Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's modification of physical custody in this custodial action but reversed the court's parenting time allocation and vacated its award of attorney fees and costs, holding that the district court abused its discretion in part.In this opinion, the Supreme Court (1) provided a definition of sole physical custody to ensure custodial orders are properly characterized; (2) directed district courts to retain their substantive decision-making authority over custodial modifications and parenting time allocations; and (3) clarified when reassignment of a case to a different judge on remand is appropriate due to the requisite fairness demanded in ongoing child custody proceedings. As to the case before it, the Court held (1) substantial evidence supported the district court's decision to modify physical custody; (2) the district court abused its discretion by improperly characterizing its custodial award as primary physical custody when it was in fact sole physical custody. View "Roe v. Roe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying a writ of prohibition preventing Judge Peter J. Corrigan from proceeding in a declaratory judgment and preliminary injunction action, holding that Judge Corrigan did not lack jurisdiction to proceed in the case.United Twenty-Fifth Building, LLC sued Jessica Maron, a party to a pending divorce case, alleging that Jessica was interfering with an easement involving a multistory building in Cleveland. Specifically, United argued that Jessica was preventing access to the building's elevator, lobby, and stairwell and delaying the construction of a restaurant in the building. Jessica filed a prohibition petition seeking to prevent Judge Corrigan from exercising jurisdiction in United's case because, under the jurisdictional-priority rule, Judge Corrigan patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to proceed because the case involved property that may be subject to equitable division in her divorce case. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Jessica failed to show that the jurisdictional-priority rule applied under the circumstances of this case. View "State ex rel. Maron v. Corrigan" on Justia Law

In April 2022, Vinson sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her former boyfriend, Kinsey, to protect herself, two children she shares with Kinsey (six and 10 years old), and her 19-year-old child from another relationship. Vinson sought orders for legal and physical custody of the younger children, with no visitation for Kinsey. Vinson’s request listed March 2022 as the date of the most recent abuse when Kinsey “began threatening to beat my face in” and “stated that he would kill me.” Vinson also described a June 2020 incident, when Kinsey took her phone out of her hand and “punched me in my face and pushed me on the floor,” leaving her with bruises. Vinson stated that Kinsey had abused her “verbally, mentally, and physically for many years,” “has threatened to kill me on numerous occasions”; and “shows up at my house unannounced any time he chooses”; and that she was “in fear of my life.”The trial court denied Vinson a DVRO and granted Kinsey unsupervised visitation. The court of appeal remanded for reconsideration. The trial court focused narrowly on the March incident, indicated that it did not believe Vinson took that threat seriously, and apparently did not consider evidence of additional threats and repeated verbal and physical abuse. View "Vinson v. Kinsey" on Justia Law

Petitioner Dana Albrecht appealed a circuit court order denying his post-final-divorce-decree motion alleging that Respondent Katherine Albrecht was in contempt of the parties’ parenting plan. Petitioner claimed that respondent had violated the parenting plan by, among other things, removing the children from school a few days early for a week-long vacation without first notifying him. The contempt motion was filed in 2019, but not scheduled for a hearing until 2022. In the meantime, numerous other post-divorce disputes and collateral proceedings arose between the parties. The motion was ultimately denied on July 22, 2022. The trial court observed that respondent and children, at that time, were coping with the recent death of a close family member, and that respondent had made appropriate arrangements with the children’s school for the vacation. Such conduct, according to the trial court, violated neither the joint decision-making provision nor the provision requiring the parties to promote healthy relationships between the children and the other parent. The New Hampshire Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion nor reversible error in that judgment and affirmed. View "In the Matter of Albrecht" on Justia Law

Carrie Pueblo brought an action against her former domestic partner, Rachel Haas seeking joint custody and parenting time for a child whom Haas conceived through in vitro fertilization and gave birth to in 2008, during the parties’ relationship. Haas moved for summary judgment, arguing that because the parties had never married and Pueblo had no biological or adoptive relationship to the child, Pueblo lacked standing to sue and also failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case without prejudice. After Haas moved for reconsideration, the trial court dismissed the action with prejudice. Pueblo then filed her own motion for reconsideration, arguing that she had standing as a natural parent, despite the lack of genetic connection, following the Court of Appeals decision in LeFever v. Matthews, 336 Mich App 651 (2021), which expanded the definition of “natural parent” to include unmarried women who gave birth as surrogates but shared no genetic connection with the children. Pueblo also argued the trial court order violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection, as well as those of the child. Furthermore, Pueblo argued that any dismissal should have been without prejudice. The trial court denied reconsideration, distinguishing LeFever on the ground that Pueblo had not given birth to the child. Pueblo appealed, reasserting her previous arguments and further asserting that the equitable-parent doctrine should extend to the parties’ relationship, which had been solemnized in a civil commitment ceremony when it was not yet legal in Michigan for same-sex partners to marry. The Court of Appeals rejected these arguments and affirmed the trial court. Because Michigan unconstitutionally prohibited same-sex couples from marrying before Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 US 644 (2015), the Michigan Supreme Court narrowly extended the equitable-parent doctrine as "a step toward righting the wrongs done by that unconstitutional prohibition. A person seeking custody who demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the parties would have married before the child’s conception or birth but for Michigan’s unconstitutional marriage ban is entitled to make their case for equitable parenthood to seek custody." The trial court's judgment was reversed and the case remanded for that court to apply the threshold test for standing announced here. View "Pueblo v. Haas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court affirming the judgment of the trial court granting Mother's motion to reinstate her guardianship rights with respect to Child, holding that the trial court correctly applied the proper best interest balancing test.After a hearing on Mother's motion for reinstatement of her guardianship rights, the trial court issued an oral decision stating that parents are entitled to a presumption that reinstatement of guardianship rights is in the child's best interests. Father appealed, arguing that this presumption does not apply in cases between two parents. The appellate court agreed but nevertheless affirmed because it discerned no indication that the trial court had actually applied the presumption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court correctly concluded that the trial court (1) did not apply a presumption in favor of Petitioner when it determined that reinstatement of her guardianship was in the best interests of Child; and (2) did not err in determining that reinstatement of guardianship was in the best interests of Child. View "In re Paulo T." on Justia Law

