Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

D.P., C.A. and E.A. (the adoptive parents of D.P.’s two older brothers) appealed an order denying a petition made pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 3881 for placement of D.P. in the siblings’ adoptive parents’ home. The siblings’ adoptive parents and D.P. (Appellants) contended the court erred by failing to apply the “relative placement preference” articulated in section 361.3. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the Appellants forfeited this claim by failing to raise the issue at the trial court. But even if it were to consider it, the Court determined the siblings’ adoptive parents did not qualify as relatives for consideration under section 361.3. The Court further concluded the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the section 388 petition after finding it would be in D.P.’s best interest to remain with de facto parents A.G. and K.P. The Court, therefore, affirmed the order. View "In re D.P." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the family court terminating Mother's parental rights with respect to her daughter (Child), holding that the trial justice did not err in finding by clear and convincing evidence that the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) made reasonable efforts to achieve reunification between Mother and Child.DCYF filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights on the grounds that she and Father were unfit to parent Child under R.I. Gen. Laws 15-7-7(a)(2)(i) and (a)(3). After a trial, the trial justice granted DCYF petition to terminate Mother's parental rights, determining that DCYF met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it employed reasonable efforts to achieve reunification. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not clearly error or overlook or misconceive material evidence in determining that DCYF made reasonable efforts to achieve reunification. View "In re R.M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals panel reversing the ruling of the district court denying Lisa Webster's request to clarify an order made during her divorce proceedings that she receive a share of Jon's Army Reserve and National Guard retirement pay based on the months of their marriage, holding that the relief from judgment statute, Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-260, was not applicable.When Jon retired about fifteen laters following the parties' divorce Lisa submitted the court's division order to the federal office administering Jon's retirement benefits, but the office told Lisa that it needed more detail to calculate Lisa's share. Lisa filed a motion seeking clarification of the order, which the district court denied. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the division order was not a final judgment subject to the dormancy statute. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, holding (1) the division order was a final judgment subject to the dormancy statute; and (2) section 60-260 was not applicable because Lisa's request for clarification did not require substantive change to the original property division. View "In re Marriage of Shafer" on Justia Law

In this action involving a district court's division of Jon Holliday's retirement account in a divorce proceeding with Tamara Holliday the Supreme Court held that Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-2403(c)'s tolling provision prevents a divorce decree dividing the parties' interests in a retirement account with the Kansas Public Employees Retirement System (KPERS) from becoming dormant until benefits become payable to the plan member.In 2009, Jon and Tamara divorced. The district court divided Jon's not-year-payable retirement account with KPERS equally between them and directed Tamara to prepare a qualified domestic relations order to "effectuate" the division. In 2021, Jon brought this action claiming that Tamara's judgment from the divorce had gone dormant because she had not sent a copy of it to KPERS as instructed and requesting that the court extinguish Tamara's interest in the account. The district court denied relief, but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-2403(c) tolled the dormancy period until Jon's benefits from his KPERS account became payable. View "In re Marriage of Holliday" on Justia Law

In proceedings involving divorce and domestic-violence-civil-protection-order (DVCPO) cases that had been pending for more than five years the Supreme Court denied M.D.'s motion to enforce this Court's writ of procedendo but granted his alternative request to declare M.A.D. a vexatious litigator under Sup. Ct. Prac. R. 4.03(B), holding that M.A.D. had persistently engaged in frivolous conduct in the Supreme Court without reasonable cause.Previously, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and granted M.D. a writ of procedendo ordering Judge Reeve Kelsey to rule on pending motions and to proceed promptly to final hearings in the underlying cases. M.D. moved to enforce the writ or, alternatively, to declare M.A.D. a vexatious litigator. The Supreme Court denied the motion to enforce but granted M.D.'s request to declare M.A.D. a vexatious litigator under Rule 4.03(B), holding that M.A.D.'s filings were calculated attempts to prevent Judge Kelsey's compliance with the previously-issued writ of procedendo. View "State ex rel. M.D. v. Kelsey" on Justia Law

