Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

V.S. and V.K., both born in India, met in 2009 in Illinois, where they both lived. In 2010, during a trip to India, they participated in the Phera Hindu marriage ceremony. In 2013, the couple had a civil marriage ceremony in Illinois. In 2019, V.S. petitioned for the dissolution of the marriage, identifying the date of marriage as December 2010. Although V.K. in his response, likewise indicated the date of marriage as December 2010. He later argued that the date of marriage was the date of the Chicago civil ceremony.The court of appeal affirmed that the 2010 Phera was not legally binding under the Hindu Marriage Act and that the parties were not married until their U.S. civil ceremony. An out-of-state marriage is “valid” in California if it “would be valid by laws of the jurisdiction in which the marriage was contracted” (Family Code 308). The court upheld a determination that the Phera was not legally binding on V.K., who was not domiciled in India and did not voluntarily submit to be bound by the Act. The court properly did not treat V.K.’s initial admission that the parties were married in 2010 as a judicial admission of fact; the date of the parties’ marriage is a predominantly legal conclusion not susceptible of judicial admission as a disputed fact. Substantial evidence supports the determination that V.S. was not entitled to treatment as a putative spouse after the Phera. View "Marriage of V.S. & V.K." on Justia Law

Petitioner Derrick Scott filed a petition to establish paternity. Respondent-Mother Candice Foster moved to dismiss, asserting that title 10, section 7700-609(B) required a party to commence an adjudication of paternity within two years of an acknowledgment of paternity. The district court granted Mother's motion to dismiss and ordered Petitioner to pay substantial attorney fees. Petitioner appealed and the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, overturning the district court's order regarding attorney fees. The Oklahoma Supreme Court previously granted certiorari to address whether the Court of Civil Appeals properly affirmed the district court in dismissing Petitioner's claim. The Supreme Court responded in the negative: "Contrary to COCA's recitation of the 'undisputed facts before the court,' the record does not show that Scott firmly believed that he was the biological father when Child was born. Rather, the record before this Court fails to show when the relationship between Scott and Mother actually took place or concluded, when Scott learned of Mother's pregnancy or childbirth, when he first thought that he was Child's father, when he became aware of the Acknowledgment of Paternity, or when he came to believe Mother committed fraud. The district court erred in granting summary judgment based on its determination that section 7700-609 is a statute of repose and erred in dismissing Scott's claim." View "Scott v. Foster" on Justia Law

Kayla (born in September 2017) came to the attention of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) after Defendant (mother) was arrested in May 2019. After mother’s arrest, officers found one-year-old Kayla in a motel room, alone. Mother, who was born in California, told an officer and a social worker that she had been living in Nevada since 2017 but had just moved back to California in May 2019 to find work and a place to live. Defendant appealed from an order terminating parental rights to her child, Kayla W. Mother contends that that Nevada’s relinquishment of jurisdiction was conditioned on Kayla being placed with maternal grandfather, so once Kayla was removed from maternal grandfather in December 2021 and placed with another caregiver, the court had to contact Nevada so that it could reassert jurisdiction. Mother argued that the court failed to comply with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA, Fam. Code, Section 3400, et seq.)   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court first held that mother forfeited the UCCJEA issue because she never objected to Nevada’s declination of jurisdiction, California’s acceptance of jurisdiction, or raised any jurisdictional issue when Kayla was removed from maternal grandfather’s care. Further, the court explained that Nevada did not and could not impose a jurisdictional condition precedent. Moreover, Sections 3429 and 3422 did not require the court to consult Nevada. View "In re Kayla W." on Justia Law

The Washington County Department of Human Services (“WCDHS”) and the Board of County Commissioners of Washington County (“the Board”)—collectively, Washington County, contended a Colorado district court erred when it failed to adhere to Colorado v. Madera, 112 P.3d 688 (Colo. 2005) in granting Father’s request for an in camera review of documents that were allegedly protected by the attorney-client privilege. The district court and Father countered that Madera was inapposite and that the challenged ruling was free of error because it is consistent with the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in Alcon v. Spicer, 113 P.3d 735 (Colo. 2005). The issue this case presented was whether Madera or Alcon, issued six days apart in the spring of 2005, controlled in this case. Here, in response to a subpoena duces tecum served by Father, Washington County provided a privilege log listing documents allegedly protected by the attorney-client privilege. After reviewing the log, Father insisted the privilege did not apply, and the parties were unable to resolve their dispute informally. Consequently, Father asked the district court to conduct an in camera inspection of the documents identified in the log. Because the log provided vague descriptions of the withheld documents, the district court could not assess Washington County’s claim of privilege. It thus granted Father’s request for an in camera review. In doing so, the district court neither made Madera’s required findings nor employed Madera’s analytical framework. Washington County argued the district court’s failure to conform to Madera rendered the in camera order faulty. But the district court and Father responded that Madera didn't apply. Instead, they maintained, Alcon applied. The Supreme Court concluded the district court correctly followed Alcon, not Madera, in this case. And the Court further concluded that, consistent with Alcon, the court correctly granted Father’s request for an in camera review because Washington County’s log did not permit an assessment of the claim of privilege. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In Re Colorado in interest of children and concerning J.L.M. and J.P." on Justia Law

