Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The parents in this case were brought to the attention of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare ("Department") regarding reports of neglect and physical abuse to their five children. The child protection case began in February 2023 as a protective supervision case. Nearly three months later, the magistrate court ordered that the children be removed from the home and placed in the legal custody of the Department. John Doe (Father) appealed the magistrate court’s order removing his five children from the parents’ custody and temporarily placing the children in the legal custody of the Department. Father argued the magistrate court’s order failed to contain detailed written findings as required by Idaho law, that the order was not supported by substantial and competent evidence, and that the magistrate court’s actions violated Father’s fundamental rights to the care and custody of his children. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate court. View "IDHW v. John Doe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellants' appeal of the dismissal of their petition for permanent third-party custody of their great niece, K.J., holding that the court of appeals erred in dismissing the appeal for failure to timely serve the guardian ad litem with a notice of appeal under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.01, subdivision 1.After Appellants filed their petition the district court appointed a guardian ad litem. A referee approved a stipulation of shared joint legal and physical custody of K.J. by Respondent, K.J.'s mother, and K.J.'s father. After a hearing, the court dismissed Appellants' petition for third-party custody. The court subsequently discharged the guardian ad litem, after which Appellants appealed. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for failure to timely serve the guardian ad litem under Rule 103.01, subdivision 1. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the guardian ad litem was no longer a party to the action once she was discharged by the district court; and (2) Rule 103.01, subdivision 1 does not require service of a notice of appeal on a former party whose dismissal is not itself the subject of the appeal. View "Blakey v. Jones" on Justia Law

This case involved the complicated relationship between a mother, Teri A., and her son, Zachary H. During a tense period in their relationship, Zachary H. moved out of Teri A.’s home and informed her that he did not want to have further contact. Over Zachary H.’s repeated objections, Teri A. continued to reach out to him by mail, text message, e-mail, and by showing up to his home unannounced. Zachary H. claimed that after he moved out, Teri A. nearly ran him over with her car as he walked along the sidewalk near his residence. Following this incident, Teri A. sent Zachary H. a series of e-mails that caused him significant emotional distress. Immediately after receiving Teri A.’s e-mail referencing firearms, Zachary H. sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO). During the DVRO hearing, the trial court found Zachary H.’s testimony to be credible, and evidence established Zachary H. was in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily harm and issued a DVRO for a period of one year, including a related firearms prohibition. Teri A. appealed, claiming the trial court abused its discretion by issuing the DVRO because it was not supported by substantial evidence and because the DVRO resulted from evidentiary errors by the trial court. She also contended the firearms prohibition violated her constitutional rights under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Finding no abuse of discretion, and that the firearms restriction issued in conjunction with the DVRO was constitutional. View "Zachary H. v. Teri A." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the New Mexico Supreme Court's review centered on whether a hearing officer improperly denied a petition for an order of protection under the Family Violence Protection Act (FVPA) by requiring the petitioner to show she was in imminent danger of harm by the respondent, whom she alleged sexually assaulted her as a child. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ memorandum opinion reversing the district court. The Court held that the plain language of the FVPA did not require petitioners to provide a showing of imminent danger or injury in seeking an order of protection. View "Nguyen v. Bui" on Justia Law

