Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff and Defendant had two children together. After the couple separated, the children remained in Mexico with Galaviz. In July 2021, Defendant took the children to El Paso and refused to return them. Plaintiff filed an action in the district court requesting the return of the children to Mexico under the Hague Convention. Defendant raised two affirmative defenses claiming that returning the children would violate their fundamental right to an education and would expose them to a grave risk of harm or an intolerable situation. The district court concluded that Defendant had satisfied his burden and denied Plaintiff’s request for the return of the children. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that in the present case, the district court’s findings regarding the children’s healthcare, including the children’s cognitive decline, the fact that they remained non-verbal, or their regression to using diapers, may be supported by evidence that would be sufficient in a custody dispute. However, this evidence falls short of meeting Defendant’s clear and convincing burden. Finally, Defendant presented no evidence that unsuitable childcare would expose the children to a grave risk of harm. He merely expressed concern that Plaintiff often left the children with her older daughters, and they did not take care of the children. This is not clear and convincing evidence of a grave risk of harm. View "Galaviz v. Reyes" on Justia Law

Trenton Albertson appealed the issuance of a disorderly conduct restraining order that directed he have no contact with Hattie Albertson and C.W.A., the couple's child, for a one-year period. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Trenton's request for a continuance. Because the district court did not make findings of fact to explain the factual basis for granting the disorderly conduct restraining order, the Supreme Court retained jurisdiction under N.D.R.App.P. 35(a)(3)(B) and remanded with instructions for the court to make sufficient findings to enable the Court's review of the disorderly conduct restraining order. View "Albertson v. Albertson" on Justia Law

Payton Small appealed from a judgment awarding Tess Hillestad primary residential responsibility of the parties’ minor child. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court’s decision awarding primary residential responsibility to Hillestad, setting a parenting time holiday schedule, and granting Hillestad tie-breaking authority was not clearly erroneous. View "Hillestad v. Small" on Justia Law

The juvenile court sustained the petition filed by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services alleging that Maira H. and Appellant, had a history of engaging in violent physical and verbal altercations in the presence of the children. At disposition the court declared the children dependents of the court, removed them from Appellant’s care and released them to Maira. Appellant appealed the December 2, 2021, findings and orders. Prior to Appellant’s filing of his opening brief on appeal, the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction and issued custody orders, based on the parents’ mediated agreement, providing for joint legal and physical custody of the children with their primary residence to be with Maira. The custody orders include a parenting plan that specifies a visitation schedule for Appellant and allows for additional visitation as agreed by both parents. Appellant did not appeal the order terminating jurisdiction or the custody orders. The Department contends termination of dependency jurisdiction moots Appellant’s appeal.   The Second Appellate District agreed with the Department and dismissed Appellant’s appeal as moot. The court explained that although Appellant is no doubt correct that the jurisdiction findings impacted the custody orders entered by the juvenile court, to provide Appellant with effective relief, the court would have to reverse not only the jurisdiction findings and disposition orders but also the orders terminating jurisdiction and determining visitation. Accordingly, the court explained that because he did not appeal the September 22, 2022, custody and visitation orders, those orders are not now before the court or otherwise subject to appellate review. View "In re Jose C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court in the underlying divorce action, holding that while parts of the decree were legally and factually supportable, other portions contained numerous legal and factual deficiencies.Following lengthy divorce proceedings the district court summarily adopted Respondent's proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of divorce without making any modifications. On appeal, Appellant argued that the district court committed reversible error in doing so. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) utilizing a party's proposed order does not in and of itself constitute an abuse of discretion; and (2) the district court abused its discretion when it granted financial awards for alimony, attorney fees, and expert fees and when it unequally distributed the parties' community property and debt. View "Eivazi v. Eivazi" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the five-year domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) issued against him at the request of his former spouse, Plaintiff. He contended the trial court abused its discretion by granting Plaintiff’s request for a DVRO because the record does not demonstrate he engaged in conduct rising to the level of abuse under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA). Defendant also asserted the trial court erred by ordering him to change the beneficiary of the $4 million insurance policy he owns on Plaintiff’s life from himself to a charity of her choice. Lastly, Defendant argued that the trial court’s order awarding $200,000 in attorneys’ fees to Plaintiff as the prevailing party under section 6344 must also be reversed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting Plaintiff’s request for a DVRO. In addition, the court rejected contentions regarding the life insurance policy. Thus, the court found that it has no reason to reverse the order awarding attorneys’ fees to Plaintiff. The court also concluded reversal is not required based on the denial of Defendant’s requests for a statement of decision. The court explained that Defendant has not shown that courts must apply an objective, reasonable person standard when deciding whether a person has “disturbed the peace of the other party” within the meaning of section 6320. Instead, the relevant inquiry is simply whether the person against whom the DVRO is sought engaged in “conduct that, based on the totality of the circumstances, destroyed the mental or emotional calm of the other party.” View "Parris J. v. Christopher U." on Justia Law

