Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court vacated the orders of the family court refusing to set aside a default judgment it ordered in favor of Husband against Wife as a discovery sanction under Hawai'i Family Court Rule (HFCR) 37(b)(2), holding that the court erred in declining to set aside the default judgment under HFCR 60(b)(1) for excusable neglect and entering default as a discovery sanction.On appeal to the Supreme Court, Wife argued that the intermediate court of appeals erred in affirming the family court's denial of her timely-filed HFCR Rule 60(b)(1) motion because her neglect was excusable. The Supreme Court vacated the family court's judgment, holding (1) the family court inadequately warned Wife about the risk and consequences of neglect and that Wife did not engage in deliberate, willful conduct under the circumstances of this case; and (2) the family court erred by declining to set aside the default judgment for excusable neglect and by entering default as a discovery sanction. View "JK v. DK" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court ordering Torrey Sears's divorce from Bobby Sears but vacated the portion of the district court's order awarding Bobby spousal support, distributing the parties' property and debt, and awarding Bobby attorney fees, holding that the court's income and valuation findings did not provide a sufficient predicate to assess the specific awards.On appeal, Torrey argued that the district court erred in its financial rulings because it failed to conduct sufficient fact finding with respect to his income. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed and vacated the order in part, holding that while the district court's rulings appeared reasonable on this record, because the court failed to make sufficient findings regarding Torrey's income this court was unable to conduct appellate review of the majority of the court's financial rulings. View "Sears v. Sears" on Justia Law

Before Peter and Debra Last were married in June 2002, they entered into a premarital agreement which included a provision by which Debra purported to waive any right to receive spousal support in the event the marriage ended in dissolution. When the marriage did end in dissolution, Debra sought, and the trial court awarded her, temporary spousal support. The court did not adjudicate the issue whether the premarital agreement was enforceable but granted Peter’s request to bifurcate that issue. Peter argued the trial court erred by awarding Debra temporary spousal support because the premarital agreement was presumed to be valid and, absent a determination the agreement was unenforceable, it barred an award of temporary spousal support. While the Court of Appeal agreed that premarital agreements were no longer disfavored and are not per se unenforceable, the Court found Peter was incorrect in asserting the premarital agreement was presumed valid simply because it facially appeared to satisfy the requirements of Family Code section 1615(c)(1) and (2). "To the contrary, a premarital agreement is presumed to have not been executed voluntarily, and is therefore unenforceable, unless the trial court finds in writing or on the record that the agreement satisfies the requirements of section 1615(c)(1) and (2)." When the court ordered temporary spousal support, the premarital agreement was deemed not to have been voluntarily executed, and, therefore, the spousal support waiver did not prevent the court from awarding Debra temporary spousal support. The appeals court also concluded the trial court had the ability to modify the support order retroactively to the first support payment if it ultimately determined the premarital agreement was enforceable. Although the appeals court believed this reservation of jurisdiction did not make the temporary spousal support order nonappealable, it resolved any doubts about appellate jurisdiction by treating the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate, which was thus denied. View "Last v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

S.L.S., biological mother of D.M.H., appeals from an order reappointing J.H.T. and L.H.T. as D.M.H’s guardians and adopting a prior visitation schedule as the current visitation schedule. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed: S.L.S. did not cite any statute or case requiring that a visitation schedule be updated or changed at a specific time. "Nor has she cited us to any law prohibiting a juvenile court from adopting a prior visitation schedule. Absent such a law and absent any argument a different visitation schedule would be beneficial to D.M.H., the court did not err by adopting the prior visitation schedule." View "Interest of D.M.H." on Justia Law

Tyler Vetter appealed a fifth amended judgment entered after the district court denied his motion to hold Amy Salter in contempt and, on its own motion, invoked N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a) to modify a fourth amended judgment. The district court entered a judgment requiring Vetter to pay Salter child support. The judgment was amended various times (for reasons not relevant to this appeal). In a separate action, the court ordered primary residential responsibility changed from Salter to Vetter. The court subsequently entered a fourth amended judgment requiring Salter to reimburse Vetter child support amounts he paid. Two days after the court entered its order to amend the judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court issued its opinion in Hamburger v. Hamburger, 978 N.W.2d 709, which explained a vested child support obligation could not be retroactively modified. Neither party appealed the fourth amended judgment. Vetter moved for an order to hold Salter in contempt for not paying him the $2,930. In consideration of Hamburger, the court, citing N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a), ordered the fourth amended judgment “be modified to reinstate the child support obligation of Tyler Vetter” for the earlier period and to “strik[e] the obligation of Amy Salter to make reimbursement.” A fifth amended judgment was entered accordingly. The Supreme Court reversed in part: even if the trial court was correct that its original decision was based upon a mistaken view of the law, Rule 60(a) did not authorize the court’s modification. Therefore, the Court concluded the trial court abused its discretion by misapplying the law when it invoked Rule 60(a) to relieve Salter of her obligations under the fourth amended judgment. View "North Dakota, et al. v. Vetter" on Justia Law

