Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Aggrieved by a chancellor’s decision, Pamela Brownlee (Pam) appeals to the Mississippi Supreme Court, averring that the chancellor erred by failing to extend in loco parentis visitation rights to her as a former live-in romantic partner. Jessica Powell had two children, A.M.P. and E.R.L., born to different fathers. A.M.P.’s father maintained no relationship with the child; E.R.L.’s father was an active parent in his child’s life. Pam and Jessica began their romantic relationship in early 2014, just before E.R.L.’s birth, and the couple lived together throughout their relationship until their breakup in 2019. Even though Pam and Jessica cohabited from 2014 to 2019, they did not marry. On December 19, 2019, approximately two months after the couple’s breakup in October 2019, Pam filed her Petition to Establish Custody and Visitation, in which Pam initially sought custody of E.R.L. and visitation with A.M.P. At the initial hearing in October 2020, Pam withdrew her request for custody of E.R.L., revising her request to seek only visitation with Jessica’s children under the doctrine of in loco parentis. Although the chancellor did not find any legal basis for Pam’s request, given her status as an unmarried non-parent and former live-in partner to the children’s natural mother. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed: “we also recognize special circumstances exist…in which justice so requires and the child’s well-being demands a relationship with a person who has stood in loco parentis in his or her life. The floodgates are not open for any third party visitation if the circumstances do not rise to this level, but Pam deserves an opportunity, at least, to provide proof of whether she meets this ‘very limited, unique situation.’” View "Brownlee v. Powell, et al." on Justia Law

Katy Blagodirova and Jose Schrock married in November 2006 and had one child, J.R., in October 2007. In 2013 the couple filed a joint complaint for divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. The divorce agreement provided that Blagodirova had primary physical custody of the child subject to Schrock’s visitation. Schrock agreed to pay $500 monthly in child support payments. Following the divorce, Blagodirova began a romantic relationship with Andres Maldonado De La Rosa (Maldonado), J.R.’s soccer coach and an undocumented immigrant. Blagodirova and Maldonado married in August 2014, divorced in 2015 and remarried in 2018. While she worked, Blagodirova entrusted J.R.’s care to Maldonado. Maldonado testified that after remarrying Blagodirova, he obtained an illegal driver’s license to drive J.R. around. Blagodirova had not provided alternatives for childcare for J.R., and instead relied on Maldonado to care for the child despite her awareness that Maldonado could have been taken into custody and deported. Schrock filed to a modification of custody, requesting physical custody of J.R. and the termination of his child support obligation. He alleged there has been a material change in circumstances adverse to J.R.’s best interests. A chancery court granted Schrock’s petition, but the Court of Appeals reversed. Schrock appealed. Finding the chancellor’s decision to modify child custody was supported by substantial evidence, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the appeals court and reinstated the chancery court’s judgment. View "Blagodirova v. Schrock" on Justia Law

Jennie requested that Rocky pay $45,000 in attorney fees she was incurring in response to Rocky’s appeals from their judgment of dissolution and from post-judgment efforts to enforce previous orders requiring him to pay $15,000 toward Jennie’s attorney fees and divide his 401(k) plan, with which Rocky had not complied. Jennie sought $45,000. Jennie declared that she had been out of work since March 2020 because of the pandemic, her unemployment benefits had been exhausted, and she was caring for the couple’s two children; her current income came from trust distributions, at the discretion of the trustee. Rocky, an attorney, responded that he was currently unemployed and had no income or assets to pay any portion of Jennie’s fees. Each submitted extensive evidence and disputed each other’s claims.The court of appeal affirmed a $25,000 award to Jennie for need-based attorney fees (Family Code 2030), rejecting Rocky’s arguments that the trial court erred in denying him an evidentiary hearing and that there is no evidence that he can comply with the order. The court declined to dismiss the appeal under the disentitlement doctrine. The trial court made explicit findings that Rocky’s income in 2020 was considerably higher than Jennie’s; her expenses exceeded her income; and Rocky had legal representation without paying attorney fees, while Jennie did not. The award complied with the statute and is supported by substantial evidence. View "Marriage of Hearn" on Justia Law

