Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court finding that Father committed an act of domestic or family violence against Child and that he represented a credible threat to the family's safety and thus granting Mother's petition for an ex parte petition order, holding that the trial court's evidence-based findings supported its judgment.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the evidence presented supported the trial court's finding that Father committed an act of domestic or family violence; and (2) Mother presented probative evidence to support the trial court's finding that Father posed a credible threat to Mother or Child's safety. View "S.D. v. G.D." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the county court in favor of the decedent's brother in this estate case, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the county court erred.Jordon R. Wiggins died, leaving two minor children and an ex-wife. In response to a claim against the estate regarding life insurance coverage that Wiggins was required under the divorce decree to maintain for the children's benefit, Wiggins's ex-wife, as guardian and next friend of the minor children, his brother, and his father, as personal representative of Wiggins's estate, entered into a settlement agreement. Thereafter, the parties jointly filed a petition for a declaration of their rights and obligations under the agreement. The county court ruled in favor of the brother, and the ex-wife appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the cause with directions for the county court to rescind the agreement and conduct further proceedings, holding that a mutual mistake as to the existence of a fact that was a material inducement to the contract is not ground for reformation, although it may be ground for rescission. View "In re Estate of Wiggins" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued a Missouri judge for putting his kids in jail twice, once after a custody hearing and again after ordering law enforcement to pick them up in Louisiana. The complaint alleged that Defendant’s action of placing Plaintiff’s children in jail and then later in a juvenile-detention facility violated their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Defendant argued that he should receive absolute immunity, but the district court disagreed and ruled that the case could proceed. At issue on appeal is whether judicial immunity shields these acts.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court explained that Defendant’s decision to personally escort the kids to jail took what would otherwise be a judicial act too far. Judges have the authority to order an officer or a bailiff to escort an unruly litigant to jail. The court wrote that Defendant crossed the line; however, when he personally escorted the kids to jail, stood there while they removed their clothes and belongings, and personally came back an hour later to release them. Further, the court explained that here, even if Defendant had no “express authority” to issue the pick-up order, he is immune because he had jurisdiction to issue one. He cannot be sued, in other words, no matter how erroneous his interpretation of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act may be. View "D. Bart Rockett v. The Honorable Eric Eighmy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court awarding Mother primary custody of the couple's two children and dividing the marital property, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.Father filed for divorce, and Mother counterclaimed for divorce. After a trial, the district court granted the parties a decree, awarded Mother primary custody of the parties' two children, ordered Father to pay Mother monthly child support, and divided the marital property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion by admitting the opinion testimony and report of one of Mother's witnesses because Mother's failure to designate that witness as an expert witness was harmless; and (2) did not abuse its discretion by granting Mother primary custody or in its division of the marital property. View "Dutka v. Dutka" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the orders of the family court reopening a divorce case finalized by the family court more than two decades ago and awarding Steven Capaldi a portion of his pension to Anne Farrer, holding that the trial justice's decision granting Anne's motion for relief was incorrect as a matter of law.In 1993, the family court entered final judgment in the underlying divorce case. In 2017, Anne filed a motion for post-judgment relief seeking an award of one-half interest in the marital portion of Steven's pension on the ground that Steven "concealed" the pension at the time of the divorce. The trial justice granted relief. The Supreme Court vacated the decision below, holding that the statute of limitations in R.I. Gen. Laws 9-1-17 barred Anne's belated request to reopen the final judgment. View "Capaldi v. Capaldi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the family court determining and assigning marital property, sanctioning Defendant $50,000, and ordering a $16,000 credit to Plaintiff, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.In 2000, the parties in this case married, and in 2017, the parties initiated divorce proceedings based on irreconcilable difference. At issue before the Supreme Court was the trial court's determination and equitable distribution of marital assets. After an eight-day trial, the trial justice issued a bench decision. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice (1) did not err in the determination and assignment of marital assets; (2) did not err in the imposition of sanctions; and (3) did not abuse her discretion in ordering a $16,000 credit to Plaintiff. View "DiDonato v. DiDonato" on Justia Law

Child K.T. was born June 2016. Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Families (CYF) first became involved with her when she tested positive for cocaine at birth; CYF had been involved with Mother since 2009 regarding an older child. Prompted by continued housing instability, a report of intimate partner violence between Mother and Child’s biological father, and Mother’s failure to follow through with service referrals, CYF sought a finding of dependency in early 2017. For more than two years, while Child remained in a foster home, and prior to CYF filing for termination, Mother was inconsistent with participation in CYF’s recommended services. The orphan court ultimately concluded “terminating the parental rights of Mother does not serve the needs and welfare of the child.” A majority of the Court of Appeals determined the record supported the trial court’s “evaluation of the bond that clearly exists between Mother and Child, and its determination that this bond was worth preserving[,]” and the court was thus within its discretion to deny termination. In this discretionary appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the court that denied CYF’s petition for involuntary termination of a mother’s parental rights gave “primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child” as required by 23 Pa.C.S. §2511(b). More specifically, the Court considered whether the court evaluating the parent-child bond must determine whether the bond was necessary and beneficial to the child, and severing the bond would cause the child to experience extreme emotional consequences, rather than a mere “adverse” impact. Upon review, the Supreme Court found error and thus (1) vacated the appellate court's orders and (2) remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "In the Int. of: K.T." on Justia Law

Gabriel Asumeng appealed a judgment dividing the marital estate and awarding Vivian Asiama primary residential responsibility of the parties’ children. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not clearly err by awarding Asiama primary residential responsibility; however, the court erred in its distribution of the marital estate. View "Asiama v. Asumeng, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal from a decision of the court of appeals requiring Adoptive Parents to provide notice to biological Father of the temporary custody of Child, rending the trial court's temporary custody order void for lack of personal jurisdiction, holding that this Court lacked appellate jurisdiction.After Child was placed full-time with Adoptive Parents, Adoptive Parents petitioned to adopt child and separately moved for temporary custody. Father was not served the petition or motions. After a hearing, the superior court granted Adoptive Parents temporary custody, determining that it was in Child's best interests while the adoption petition was pending. Father later filed a motion to set aside the order of custody on the grounds that he was not given notice. The trial court denied the motion. Adoptive Parents appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the superior court's order granting temporary custody was not a final judgment because it neither disposed of all claims for all parties nor stated that there was no just reason for delay. View "P.L. v. A.H." on Justia Law

S.B. (father) appealed from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights over his daughter H.B. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26. Father contends only that the juvenile court erred in finding the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) inapplicable based on the record of inquiry made by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) with H.B.’s extended family members.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the Department inquired about Indian ancestry with representatives from both sides of two generational levels of H.B.’s family. It contacted every person its interviewees identified as a likely source of information about ancestry. The juvenile court had an adequate basis on which to conclude the Department fulfilled its inquiry obligations under section 224.2, subdivision (b), and that neither the Department nor the court had reason to know or believe that H.B. is an Indian child. Under the court’s deferential standard of review, the juvenile court did not need the Department to contact every unnamed extended family member that had attended a court hearing, regardless of difficulty in doing so, to reach its conclusion. View "In re H.B." on Justia Law