Swan and Hatchett are the parents of triplets born in 2016. They share custody. At a hearing addressing child support, Swan testified from a profit and loss statement that he had prepared for his self-employment as a tax preparer, real estate broker, mortgage broker, and appraiser, that his net income as of August 2017 was $40,498. The trial court found Swan’s bookkeeping poor, and after adding back certain deductions Swan had taken, calculated Swan’s income as $110,940 per year. The trial court ordered Swan to pay child support of $2,350 per month, retroactive to the beginning of 2017. Hatchett was not working. The trial court did not impute income to her due to insufficient information. In September 2018, Swan requested changes to the order, including ordering Hatchett to seek work and waiving interest on certain arrears. The court ordered Hatchett to undergo a vocational evaluation paid for by Swan. The parties stipulated that Swan was “entitled to a hardship when calculating child support.”The trial court denied his request to reduce the amount of child support and awarded Hatchett $10,000 in need-based attorney’s fees. The court of appeal reversed. The trial court erred by ignoring Swan’s evidence of his income, that he had a new child, and that Hatchett’s income had increased. The trial court’s refusal to consider Swan's evidence of his income for child support purposes conflicted with its finding that he could pay Hatchett’s attorney’s fees. View "Swan v. Hatchett" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's pro se petition for a writ of prohibition challenging the trial court's rulings in criminal cases and a separate civil case, holding that Petitioner failed to show cause why he should not be pro se barred for his repeated misuse of the Court's limited resources.Petitioner, an inmate whose most recent conviction was for possession of a controlled substance, began filing petitions in the Supreme Court in 2018 pertaining to several different criminal cases and a dependency case regarding his children. Petitioner filed the instant prohibition petition challenging the trial court's denial of a motion and seeking to dismiss the case. The Supreme Court denied the petition and directed Petitioner to show cause why he should not be barred from filing further pro se requests for relief. The Supreme Court then sanctioned Petitioner, holding that Petitioner had abused the Court's limited judicial resources. View "Hill v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals determining that the juvenile court had subject-matter jurisdiction over this case, rejecting Father's statutory interpretation argument about the interplay between the child protection and predatory offender registration statutes, and affirming the termination of Father's parental rights by the juvenile court, holding that Father was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.While Father was incarcerated for an offense that arose out of the same circumstances as an offense enumerated in the predatory offender registration statute Mother gave birth to H.Q., who was adjudicated as a child in need of protection or services. The juvenile court terminated Father's parental rights to H.Q. because of his conviction. The court of appeals affirmed the juvenile court's termination of Father's parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the juvenile court did not err in determining that clear and convincing evidence supported the statutory ground for termination in Father's case. View "In re Welfare of Child of S.B.G." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the surviving parents of their deceased daughter, brought an action to nullify their daughter’s marriage to defendant, Eden Kol, based upon the allegation that their daughter and defendant entered into the marriage for the sole purpose of evading federal immigration laws to obtain permanent resident status for defendant. Defendant filed an exception of no cause of action, alleging the petition failed to state a cause of action for nullification of marriage under the Louisiana Civil Code. The trial court granted the exception, and the court of appeal affirmed. Finding no reversible error, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Wederstrandt v. Kol" on Justia Law

The putative biological father sought to rebut, pursuant to La. C.C. art. 198, a presumption set forth in La. C.C. art. 185, despite having filed his avowal petition more than one year after the birth of the child and even though no “bad faith” was found on the part of the mother. After years of litigation on preliminary issues, the appellate court reviewed an earlier district court ruling, which found that La. C.C. art. 198 was not unconstitutional, and reversed the district court, concluding Article 198 was unconstitutional as applied. On review, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that under the facts presented here, that the putative biological father had no fundamental constitutional right to parent a child born to a mother, who was married to and living with another man at the time of the child’s conception and birth. Therefore, the Court reversed the appellate court, reinstated the district court judgment holding that La. C.C. art. 198 was constitutional, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Kinnett v. Kinnett" on Justia Law