In October 2021, Defendant flew from Japan to Missouri with her and Plaintiff’s child, L.T. In March 2022, Plaintiff filed a petition for the return of their child under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“Hague Convention”) to have L.T. returned to Japan. The district court found L.T. was “at home” in Japan before Defendant removed the child to the United States. The district court granted Plaintiff’s petition to have L.T. returned to Japan. Defendant appealed arguing Japan cannot be L.T.’s habitual residence because Sarah was coerced into living in Japan and therefore did not intend to make Japan L.T.’s home.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that there is no evidence of physical abuse, violence, or threats of violence in this case. Additionally, having considered the testimony and having reviewed the text message exchanges between the parties, the court did not find evidence of the type of verbal abuse or controlling behavior that would suggest that Defendant was coerced or forced into staying in Japan. Therefore, Defendant’s coercion argument on appeal is inconsistent with the district court’s factual findings, which are not clearly erroneous. View "Naoteru Tsuruta v. Sarah Tsuruta" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment entered by the district court divorcing Katharine Allerding from Neill Ewing-Wegmann, holding that Allerding was not entitled to relief on her allegations of error.On appeal, Allerding challenged portion of the order awarding her and Ewing-Wegmann shared parental rights of their daughter and allocating Father's Day with the child to Ewing-Wegmann. Allerding also appealed the court's judgment ordering her to contribute to the fees of the appointed guardian ad litem (GAL). The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determinations of rights of contact; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating GAL fees. View "Ewing-Wegmann v. Allerding" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing Plaintiff's action for a writ of mandamus ordering Defendant, the chief court reporter for the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, to produce transcripts that were sealed by another trial court in a separate proceeding involving unrelated parties, holding that the trial court correctly determined that Plaintiff's action was nonjusticiable.Jennifer Dulos commenced a marital dissolution against Fotis Dulos. Following a hearing relating to the custody of the parties' children the family court closed the courtroom to the public and sealed the hearing transcripts. Fotis subsequently died, and the family court dismissed the martial dissolution action. Plaintiff then commenced this action seeking an injunction compelling Defendant to produce the transcripts. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that to grant the requested relief would require the trial court to overturn the order sealing the transcripts. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's complaint did not present a justiciable claim. View "Schoenhorn v. Moss" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals vacating the order of the juvenile court terminating Mother's parental rights under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 8-533(B)(8)(c), holding that the court of appeals exceeded the proper scope of review and erroneously implied that it could dismiss the dependency finding in an appeal challenging a termination order.In vacating the juvenile court's judgment terminating parental rights, the court of appeals concluded that "even accepting all of the juvenile court's findings of fact...the state failed to meet its burden to justify severance" and that the juvenile court clearly erred. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals opinion and affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court, holding (1) the court of appeals' failure to examine each element contained in the statutory ground for termination was error; (2) the court of appeals exceeded the proper scope of review by reweighing the evidence presented to the juvenile court; and (3) the juvenile court did not clearly err in determining that the statutory ground for termination was proven by clear and convincing evidence. View "Brionna J. v. Dep't of Child Safety, A.V." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Suzanne Cardali and defendant Michael Cardali entered into a property settlement agreement (PSA), which was incorporated in their judgment of divorce in December 2006. The PSA provided that defendant’s obligation to pay plaintiff alimony would end upon her “cohabitation,” as defined by New Jersey law. In December 2020, defendant moved to terminate alimony, stating he believed that plaintiff and an individual named Bruce McDermott had been in “a relationship tantamount to marriage” for more than 8 years, over the course of which they attended family functions and other social events as a couple, memorialized their relationship on social media, and vacationed together. Defendant submitted the report of a private investigator indicating that plaintiff and McDermott were together on all of the 44 days that they were under surveillance, and that they were together overnight on more than half of those days. The investigator’s report included photographs of plaintiff and McDermott carrying groceries, bags of personal belongings, and laundry in and out of one another’s residences. The investigator stated plaintiff had access to McDermott’s home when McDermott was not at home. The trial court denied defendant’s application, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that a movant need not present evidence on all of the “Konzelman” cohabitation factors in order to make a prima facile showing. “If the movant’s certification addresses some of the relevant factors and is supported by competent evidence, and if that evidence would warrant a finding of cohabitation if unrebutted, the trial court should find that the movable has presented prima facie evidence of cohabitation.” View "Cardali v. Cardali" on Justia Law

Tiffani Finco appealed a district court’s decision, acting in its appellate capacity, remanding a petition to modify child custody to the magistrate court for further proceedings. The Idaho Supreme Court dismissed the appeal because it was moot. View "Edmonson v. Finco" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court granting Wife's motion to alter or amend after granting Husband's motion to alter or amend a stipulated decree of dissolution of marriage based upon a written agreement between the parties, holding that Husband was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Inaccurate information during settlement negotiations ultimately resulted in the failure of a portion of the stipulated decree of dissolution. Therefore, the district court granted Husband's motion to alter or amend, vacating portions of the stipulated decree concerning spousal support and division of property and the court's equitable division of property calculation. Wife subsequently moved to alter or amend the judgment, which the court granted, recalculating the division of property and limiting the alimony award to fifteen years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the alimony award to fifteen years or in classifying and dividing the marital estate. View "Karas v. Karas" on Justia Law