Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Justin J. (Father) appealed a jurisdiction finding and disposition order declaring his children, Hunter V. and B.V., dependents of the juvenile court. The court sustained a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j), alleging the children's mother had a history of substance abuse and left the children without proper care. The petition also alleged Father had an extensive criminal history and was incarcerated, which placed the children at risk.The Los Angeles County Superior Court held a detention hearing where neither parent was present. The court detained the children and ordered monitored visitation for both parents. At the jurisdiction hearing, the court amended the petition to allege Father was unable to parent due to his incarceration and inability to make an appropriate plan for the children. The court sustained the amended allegations and proceeded with the disposition hearing, declaring the children dependents of the court and ordering reunification services for both parents.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court found that the juvenile court violated Father's due process rights by failing to provide notice of the amended allegations, which were based on a different set of facts and legal theory from the initial petition. The court also violated Father's statutory right to be present at the jurisdiction hearing, as required by Penal Code section 2625, subdivision (d). The appellate court applied the Chapman standard for federal constitutional error and concluded the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the court reversed the jurisdiction finding and disposition order as to Father and remanded the case for further proceedings with Father present unless he waives his right to be present. View "In re Hunter V." on Justia Law

Deborah A. Chatfield filed for divorce from Frederick H. Chatfield Jr. on July 14, 2021. Frederick initially had legal representation, but his attorney withdrew in December 2021, leaving him to represent himself. A final hearing was held on August 23, 2024, which Frederick did not attend. The court granted the divorce and classified certain real estate in Rockport as marital property, ordering its sale. Frederick did not appeal the divorce judgment or request further findings of fact.Frederick later retained counsel and filed a motion for relief from judgment under M.R. Civ. P. 60(b), arguing that the property was nonmarital, the court lacked jurisdiction, and Deborah's belief that the property was marital was a mistake. The District Court (Rockland) denied the motion, finding that Frederick had not protected his interests during the original proceedings and had not provided justification for his absence. The court also found no credible evidence to support Frederick's claims.The Estate of Frederick H. Chatfield Jr. appealed the denial to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. The court reviewed the denial for abuse of discretion, considering whether the lower court's findings were supported by the record, whether the court understood the applicable law, and whether the court's decisions were reasonable. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion or clear error. The court noted that Frederick failed to protect his interests by not attending the hearing, not filing for further findings, and not appealing the original judgment. The court also found that the lower court had jurisdiction over the property and that Frederick did not meet the burden of proof required for relief under Rule 60(b). View "Chatfield v. Estate of Chatfield" on Justia Law

Katrina M. Welch filed a complaint seeking de facto parentage of the biological child of her former partner, Naomi R. Chavaree. Welch claimed she had undertaken a permanent, committed parental role, established a bonded relationship with the child, and that it was in the child's best interest to continue their relationship. Welch's affidavit detailed her involvement during Chavaree's pregnancy, the child's birth, and their life together until their separation. She asserted that she played an active role in the child's life, including co-parenting after their separation.The District Court (Biddeford, Sutton, J.) dismissed Welch's complaint for lack of standing, determining that Welch had not made a prima facie showing of the statutory requirements for de facto parentage. The court concluded that Welch's affidavit did not demonstrate that her relationship with the child was fostered or supported by Chavaree or that both parties understood or accepted Welch as a parent. Welch's request for an expedited hearing was also denied as moot.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that the District Court abused its discretion by not holding a hearing to resolve disputed facts material to the issue of standing. The Supreme Judicial Court noted that Welch's affidavit, if accepted as true, could support a finding of standing and that there were bona fide issues of material fact regarding Welch's role and Chavaree's acceptance of that role. The court emphasized that a hearing was necessary to assess the credibility of the parties' conflicting affidavits.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the District Court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, including a hearing to determine the disputed facts related to Welch's standing to seek de facto parentage. View "Welch v. Chavaree" on Justia Law