Savanna Perales appealed a district court order requiring her to return her children to North Dakota. Perales and Erik Gonzalez were divorced by a Texas divorce decree. After the divorce, both parties lived in North Dakota. Perales then relocated with the children to Georgia. The district court, in an ex parte emergency order, ordered Perales to return the children to North Dakota. Later, the court held a hearing and issued the order from which Perales appealed. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded this order was not appealable and dismissed the appeal. View "Gonzalez v. Perales" on Justia Law

Jerome Lowe, Jr. appealed a domestic violence protection order restraining him from contact with Lori Legacie-Lowe for 12 months. The North Dakota Supreme Court retained jurisdiction and remanded with instructions for the district court to make sufficient findings to enable the Supreme Court to review the order. Upon reviewing the district court’s findings on remand, the Court affirmed the domestic violence protection order. View "Legacie-Lowe v. Lowe" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Edison appealed a divorce judgment and an amended judgment awarding primary residential responsibility for two children to Signe Edison, arguing error in the form of gender bias and in the court’s finding that Jeffrey Edison was underemployed for purposes of child support. Signe argued Jeffrey waived his gender bias argument and, in the alternative, that the trial court’s judgment was not based on gender bias. Jeffrey also requested the North Dakota Supreme Court award the parties equal residential responsibility and impose a “50/50 parenting plan” or reassign the case on remand to a different trial judge. After review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to reconsider: (1) the decision to award Signe with primary residential responsibility; and (2) the best interests of the children under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1) and to recalculate any child support obligations. View "Edison v. Edison" on Justia Law

Vilches, the father and guardian of Doe (age 7), took her to Leao for treatment. Vilches later sued Leao to compel the release of Doe’s therapy records. Under Health and Safety Code 123110, the personal representative of a minor is entitled to access the minor’s patient records unless “[t]he health care provider determines that access to the patient records ... would have a detrimental effect on the provider’s professional relationship with the minor patient or the minor's physical safety or psychological well-being. The decision of the health care provider ... shall not attach any liability to the provider unless the decision is found to be in bad faith. Leao indicated she had determined that it would have a detrimental impact on Doe’s ability to trust in general, and would negatively impact the patient-counselor relationship. She was also concerned that Vilches would use the records to coach his daughter's responses in a court evaluation in an upcoming custody proceeding.The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of Leao, rejecting an argument that the absence of bad faith does not immunize a therapist’s determination from judicial review and that section 123110 creates a presumption of entitlement to disclosure. The statute does not require separate determinations for each type of patient record. When the provider makes the detriment determination, a plaintiff must show bad faith to compel disclosure. View "Vilches v. Leao" on Justia Law

Mother has seven children by several different fathers: the child at issue in this case—Jayden M. (born 2021). On November 19, 2021, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) filed a petition asking the juvenile court to exert jurisdiction over Jayden on two grounds. On May 2, 2022, the juvenile court held the dispositional hearing. The court removed Jayden from Mother’s custody and also bypassed reunification services under subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11) of section 361.5. More specifically, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that bypass was proper under these provisions because (1) Mother’s reunification services or parental rights for Jayden’s older half-siblings had been terminated, and (2) Mother’s most recent four months of effort to address her drug addiction—did not eliminate the court’s “concerns” in light of her 20-year history of drug abuse problems and prior dependency cases. On appeal, Mother’s chief argument on appeal is that the juvenile court’s order bypassing reunification services was not supported by the record.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the juvenile court’s order. The court held that the juvenile court’s finding is further supported by evidence that Mother has repeatedly relapsed after treatment and/or periods of sobriety in the past. This finding is consistent with the conventional wisdom and practical reality that short and recent periods of sobriety are often not enough to counter a longstanding pattern of use and relapse. Thus, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the effort underlying Mother’s brief period of sobriety after decades of drug abuse is not “reasonable.” View "In re Jayden M." on Justia Law