Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

In an appeal by allowance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether a proposed adoption by a mother’s long-term partner, in conjunction with the termination of the biological father’s parental rights, constituted “cause” to excuse the relinquishment requirement of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2903 with respect to the mother under Section 2901. The Court found that, in order to seek termination of Father’s parental rights and the proposed adoption by Partner under Section 2901, Mother had to demonstrate cause as to why she could not satisfy the statutory requirement, i.e., why she and Partner cannot marry, and then establish why the relinquishment requirement under Section 2711(d) was satisfied under the facts of her case. As the orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights without first evaluating whether Mother established cause under Section 2901, and given that Mother did not provide evidence pertaining to this “cause” analysis, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s order remanding to the orphans’ court for consideration of whether Mother could establish cause, as defined in this opinion, to excuse the relinquishment requirement under the facts of this case. View "In Re Adopt. of: M.E.L." on Justia Law

Nicholas Otten appealed a district court judgment entered after a bench trial on divorce proceedings. On appeal, he argued the court erred by denying his motion to continue trial. He also argued the court erroneously admitted, reviewed, and relied on Jessica Otten’s evidence, and thereby erred in its division of marital property, consideration of the best interest factors, and award of his parenting time. After review of the trial court record, the North Dakota Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the judgment. View "Otten v. Otten, et. al." on Justia Law

Derrick Dogbe appealed district court’s order denying his motion to modify primary residential responsibility, an order denying his motion to vacate the modification order, and an order awarding attorney’s fees to Rebekah Dogbe (now known as Rebekah Grafsgaard). After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed that part of the order denying Dogbe’s motion to modify primary residential responsibility, but reversed those parts of the orders awarding attorney’s fees. View "Dogbe v. Dogbe, et al." on Justia Law

Ryan Fleck appealed the denial of his motion to amend a parenting plan. He argued the district court erred in allowing Dana Fleck to testify, and he made various challenges to the court’s findings. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court held the court did not err in allowing Dana to testify. Furthermore, the Court held the trial court applied an erroneous standard for determining whether a material change in circumstances had occurred for purposes of modifying parenting time. Thus, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Fleck v. Fleck, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights as to his minor child (Child), holding that the trial court did not violate Father's right to adequate notice when it terminated Father's parental rights after the close of the evidence pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 17-112(j)(3)(B)(ii).At the close of the evidence in this case the Commissioner of Children and Families moved to amend the petition to allege a different ground for the termination of Father's rights. The trial court granted the motion pursuant to Practice Book section 34a-1(d). Thereafter, the Commissioner of Children and Families filed an amended summary of the facts in support of its petition claiming that grounds existed for termination of Father's parental rights pursuant to section 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(ii). At the conclusion of trial, the trial court granted the petition to terminate Father's parental rights on ground (B)(ii). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not violate Father's constitutional due process right to adequate notice by allowing the Commissioner to amend the petition after the close of the evidence and terminating Father's parental rights pursuant to ground (B)(ii). View "In re Gabriel S." on Justia Law

Malinowski filed for dissolution of her marriage to Martin. While that case was pending, Malinowski filed an ex parte request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA; Fam. Code, 6200), seeking to protect herself and the parties’ children. Pending a hearing on the merits, the trial court issued a domestic violence temporary restraining order (DVTRO) against Martin with “no-contact” and “stay-away” provisions. Subsequently, the court modified the DVTRO to allow Martin brief contact with the children consistent with a visitation order. Malinowski contends the trial court erred by modifying the DVTRO without adhering to Code of Civil Procedure section 533, which requires notice and a showing of changed circumstances for modification or dissolution of an injunction or a temporary restraining order.The court of appeal concluded that section 533 does not provide the exclusive means by which a trial court in a DVPA action may modify a DVTRO; a trial court is not necessarily obligated to proceed under section 533 before modifying a DVTRO to allow for exceptions consistent with child visitation ordered in a parallel dissolution case. In an appropriate case, the requirements of due process may require the court to consider evidence presented at a noticed hearing consistent with section 533 in order to resolve disputed factual matters. View "Malinowski v. Martin" on Justia Law

Appellant Shauna Willis appealed an order granting her request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her ex-husband, Respondent Ricky Willis. She contended the family court erred under Family Code section 3044(a) because the court maintained joint physical custody by keeping in place a visitation order which had granted each approximately equal custody time with their child, T.W. The issue presented by this appeal was whether the rebuttable presumption of section 3044(a) arose in a proceeding for issuance of a DVRO when neither party was seeking custody or a modification of a custody or visitation order. To this, the Court of Appeal concluded the presumption of section 3044(a) did not arise in that situation. "Our conclusion is based on the plain language of section 3044(a), which by its terms applies only when a party is seeking custody of the child and is reinforced by other statutory provisions." Because the presumption of section 3044(a) did not arise, the family court erred by awarding Appellant sole legal and physical custody of T.W. Although Respondent did not appeal, the Court reversed that part of the order in the interest of justice. View "Marriage of Willis v. Costa-Willis" on Justia Law

Wife Connie Stockton challenged a superior court’s order denying relief from judgment under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b). She sought to overturn a default judgment entered against her in 2013, that divided marital property upon divorce from her husband Veral Stockton. Asserting that she suffered from severe depression during the divorce proceedings and that her husband improperly served the notice of default, she argued the judgment was void for lack of due process and, alternatively, should have been vacated due to extraordinary circumstances. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s factual finding that she was not incompetent at the time of divorce and its legal rulings that the judgment was not void and extraordinary circumstances warranting relief were not shown. View "Stockton v. Stockton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting Mother primary physical custody of the parties' two children in this case, holding that the circuit court's child custody determination was within the range of permissible choices and was supported by competent evidence.Mother and Father were never married and shared two children together. Father eventually petitioned for "Interim and Primary Custody, Child Support, and Paternity" determinations. Following a trial, the circuit court concluded that it would be in the children's best interests to grant Mother primary custody with Father having parenting time. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in declaring the S.D. Codified Laws 25-4-45.5 presumption to have been rebutted; and (2) did not give too much weight to its primary caretaker determination. View "Harwood v. Chamley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court modifying Father's child support, holding that Mother was not entitled to relief on her allegations of error.On appeal, Mother argued that the district court abused its discretion when it calculated Father's net monthly income without first obtaining sufficient financial information and by calculating her net monthly income contrary to the evidence on the record. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) obtained sufficient financial information to calculate Father's net monthly income; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in calculating Mother's net monthly income. View "Corbitt v. Davidson" on Justia Law