Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing Plaintiff's action for a writ of mandamus ordering Defendant, the chief court reporter for the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, to produce transcripts that were sealed by another trial court in a separate proceeding involving unrelated parties, holding that the trial court correctly determined that Plaintiff's action was nonjusticiable.Jennifer Dulos commenced a marital dissolution against Fotis Dulos. Following a hearing relating to the custody of the parties' children the family court closed the courtroom to the public and sealed the hearing transcripts. Fotis subsequently died, and the family court dismissed the martial dissolution action. Plaintiff then commenced this action seeking an injunction compelling Defendant to produce the transcripts. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that to grant the requested relief would require the trial court to overturn the order sealing the transcripts. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's complaint did not present a justiciable claim. View "Schoenhorn v. Moss" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals vacating the order of the juvenile court terminating Mother's parental rights under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 8-533(B)(8)(c), holding that the court of appeals exceeded the proper scope of review and erroneously implied that it could dismiss the dependency finding in an appeal challenging a termination order.In vacating the juvenile court's judgment terminating parental rights, the court of appeals concluded that "even accepting all of the juvenile court's findings of fact...the state failed to meet its burden to justify severance" and that the juvenile court clearly erred. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals opinion and affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court, holding (1) the court of appeals' failure to examine each element contained in the statutory ground for termination was error; (2) the court of appeals exceeded the proper scope of review by reweighing the evidence presented to the juvenile court; and (3) the juvenile court did not clearly err in determining that the statutory ground for termination was proven by clear and convincing evidence. View "Brionna J. v. Dep't of Child Safety, A.V." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Suzanne Cardali and defendant Michael Cardali entered into a property settlement agreement (PSA), which was incorporated in their judgment of divorce in December 2006. The PSA provided that defendant’s obligation to pay plaintiff alimony would end upon her “cohabitation,” as defined by New Jersey law. In December 2020, defendant moved to terminate alimony, stating he believed that plaintiff and an individual named Bruce McDermott had been in “a relationship tantamount to marriage” for more than 8 years, over the course of which they attended family functions and other social events as a couple, memorialized their relationship on social media, and vacationed together. Defendant submitted the report of a private investigator indicating that plaintiff and McDermott were together on all of the 44 days that they were under surveillance, and that they were together overnight on more than half of those days. The investigator’s report included photographs of plaintiff and McDermott carrying groceries, bags of personal belongings, and laundry in and out of one another’s residences. The investigator stated plaintiff had access to McDermott’s home when McDermott was not at home. The trial court denied defendant’s application, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that a movant need not present evidence on all of the “Konzelman” cohabitation factors in order to make a prima facile showing. “If the movant’s certification addresses some of the relevant factors and is supported by competent evidence, and if that evidence would warrant a finding of cohabitation if unrebutted, the trial court should find that the movable has presented prima facie evidence of cohabitation.” View "Cardali v. Cardali" on Justia Law

Tiffani Finco appealed a district court’s decision, acting in its appellate capacity, remanding a petition to modify child custody to the magistrate court for further proceedings. The Idaho Supreme Court dismissed the appeal because it was moot. View "Edmonson v. Finco" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court granting Wife's motion to alter or amend after granting Husband's motion to alter or amend a stipulated decree of dissolution of marriage based upon a written agreement between the parties, holding that Husband was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Inaccurate information during settlement negotiations ultimately resulted in the failure of a portion of the stipulated decree of dissolution. Therefore, the district court granted Husband's motion to alter or amend, vacating portions of the stipulated decree concerning spousal support and division of property and the court's equitable division of property calculation. Wife subsequently moved to alter or amend the judgment, which the court granted, recalculating the division of property and limiting the alimony award to fifteen years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the alimony award to fifteen years or in classifying and dividing the marital estate. View "Karas v. Karas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the orders of the family court refusing to set aside a default judgment it ordered in favor of Husband against Wife as a discovery sanction under Hawai'i Family Court Rule (HFCR) 37(b)(2), holding that the court erred in declining to set aside the default judgment under HFCR 60(b)(1) for excusable neglect and entering default as a discovery sanction.On appeal to the Supreme Court, Wife argued that the intermediate court of appeals erred in affirming the family court's denial of her timely-filed HFCR Rule 60(b)(1) motion because her neglect was excusable. The Supreme Court vacated the family court's judgment, holding (1) the family court inadequately warned Wife about the risk and consequences of neglect and that Wife did not engage in deliberate, willful conduct under the circumstances of this case; and (2) the family court erred by declining to set aside the default judgment for excusable neglect and by entering default as a discovery sanction. View "JK v. DK" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court ordering Torrey Sears's divorce from Bobby Sears but vacated the portion of the district court's order awarding Bobby spousal support, distributing the parties' property and debt, and awarding Bobby attorney fees, holding that the court's income and valuation findings did not provide a sufficient predicate to assess the specific awards.On appeal, Torrey argued that the district court erred in its financial rulings because it failed to conduct sufficient fact finding with respect to his income. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed and vacated the order in part, holding that while the district court's rulings appeared reasonable on this record, because the court failed to make sufficient findings regarding Torrey's income this court was unable to conduct appellate review of the majority of the court's financial rulings. View "Sears v. Sears" on Justia Law