Respondent, the mother of J.H. (Mother), appealed a circuit court order finding that she neglected her son, J.H. On appeal, Mother argued the trial court erred because, as a matter of law, she could not be found neglectful when another person was the legal guardian of J.H. In the alternative, she contended the evidence in the record was insufficient to support the neglect finding. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re J.H." on Justia Law

Respondent, the mother of H.C., appealed a circuit court order that terminated her parental rights after the court found that she had been convicted of a felony assault which resulted in injury to H.C.’s sibling. The issues this case presented to the New Hampshire Supreme Court were: (1) whether RSA 170-C:5, VII(d) applied in this case when H.C. was born after the date of the felony assault; (2) whether RSA 170-C:5, VII(d) applied to convictions obtained outside the State of New Hampshire; and (3) whether the trial court erred in finding that termination of the respondent’s parental rights was in H.C.’s best interest. Because the Supreme Court concluded RSA 170-C:5, VII(d) applied and that the trial court did not err in ruling that termination of the respondent’s parental rights was in H.C.’s best interest, the Court affirmed its decision. View "In re H.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the circuit court terminating the parental rights of Father and Mother two their two minor children, holding that numerous procedural errors substantially affected the integrity of the underlying proceedings.On appeal, Mother and Father argued that the circuit court erred by terminating their parental rights in its dispositional order. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the circuit court properly adjudicated the children and the parents in the underlying abuse and neglect proceedings. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's order, holding (1) the circuit court erred in adjudicating Z.S.-1 as a neglected child and Mother and Father as neglectful parents based upon the parents' defective stipulations; and (2) because the circuit court could not locate any definitive adjudication of Z.S.-2 as an abused and/or neglected child or of Mother or Father as abusive and/or neglectful of Z.S.2 the circuit court's dispositional order as to Z.S.-2 must be vacated. View "In re Z.S.-1" on Justia Law

The parties married in 2001 and separated in 2011. Before the marriage, the husband operated a nursery as a sole proprietorship. After the marriage, the husband formed a corporation to operate the business. In 2003, the nursery business was “sold” to the corporation for $1 In the dissolution action, the court rejected the husband’s contention that the corporation was a continuation of the pre-existing business and that the business was presumptively community property.On interlocutory appeal, the court of appeal affirmed that the husband did not have a claim for reimbursement under Family Code section 2640 for contributions of separate property to a community asset. The $1 sale price is not determinative. A spouse who decides to sell property to the community is electing not to contribute the property “freely and without reservation” “to benefit the community.” It also is not a “general expectation” (ibid.) of most spouses that if they sell separate property to the community, they will nevertheless receive additional reimbursement for the transferred property, over and above the sale price, if the community dissolves. View "Marriage of Motiska & Ford" on Justia Law

In these consolidated abuse and neglect appeals the Supreme Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction Mother's appeal and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court terminating Father's parental rights to baby N.W., holding that there was no reason to disturb the circuit court's judgment.After a hearing, the circuit court terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father to N.W., concluding that there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse or neglect could be substantially corrected. N.W. was subsequently adopted, and the court denied Petitioners' motion for post-termination visitation. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal brought by Mother and affirmed the circuit court's order terminating Father's parental rights, holding (1) Mother's appeal presented an issue that was not ripe, divesting this Court of jurisdiction; and (2) the circuit court did not err in terminating Father's parental rights. View "In re N.W." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court adjudicating Petitioner as a neglectful parent because of his failure to provide for B.P.'s basic needs due to Petitioner's absence from her life as a result of his incarceration, holding that the circuit court did not base its adjudication of Petitioner on drug use.On appeal, Petitioner challenged the termination of his parental rights based on what he argued was the circuit court's improper adjudication for drug use. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding (1) there was no merit to Petitioner's argument that he was improperly adjudicated based upon alleged drug use; (2) a parent's absence from a child's life because of incarceration that results in the inability of the parent to provide for their children's basic needs is a form of neglect under the definition of "neglected child" set forth in W. Va. Code 49-1-201; and (3) the circuit court appropriately considered all of the factors in adjudicating Petitioner as a neglectful parent. View "In re B.P." on Justia Law