R.K. (Father) appeals an order granting sole physical custody of his daughter to G.K. (Mother). Previously, Father had sole physical custody. He argues he was denied due process because he was not given advance notice of the proposed custody change and the trial court ordered a move-away of the child without an evidentiary hearing. Additionally, Father contends the trial court did not consider the separation of the daughter from her three siblings. However, Father did not raise these issues in the trial court and provided an inadequate record for the appeal.The trial court conducted a three-day evidentiary hearing and made detailed factual findings about Father's uncooperative and disrespectful behavior towards Mother, the court, and court procedures. The court found that a significant change in circumstances indicated it was in the daughter's best interest for Mother to have sole physical custody. Consequently, the trial court granted Mother sole physical custody and ordered that the parties continue to share joint legal custody.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court noted that Father failed to object to the trial court's tentative decision and did not preserve his due process claim. The appellate court found that Father was not denied due process as he had notice that physical custody was at issue and had the opportunity to oppose the request during the evidentiary hearing. The court also rejected Father's claim regarding the separation of the daughter from her siblings, noting that two of the three children were stepsiblings, not biological siblings, and compelling circumstances were not required to justify their separation.The appellate court affirmed the trial court's order granting Mother sole physical custody of the daughter. View "In re Marriage of R.K. & G.K." on Justia Law

X.K. sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her former husband, M.C., under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA). She alleged a history of physical, sexual, and emotional abuse by M.C., including incidents where he slapped her, pulled her away from a car, and forced her to have sex. She also claimed M.C. engaged in coercive control, such as restricting her movements and financial resources. X.K. requested sole custody of their daughter, J.K.C., and no visitation for M.C.The Sonoma County Superior Court denied X.K.'s ex parte request for a temporary restraining order, stating the events described were not recent and did not provide sufficient reason to restrain M.C.'s conduct. At the evidentiary hearing, X.K. represented herself, while M.C. had legal counsel. The court focused on the custody and visitation disputes between the parents and denied the DVRO request, reasoning that these issues did not fall under the definition of domestic violence.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in its understanding of the definition of "abuse" under the DVPA and improperly denied the DVRO because the allegations occurred in the context of a custody dispute. The appellate court noted that X.K.'s evidence, if credited, could constitute physical and sexual abuse and conduct disturbing her peace. The court emphasized that the trial court should have considered the totality of the circumstances, including incidents in China, when assessing whether M.C.'s conduct in California constituted abuse.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for a new hearing to properly evaluate the evidence and apply the correct legal standards under the DVPA. View "X.K. v. M.C." on Justia Law

The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) removed two Indian children from their home after finding their parents intoxicated and unable to care for them. The superior court adjudicated the children as being in need of aid, and the children’s tribe intervened. The children’s father moved to another state and, after initially failing to engage with OCS, eventually completed all case plan requirements. OCS then sought to place the children with their father through the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children (ICPC), but the other state denied approval. Despite this, OCS sought permission from the superior court to release custody to the father while he was temporarily in Alaska.The superior court found that the ICPC was inapplicable to a release of custody to a parent under AS 47.14.100(p) and granted OCS’s request, dismissing the case. OCS released custody to the father before he left Alaska. The Native Village of Saint Michael appealed, arguing that the ICPC should apply and that the superior court failed to make adequate best interest findings.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and concluded that when OCS properly releases custody of a child to a parent under AS 47.14.100(p), the requirements of the ICPC do not apply, even if the parent plans to subsequently transport the child to another state. The court affirmed the superior court’s decision that the ICPC was inapplicable under the circumstances and that the other state’s approval was not required for placement with the father. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the case. View "Native Village of Saint Michael v. State" on Justia Law

A mother and father had their parental rights terminated in two consolidated child in need of aid (CINA) cases. They appealed the termination, and the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the termination order and remanded for further proceedings. While the appeal was pending, the children's foster parents petitioned to adopt them, and the superior court granted the adoption petitions. On remand, the superior court did not require the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) to make further efforts to reunify the family and instead reevaluated the same information, terminating the parental rights again. The parents appealed, and the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the termination order a second time.The parents then sought to vacate the adoption and reopen the CINA case. The adoptive parents opposed, arguing that the parents' attempt to vacate the adoption was barred by the one-year limitation period for challenging an adoption decree. The superior court agreed with the adoptive parents, concluding that the parents' failure to appeal the adoption decree itself within one year barred their challenge. The court also concluded that the motion to reopen the CINA case was moot because the adoption remained valid, and the children were no longer in need of aid.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court's judgment. The court held that the one-year limitation period for challenging an adoption decree under AS 25.23.140(b) applies strictly to appeals of the adoption decree itself, not to appeals of related termination orders in CINA cases. The court emphasized the legislative intent to provide finality and stability for adopted children, noting that allowing collateral attacks on adoption decrees beyond the one-year period would unreasonably disrupt the upbringing of adopted children. Consequently, the adoption remained valid, and the CINA case was moot. View "In re Adoption of C.R. and E.R. v. State" on Justia Law