Before Peter and Debra Last were married in June 2002, they entered into a premarital agreement which included a provision by which Debra purported to waive any right to receive spousal support in the event the marriage ended in dissolution. When the marriage did end in dissolution, Debra sought, and the trial court awarded her, temporary spousal support. The court did not adjudicate the issue whether the premarital agreement was enforceable but granted Peter’s request to bifurcate that issue. Peter argued the trial court erred by awarding Debra temporary spousal support because the premarital agreement was presumed to be valid and, absent a determination the agreement was unenforceable, it barred an award of temporary spousal support. While the Court of Appeal agreed that premarital agreements were no longer disfavored and are not per se unenforceable, the Court found Peter was incorrect in asserting the premarital agreement was presumed valid simply because it facially appeared to satisfy the requirements of Family Code section 1615(c)(1) and (2). "To the contrary, a premarital agreement is presumed to have not been executed voluntarily, and is therefore unenforceable, unless the trial court finds in writing or on the record that the agreement satisfies the requirements of section 1615(c)(1) and (2)." When the court ordered temporary spousal support, the premarital agreement was deemed not to have been voluntarily executed, and, therefore, the spousal support waiver did not prevent the court from awarding Debra temporary spousal support. The appeals court also concluded the trial court had the ability to modify the support order retroactively to the first support payment if it ultimately determined the premarital agreement was enforceable. Although the appeals court believed this reservation of jurisdiction did not make the temporary spousal support order nonappealable, it resolved any doubts about appellate jurisdiction by treating the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate, which was thus denied. View "Last v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

S.L.S., biological mother of D.M.H., appeals from an order reappointing J.H.T. and L.H.T. as D.M.H’s guardians and adopting a prior visitation schedule as the current visitation schedule. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed: S.L.S. did not cite any statute or case requiring that a visitation schedule be updated or changed at a specific time. "Nor has she cited us to any law prohibiting a juvenile court from adopting a prior visitation schedule. Absent such a law and absent any argument a different visitation schedule would be beneficial to D.M.H., the court did not err by adopting the prior visitation schedule." View "Interest of D.M.H." on Justia Law

Tyler Vetter appealed a fifth amended judgment entered after the district court denied his motion to hold Amy Salter in contempt and, on its own motion, invoked N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a) to modify a fourth amended judgment. The district court entered a judgment requiring Vetter to pay Salter child support. The judgment was amended various times (for reasons not relevant to this appeal). In a separate action, the court ordered primary residential responsibility changed from Salter to Vetter. The court subsequently entered a fourth amended judgment requiring Salter to reimburse Vetter child support amounts he paid. Two days after the court entered its order to amend the judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court issued its opinion in Hamburger v. Hamburger, 978 N.W.2d 709, which explained a vested child support obligation could not be retroactively modified. Neither party appealed the fourth amended judgment. Vetter moved for an order to hold Salter in contempt for not paying him the $2,930. In consideration of Hamburger, the court, citing N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a), ordered the fourth amended judgment “be modified to reinstate the child support obligation of Tyler Vetter” for the earlier period and to “strik[e] the obligation of Amy Salter to make reimbursement.” A fifth amended judgment was entered accordingly. The Supreme Court reversed in part: even if the trial court was correct that its original decision was based upon a mistaken view of the law, Rule 60(a) did not authorize the court’s modification. Therefore, the Court concluded the trial court abused its discretion by misapplying the law when it invoked Rule 60(a) to relieve Salter of her obligations under the fourth amended judgment. View "North Dakota, et al. v. Vetter" on Justia Law