.H., reasoning that the trial court relied solely on E.H.’s abuse without specific findings predictive of probable neglect for R.H. The majority remanded for further findings, while the dissent argued the trial court’s findings were sufficient.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision regarding R.H. The Supreme Court held that when a child is severely abused and the parents cannot plausibly explain the injuries or assure that abuse will not recur, a trial court may find that other children in the home are at substantial risk and thus neglected. The Court also emphasized that appellate courts should not address issues not raised by the parties. The adjudication of R.H. as neglected was reinstated. View "In re E.H. & R.H." on Justia Law

A mother and father, after separating, entered into a consent order in 2017 granting them joint legal and physical custody of their two children, one of whom has a serious medical condition. The order required cooperation regarding the child’s medical care. In 2020, following ongoing disputes and allegations of contempt by the father, the parties agreed to a modified custody order that maintained joint custody but appointed a parenting coordinator to help manage escalating conflict, particularly regarding the children’s medical needs.Subsequently, the father repeatedly disagreed with the parenting coordinator’s decisions, refused to comply with directives about the children’s therapy and medication, and engaged in hostile conduct toward the coordinator. The mother moved to modify custody again, alleging the father’s actions endangered the children’s welfare. The District Court, Wake County, found that the father’s conduct—including failure to administer medication and interference with therapy—adversely affected the children’s health and welfare. The court issued temporary and then permanent orders granting the mother primary physical custody and final decision-making authority on major issues.The father appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court’s order. The appellate majority held that the findings did not support a conclusion of a substantial change in circumstances affecting the children’s welfare, reasoning that the children were insulated from parental conflict.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that an escalating pattern of conflict and a parent’s unwillingness to communicate or cooperate regarding the children’s health, education, and welfare can constitute a substantial change in circumstances justifying modification of a custody order. The Court found the trial court’s findings supported both the existence of such a change and that modification was in the children’s best interests. The case was remanded to reinstate the trial court’s modified custody order. View "Durbin v. Durbin" on Justia Law

After the death of David Balandran in August 2021, his wife Felicia became the sole parent of their two young daughters. David’s parents, Juan and Cindy, had previously enjoyed regular contact with the children, both before and after David’s passing. Felicia continued to allow the grandparents to visit, though the frequency and scheduling of visits varied due to family circumstances, including therapy and illness. In July 2022, the grandparents sought a formalized visitation schedule, requesting overnight and weekday visits. Felicia opposed a court-ordered schedule, preferring to maintain flexibility and asserting her willingness to facilitate reasonable visitation.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County held a trial on the grandparents’ petition under California Family Code section 3102. The court found Felicia to be a fit parent but granted the grandparents’ request for structured visitation, ordering visits on the first and third Sundays of each month and weekly Wednesday dinners. The court reasoned that the grandparents could provide unique insights and support related to the children’s deceased father. Felicia appealed, arguing that the order infringed on her constitutional rights as a fit parent.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. Applying the constitutional principles established in Troxel v. Granville and subsequent California decisions, the appellate court held that a fit parent who allows reasonable grandparent visitation is entitled to a presumption that her decisions are in the children’s best interests. The court found that the trial court failed to give “special weight” to Felicia’s preferences and that there was no clear and convincing evidence that her voluntary visitation schedule was detrimental to the children. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded with directions to deny the grandparents’ petition for court-ordered visitation. View "Balandran v. Balandran" on Justia Law

Roger Contreras and Nancy Bourke were involved in a marriage dissolution proceeding in Cochise County, Arizona, with a decree entered in 2011. The case saw extensive post-decree litigation. In February 2020, all Cochise County Superior Court judges, including Judge Timothy Dickerson, recused themselves from the matter without providing reasons on the record, and the case was reassigned to a Pima County judge. In 2021, Judge Dickerson became the presiding judge of Cochise County Superior Court and subsequently appointed Contreras as a justice of the peace pro tempore. In December 2022, Contreras moved to have Bourke declared a vexatious litigant, and Judge Dickerson, despite his prior recusal, ruled on the motion without explaining his re-entry or giving the parties an opportunity to object.Judge Dickerson designated Bourke a vexatious litigant. Bourke appealed, and the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that Bourke had waived any challenge to Judge Dickerson’s participation by failing to timely seek disqualification under relevant statutes and rules. The appellate majority did not address Bourke’s argument regarding Judge Dickerson’s appointment of Contreras as a justice of the peace pro tempore as a potential conflict, while the dissent argued that waiver should not apply under the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case. It held that once a judge recuses from a case, the judge remains disqualified from further participation unless the judge articulates the reasons why recusal is no longer required and allows the parties an opportunity to object. The court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion, reversed the superior court’s order declaring Bourke a vexatious litigant, and remanded for a different judge to rule on Contreras’ motion. View "CONTRERAS v BOURKE" on Justia Law