This case concerns a social worker’s duty to inquire whether a child involved in a dependency proceeding “is or may be an Indian child” under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), a duty commonly referred to as the “initial inquiry.” At issue in this appeal was whether the initial inquiry encompassed available extended family members in every proceeding where a child is removed from home or in only those cases where the social worker takes temporary custody of the child without a warrant under exigent circumstances. Here, the child was initially taken into the custody of the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the department) by protective custody warrant before being detained by the juvenile court and later removed at disposition. Reunification efforts failed, and the juvenile court ultimately terminated parental rights and freed the child for adoption. Relying on In re Robert F., 90 Cal.App.5th 492 (2023) the department argued that because the child wasn’t initially removed from home without a warrant, the duty to interview available to extended family members never arose. The Court of Appeal concluded there was only one duty of initial inquiry, and that duty encompasses available extended family members no matter how the child is initially removed from home. Applying a narrower initial inquiry to the subset of dependencies that begin with a temporary removal by warrant frustrates the purpose of the initial inquiry and “den[ies] tribes the benefit of the statutory promise” of Assembly Bill No. 3176 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.). Because the department in this case failed to ask the child’s available extended family members whether the child had any Native American ancestry, the Court conditionally reversed the order terminating parental rights and remanded for the juvenile court to direct the department to complete its investigation. View "In re Delila D." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from a privately compensated temporary judge’s ruling that Plaintiff’s former husband, provided an accounting as to certain stock that was the subject of a marital settlement agreement (MSA). Among other things, Plaintiff contends Judge Johnson erred in issuing her ruling because she had withdrawn her request for an order for an accounting of her stock interest before the ruling.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court held that Plaintiff’s notice withdrawing her accounting RFO was effective when made on June 26, 2020. Judge Johnson’s ruling granting Chris’s restoration RFO tacitly supports our holding. That is, if Plaintiff’s withdrawal of her accounting RFO had not been effective when made, Judge Johnson would not have later had to order that RFO restored. Plaintiff’s ex-husband does not cite any case that holds that a party needs a trial court’s approval to withdraw a motion. Because Plaintiff withdrew her accounting RFO, Judge Johnson did not have jurisdiction to rule on it. Her ex-husband’s restoration RFO did not restore her withdrawn accounting RFO and Judge Johnson’s jurisdiction because her ex-husband filed it after April 1, 2020, the date Judge Johnson’s appointment terminated under the parties’ stipulation. View "Marriage of DeWolfe" on Justia Law

Niagara County’s Child Protective Services successfully petitioned in Niagara County Family Court to strip Plaintiff of her parental rights over her minor son. Plaintiff appealed the Family Court’s decision. While that appeal was pending, she brought suit in federal court against officials and entities involved in terminating her parental rights. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s suit pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.   The Second Circuit vacated the judgment insofar as the district court denied Plaintiff’s motions for leave to amend and for additional time to serve defendants. The court held that the RookerFeldman doctrine does not apply when an appeal remains pending in state court. Rooker-Feldman applies only after the state proceedings have ended. View "Hunter v. McMahon" on Justia Law

Miguel D. (Father) left his eight-year-old daughter, M.D., alone inside a locked apartment that had no electricity, an empty non-operable refrigerator, and no edible food. After waking up to find her father and his truck gone, M.D. climbed through a kitchen window to look for him and was found wandering the apartment complex. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a dependency petition alleging Father failed to adequately supervise and protect M.D., and willfully or negligently failed to provide her with adequate food and shelter. The juvenile court found the petition true, took jurisdiction, and removed M.D. from Father’s custody while he was offered reunification services. On appeal, Father argued the Court of Appeal had to reverse the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order because Welfare and Institutions Code section 300(b)(2) prohibited the juvenile court from assuming jurisdiction over a child “solely” due to a parent’s indigence or poverty. He further argued the Court should reverse the dispositional order because the Agency failed to demonstrate there were no reasonable means to protect M.D. without removing her from Father’s custody. Because the record did not support either contention, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re M.D." on Justia Law