Daniel Barefoot, as a personal representative and legatee of the estate of Danny Bryant Barefoot, appealed a probate court order that determined the estate of Donna Viola Barefoot was entitled to a share of Danny's estate on the basis that Donna was an omitted spouse under § 43-8-90, Ala. Code 1975. Danny executed a will in August 2012, while married to Merita Hall Barefoot. In the will, other than a specific bequest to his and Merita's son, Daniel, Danny devised his residuary estate to Merita. Danny specified that, if Merita predeceased him, his estate would be shared jointly in equal shares by Daniel and Marcie Jenkins, whom he identified in the will as his stepdaughter. Danny also named Daniel and Marcie as corepresentatives of his estate. Merita died on September 6, 2014. On January 21, 2018, Danny married Donna. Danny and Donna did not execute a prenuptial agreement, and Danny did not execute a new will or a codicil to his previous will to include any testamentary dispositions to Donna. Danny died on September 5, 2021. Twelve days later, on September 17, 2021, Donna died. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the appeal was from a nonfinal order and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Barefoot v. Cole" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Mother's parental rights to Daughter, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.Following a hearing, the district court held that it was in Daughter's best interest to terminate Mother's parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Mother failed to show that the Department's failure to insist on a written response prejudiced Mother's substantial rights; (2) a district court's failure to comply with statutory requirements for adjudication as youth in need of care has no effect on the court's jurisdiction to hear and determine a petition of parental rights, and the district court in this case did not commit legal error by proceeding on the termination petition; (3) Mother's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel failed; and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that termination, as opposed to guardianship, was appropriate. View "In re Z.N-M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting Wife's motion filed under Wyo. R. Civ. P. 60 seeking to set aside a stipulated final decree of divorce due to inadvertence or mistake, holding that the stipulated decree was ambiguous, and the record was insufficient to support the district court's interpretation.After the stipulated decree was entered in this case Husband refinanced the marital home. Wife believed she was entitled to half of the net equity in the home at the completion of the refinance, but Husband argued that she was only entitled to half the net proceeds if the house was sold. The district court granted Wife's Rule 60 motion determining that the stipulated decree unambiguously required Husband to pay Wife half the equity in the property from the refinance or sale of the home. The court entered an order requiring that any equity recognized through sale or refinance of the home was to be equally divided between the two parties. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding (1) the stipulated decree was ambiguous as to whether Husband was required to provide Wife half the net proceeds in the event of refinance; and (2) the record did not contain sufficient evidence to clarify the stipulated decree under Rule 60(a). View "Van Vlack v. Van Vlack" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed a challenge to a magistrate court’s decision to take jurisdiction of an infant after finding that the infant was “at risk of being a victim of abuse, neglect, or abandonment.” The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (“IDHW” or “Department”) filed a Child Protective Act (“CPA”) petition pursuant to Idaho Code section 16-1603(2) in March 2023 for an infant (“Infant”) who was about three months old. The magistrate court had jurisdiction over the infant’s older brother (“Toddler”), having removed Toddler at age eighteen months after determining Toddler had been physically abused, neglected, and subjected to an unstable home. Infant was born about four months after Toddler was placed in foster care. At the adjudicatory hearing pertaining to Infant, the magistrate court found: (1) Mother and Father failed to make any progress whatsoever on the case plan associated with Toddler; (2) Mother and Father were unresponsive and uncooperative with the Department; (3) none of the safety issues that were identified as part of Toddler’s removal had been alleviated; and (4) Mother and Father consistently failed to comply with a court order for drug testing (including a urinalysis and hair follicle testing). The Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the magistrate court’s decision. View "IDHW v. Jane Doe / IDHW v. John Doe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of dissolution in this case, holding that the district court did not err in awarding Wife alimony and an equalization payment and in equally dividing student loans for the parties' children.After the district court entered its judgment Husband timely filed a motion to alter the judgment or alternatively, for a new trial, arguing that the district court erred in awarding Wife alimony, awarding Wife a $53,200 equalization payment, and classifying the student loans incurred for the parties' adult children as marital debt subject to equal division. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the alimony award was not unreasonable; (2) the equalization payment was not an abuse of discretion; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in classifying the student loans incurred for the parties' children as marital debt that was to be equally divided between the parties. View "Radmanesh v. Radmanesh" on Justia Law

A Delaware Family Court terminated Carter Ralston’s parental rights in his daughter who, at the time, had been in the State’s custody for over a year. The court’s decision was based primarily on Ralston’s failure to make progress on a case plan established by the Department of Services for Children, Youth, and Their Families (the “Department”). Ralston was incarcerated throughout most of the proceedings, but the case plan aimed to reunify him with his daughter. After the court terminated his parental rights, Ralston moved for relief from the order on the grounds that, since the order’s issuance, he had been released from prison and had completed the requirements of his case plan. The Family Court denied that motion, concluding that evidence of Ralston’s post-termination compliance with the case plan did not constitute “newly discovered evidence” under Family Court Civil Rule 60. Ralston appealed. Having considered each of Ralston’s arguments, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded the Family Court’s decision should be affirmed. "Although disposing of the guardianship petition before terminating Mr. Ralston’s parental rights would have been the better practice, the procedural sequence was not so deficient that it violated Mr. Ralston’s due process rights. As to the remaining issues, the Family Court correctly applied the law and did not abuse its discretion." View "Ralston v. Division of Services for Children, Youth and Their Families" on Justia Law