Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted Respondents' motion to dismiss the underlying complaint seeing writs of procedendo and mandamus to compel Respondents to proceed to a hearing on an ex parte motion seeking temporary custody of minor children, holding that dismissal was warranted.Specifically, the Supreme Court (1) sua sponte dismissed the claims against Sherrick; (2) dismissed the mandamus claim as to all Respondents based on Relator's failure to properly caption her complaint; and (3) dismissed the procedendo claims against all Respondents because none of the Respondents were properly named as defendants. View "Page v. Geauga County Probate & Juvenile Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the circuit court that it did not have statutory authority to terminate Father's parental rights against his wishes in the absence of an adoption, holding that S.D. Codified Laws 25-5A cannot be used to involuntarily terminate a parent's rights without a corresponding adoption.Mother filed a petition under chapter 25-5A seeking the involuntary termination of Father's parental rights, arguing that the termination was in the best interests of the parties' children and that Father's consent to the termination could not be waived. The circuit court denied the petition after an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in determining that chapter 25-5A cannot be used to involuntarily terminate a parent's parental rights. View "In re Interest of I.A.D." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the probate and family court judge denying M.H.'s motion to intervene in an action brought by J.M. against C.G. seeking custody and expanded parenting time and affirmed the judgments dismissing two other actions brought by M.H., holding that there was no clear error.In 2016, J.M. had executed a voluntary acknowledgment of parentage as to Amelia. In 2020, J.M. brought an action seeking legal custody and expanded parenting time. M.H., Amelia's putative biological father, moved to intervene in the action as Amelia's putative biological father. M.H. filed complaints in both equity and under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209C to establish his paternity of Amelia. The lower judge dismissed both complaints and denied the motion to intervene. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) to the extent M.H. challenged the VAP on the basis of fraud, his claim was time barred; and (2) there was no reason to address the constitutionality of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209B. View "J.M. v. C.G." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the sanctions order entered by the trial court against Joseph Monroe for pursuing a shareholder-derivative suit against his wife, Lisa Monroe, the majority shareholder of a closely held corporation, holding that the sections order violated Rule 1:1.Lisa and Joseph were the married co-owners of MEPCO Materials, Inc. One week after Joseph, as the then-sole director, filed for divorce he caused MEPCO to filed a civil action against Lisa for conversion and breach of fiduciary duty. After Joseph resigned his position at MEPCO he sought to convert the action to a shareholder-derivative action. The granted the motions, converted the suit to a derivative action, and then dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Thereafter, the trial court granted Lisa's motion for sanctions and ordered Joseph to pay $70,097 to MEPCO and Lisa. The Supreme Court vacated the order granting sanctions, holding (1) Joseph had standing to appeal the sanctions award; but (2) the sanctions order violated Rule 1:1 because it was not timely entered. View "Monroe v. Monroe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals upholding the district court's award of attorney fees based on conduct that occurred outside the context of litigation, holding that the district court exceeded the scope of its inherent authority when it awarded attorney fees.In this case arising from a post-dissolution, mediated settlement agreement between Appellant and Respondent regarding the treatment of a college savings account. The agreement required that the account be awarded to the parties' daughter when she turned twenty-one years old, but when their daughter reached that age Appellant took no action to transfer the account. Ultimately, after intervention on the part of the district court, the transfer became effective. Respondent moved for conduct-based attorney fees under Minn. Stat. 518.14. The district court granted the motion.. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court exceeded the scope of its inherent authority in awarding attorney fees because the award was not necessary to the performance of a judicial function. View "Buckner v. Robichaud" on Justia Law

In an appeal by allowance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether a proposed adoption by a mother’s long-term partner, in conjunction with the termination of the biological father’s parental rights, constituted “cause” to excuse the relinquishment requirement of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2903 with respect to the mother under Section 2901. The Court found that, in order to seek termination of Father’s parental rights and the proposed adoption by Partner under Section 2901, Mother had to demonstrate cause as to why she could not satisfy the statutory requirement, i.e., why she and Partner cannot marry, and then establish why the relinquishment requirement under Section 2711(d) was satisfied under the facts of her case. As the orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights without first evaluating whether Mother established cause under Section 2901, and given that Mother did not provide evidence pertaining to this “cause” analysis, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s order remanding to the orphans’ court for consideration of whether Mother could establish cause, as defined in this opinion, to excuse the relinquishment requirement under the facts of this case. View "In Re Adopt. of: M.E.L." on Justia Law

Nicholas Otten appealed a district court judgment entered after a bench trial on divorce proceedings. On appeal, he argued the court erred by denying his motion to continue trial. He also argued the court erroneously admitted, reviewed, and relied on Jessica Otten’s evidence, and thereby erred in its division of marital property, consideration of the best interest factors, and award of his parenting time. After review of the trial court record, the North Dakota Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the judgment. View "Otten v. Otten, et. al." on Justia Law

Derrick Dogbe appealed district court’s order denying his motion to modify primary residential responsibility, an order denying his motion to vacate the modification order, and an order awarding attorney’s fees to Rebekah Dogbe (now known as Rebekah Grafsgaard). After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed that part of the order denying Dogbe’s motion to modify primary residential responsibility, but reversed those parts of the orders awarding attorney’s fees. View "Dogbe v. Dogbe, et al." on Justia Law

Ryan Fleck appealed the denial of his motion to amend a parenting plan. He argued the district court erred in allowing Dana Fleck to testify, and he made various challenges to the court’s findings. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court held the court did not err in allowing Dana to testify. Furthermore, the Court held the trial court applied an erroneous standard for determining whether a material change in circumstances had occurred for purposes of modifying parenting time. Thus, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Fleck v. Fleck, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights as to his minor child (Child), holding that the trial court did not violate Father's right to adequate notice when it terminated Father's parental rights after the close of the evidence pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 17-112(j)(3)(B)(ii).At the close of the evidence in this case the Commissioner of Children and Families moved to amend the petition to allege a different ground for the termination of Father's rights. The trial court granted the motion pursuant to Practice Book section 34a-1(d). Thereafter, the Commissioner of Children and Families filed an amended summary of the facts in support of its petition claiming that grounds existed for termination of Father's parental rights pursuant to section 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(ii). At the conclusion of trial, the trial court granted the petition to terminate Father's parental rights on ground (B)(ii). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not violate Father's constitutional due process right to adequate notice by allowing the Commissioner to amend the petition after the close of the evidence and terminating Father's parental rights pursuant to ground (B)(ii). View "In re Gabriel S." on Justia Law