Julie and Gerald Ross (Grandparents) filed a petition in district court to adopt their grandchildren, R.K. and J.K., and to terminate the parental rights of the children's biological parents, Steven and Denielle Kracht (Parents). The district court terminated the parental rights of both parents, finding that they had abandoned and neglected their children, that the father had abused the children, and that both parents were unfit. The adoption petition by the Grandparents was still pending.Parents appealed the termination order to the Utah Court of Appeals before the adoption action concluded. The Court of Appeals certified the matter to the Utah Supreme Court for original appellate review. The central issue was whether the termination order issued by the district court was immediately appealable before the adoption action concluded.The Utah Supreme Court held that Utah Code subsection 78B-6-112(3) creates a statutory exception to the final judgment rule, allowing termination orders issued by district courts to be immediately appealable. The court concluded that the statutory language of subsection 78B-6-112(3) indicates that a district court may enter a final order terminating parental rights before a final decree of adoption is entered, thus making such termination orders appealable upon entry. This decision overruled the Court of Appeals' previous decision in In re Adoption of K.R.S., which had held that no exception to the final judgment rule allowed parties to appeal a district-court-issued termination order before it was final. The Utah Supreme Court retained the case for further argument on the merits of the Parents' challenges to the termination order. View "Ross v. Kracht" on Justia Law

A.K. (Mother) is the mother of four minor children, B.C., K.J.C., D.W.C., and B.C. In 2013, while living in Alaska, the children’s biological father, C.C. (Father), was charged with two counts of sexual abuse of a minor and subsequently incarcerated. That same year, Mother and the children moved to Utah. In 2015, Father was convicted, and in 2016, Mother divorced Father and married L.K. (Stepfather), who then began living with and raising the children alongside Mother.In 2020, Mother and Stepfather filed a petition in district court for Stepfather to adopt the children, which included a motion to terminate Father’s parental rights. Father intervened and opposed the termination and adoption. After an evidentiary hearing, the Second District Court in Weber County terminated Father’s parental rights.Father immediately appealed the termination order. While his appeal was pending, the Utah Court of Appeals decided In re Adoption of K.R.S., holding that a termination order issued by a district court is not immediately appealable when an underlying adoption petition remains unresolved, as it does not constitute a final judgment.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case and, for reasons articulated in Ross v. Kracht, 2025 UT 22, retained jurisdiction to hear further arguments on Father’s challenges to the termination order. The court issued an order requesting the parties to brief the merits of Father’s challenges to the termination order. View "In re Adoption of B.C." on Justia Law

X.K., a Chinese emigrant, and M.C., a U.S. citizen, married and had a child in California. After moving to China in 2018, M.C. returned to California in January 2022, and X.K. followed with their child in December 2022. They lived with M.C.'s parents until August 2023, when X.K. left for a domestic violence shelter. She filed for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against M.C., alleging a history of physical, sexual, and emotional abuse.The Sonoma County Superior Court denied X.K.'s ex parte request for a temporary restraining order, citing the lack of recent events and insufficient reasons to restrain M.C.'s conduct. At the evidentiary hearing, X.K. represented herself, while M.C. had legal counsel. X.K. testified about M.C.'s abusive behavior, including physical assaults, sexual coercion, and emotional and financial control. M.C. did not testify but his counsel argued against the DVRO and sought increased visitation rights. The trial court denied the DVRO, stating that the issues were primarily about custody and visitation, which did not fall under the definition of domestic violence.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in its understanding of "abuse" under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) and improperly denied the DVRO based on the context of custody and visitation disputes. The appellate court noted that X.K.'s evidence, if credible, could constitute abuse under the DVPA, including physical, sexual, and emotional abuse. The court emphasized the need to consider the totality of the circumstances, including incidents in China, when assessing abuse.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for a new hearing to properly evaluate the evidence and apply the correct legal standards under the DVPA. View "X.K. v. M.C." on Justia Law