Mother appealed multiple family court decisions that found her four minor children B.G., E.G., I.O., and A.O. to be children in need of care or supervision (CHINS). Mother’s husband J.O., who was the father of I.O. and A.O., also appealed the decisions concerning those children. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the CHINS determinations were not supported by the court’s findings or the evidence, and therefore reversed the CHINS merits and associated disposition orders. The Supreme Court also concluded that the court erred in permitting the dissemination of certain records from the CHINS proceedings to J.O. and his advocate in a separate administrative appeal, and reversed that order as well. View "In re A.O. & I.O." on Justia Law

Child Protection Services (CPS) petitioned to terminate the parental rights of both parents of three minor children who were sexually abused by their father. The mother, S.F., objected and argued that she should not lose her parental rights. The trial court granted CPS’s petition and terminated the rights of both parents. S.F. appealed. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that through the totality of the circumstances and the evidence presented to the youth court satisfied the grounds for termination. Because S.F. lacked protective capacity toward her children, the youth court did not err by finding clear and convincing evidence that termination was appropriate. As such, the Court affirmed. View "S.F. v. Lamar County Department of Child Protection Services, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court sua sponte deciding to remove a protected minor's guardian and terminate the minor's guardianship based upon an ex parte communication, holding that the proceedings and resulting order did not comport with due process.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court (1) has authority to sua sponte remove a guardian and terminate a guardianship even in the absence of a petition seeking removal and termination; (2) violated Defendant's right to due process by failing to give proper notice that it was contemplating removal and termination; (3) abused its discretion by failing to apply the applicable statutes and factors for removal and termination; and (4) made unsupported and clearly erroneous factual determinations in reaching its decision. View "In re D.M.F." on Justia Law

This is an appeal from post-judgment findings and an order determining the amount of attorney fees and sanctions payable by Appellant to ex-wife. The family court ordered Appellant to pay a total of $70,000 ($22,000 and $48,000) in attorney fees and costs in the nature of sanctions. Appellant appealed. He argued the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay “excessive” attorney fees and “an egregious amount of sanctions as a result of ex-wife’s litigation.” He contends the trial court erred because he cooperated throughout the case, produced the accounting and documents requested, and “demonstrated willingness to settle.”   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the record is replete with evidence demonstrating Deric’s steadfast, continued disregard of the court’s orders and the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement and judgment. He delayed listing the Oklahoma property for sale. He delayed providing an accounting of rental income received, along with bank statements, receipts, and proof of expenditures. He delayed paying court-ordered attorney fees and costs to his ex-wife and her counsel. The court explained that this warranted an imposition of attorney fees and costs in the nature of section 271 sanctions. The court found that there is no unreasonable financial burden on Appellant, as he has approximately $26,928 as his one-half of rental income and $102,000 in sale proceeds in his possession, which can be used to pay the attorney fees and sanctions award. View "Marriage of Rangell" on Justia Law