Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting Wife's motion filed under Wyo. R. Civ. P. 60 seeking to set aside a stipulated final decree of divorce due to inadvertence or mistake, holding that the stipulated decree was ambiguous, and the record was insufficient to support the district court's interpretation.After the stipulated decree was entered in this case Husband refinanced the marital home. Wife believed she was entitled to half of the net equity in the home at the completion of the refinance, but Husband argued that she was only entitled to half the net proceeds if the house was sold. The district court granted Wife's Rule 60 motion determining that the stipulated decree unambiguously required Husband to pay Wife half the equity in the property from the refinance or sale of the home. The court entered an order requiring that any equity recognized through sale or refinance of the home was to be equally divided between the two parties. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding (1) the stipulated decree was ambiguous as to whether Husband was required to provide Wife half the net proceeds in the event of refinance; and (2) the record did not contain sufficient evidence to clarify the stipulated decree under Rule 60(a). View "Van Vlack v. Van Vlack" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed a challenge to a magistrate court’s decision to take jurisdiction of an infant after finding that the infant was “at risk of being a victim of abuse, neglect, or abandonment.” The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (“IDHW” or “Department”) filed a Child Protective Act (“CPA”) petition pursuant to Idaho Code section 16-1603(2) in March 2023 for an infant (“Infant”) who was about three months old. The magistrate court had jurisdiction over the infant’s older brother (“Toddler”), having removed Toddler at age eighteen months after determining Toddler had been physically abused, neglected, and subjected to an unstable home. Infant was born about four months after Toddler was placed in foster care. At the adjudicatory hearing pertaining to Infant, the magistrate court found: (1) Mother and Father failed to make any progress whatsoever on the case plan associated with Toddler; (2) Mother and Father were unresponsive and uncooperative with the Department; (3) none of the safety issues that were identified as part of Toddler’s removal had been alleviated; and (4) Mother and Father consistently failed to comply with a court order for drug testing (including a urinalysis and hair follicle testing). The Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the magistrate court’s decision. View "IDHW v. Jane Doe / IDHW v. John Doe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of dissolution in this case, holding that the district court did not err in awarding Wife alimony and an equalization payment and in equally dividing student loans for the parties' children.After the district court entered its judgment Husband timely filed a motion to alter the judgment or alternatively, for a new trial, arguing that the district court erred in awarding Wife alimony, awarding Wife a $53,200 equalization payment, and classifying the student loans incurred for the parties' adult children as marital debt subject to equal division. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the alimony award was not unreasonable; (2) the equalization payment was not an abuse of discretion; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in classifying the student loans incurred for the parties' children as marital debt that was to be equally divided between the parties. View "Radmanesh v. Radmanesh" on Justia Law

A Delaware Family Court terminated Carter Ralston’s parental rights in his daughter who, at the time, had been in the State’s custody for over a year. The court’s decision was based primarily on Ralston’s failure to make progress on a case plan established by the Department of Services for Children, Youth, and Their Families (the “Department”). Ralston was incarcerated throughout most of the proceedings, but the case plan aimed to reunify him with his daughter. After the court terminated his parental rights, Ralston moved for relief from the order on the grounds that, since the order’s issuance, he had been released from prison and had completed the requirements of his case plan. The Family Court denied that motion, concluding that evidence of Ralston’s post-termination compliance with the case plan did not constitute “newly discovered evidence” under Family Court Civil Rule 60. Ralston appealed. Having considered each of Ralston’s arguments, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded the Family Court’s decision should be affirmed. "Although disposing of the guardianship petition before terminating Mr. Ralston’s parental rights would have been the better practice, the procedural sequence was not so deficient that it violated Mr. Ralston’s due process rights. As to the remaining issues, the Family Court correctly applied the law and did not abuse its discretion." View "Ralston v. Division of Services for Children, Youth and Their Families" on Justia Law

Natalie F. (Mother) and Jan F. (Father) are parents of a now six-year-old girl, M.F., and a three-year-old boy, O.F. Mother sought a restraining order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) against Father. She claimed she suffered abuse within the meaning of the DVPA as a result of Father making false police reports to the Santa Monica Police Department (SMPD) to conduct welfare checks on the children while they were in Mother’s care and sending her and her attorney over 130 harassing messages via email and the communication platform Our Family Wizard (OFW) over a 40-day period. The family court denied Mother’s request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO), finding Father’s actions as alleged by Mother did not constitute abuse under the DVPA. Mother argues the family court erred in denying her DVRO request because Father’s actions amounted to abuse, and the First Amendment does not protect such conduct. She further argues that regardless of whether she could seek a remedy in the custody proceedings, she was still entitled to a DVRO.   The Second Appellate District reversed and remanded. The court concluded that based on the limited evidence before it, the family court erred in denying the DVRO. Mother adduced evidence that Father made multiple requests for police welfare checks not for any legitimate reason but based on false information to harass her. If fully credited, that evidence alone was sufficient to demonstrate abuse under the DVPA and to require the issuance of a DVRO, and the family court erred in finding otherwise. View "Jan F. v. Natalie F." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether an order determining that grandparents had standing under Section 5325(3) of the Domestic Relations Code, 23 Pa. C.S. § 5325(3), to file and pursue an action for partial physical custody of their grandchildren was a collateral order appealable as of right under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 313, Pa.R.A.P. 313 (Rule 313). In August 2017, A.L.R. (Father) and T.A.D-R. (Mother) (collectively, Parents) began residing with J.C.D., III, and A.M.D. (collectively, Grandparents), Mother’s parents, at their home in York County, Pennsylvania. While Parents resided at Grandparents’ home, the Children were born to Parents: E.J.R. and A.L.R. Parents and the Children resided with Grandparents until May 2022, when, following a disagreement, Parents moved out of Grandparents’ home with the Children. Thereafter, Grandparents filed a complaint seeking shared legal and partial physical custody of the Children. Parents filed preliminary objections, alleging, inter alia, that Grandparents lacked standing to pursue an action for custody of the Children. The trial court found: (1) Parents and Children lived in the same home as Grandparents for approximately five years; (2) during that time, Grandparents were not raising the Children and did not stand in loco parentis to the Children and helped Parents with the Children as grandparents and as people sharing living quarters typically do; and (3) Grandparents filed their custody complaint within six months of when Parents removed the Children from Grandparents’ home. Based on these findings, the trial court entered an order concluding that Grandparents did not have standing to file and pursue an action for shared legal and partial physical custody of the Children. After reconsideration, the trial court entered a second order determining the Grandparents did have standing to file and pursue their action for partial custody of the Children. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that such an order was not a collateral order, and, therefore, it affirmed the Superior Court’s order quashing this appeal. View "A.M.D., et al. v. A.L.R, et al." on Justia Law

At a dispositional hearing, a juvenile court placed R.Q. (minor) with her biological father, C.H. On appeal, defendant-appellant, K.Q. (presumed father), contended the court abused its discretion in placing minor with C.H. Plaintiff-respondent, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (the department), received a referral alleging physical abuse to R.Q. by A.P. (stepmother). Minor disclosed stepmother had choked her and pulled her hair. The family had an open, voluntary family maintenance plan due to stepmother hitting minor. The department had also received a previous referral alleging physical abuse to minor by stepmother. A.H., minor’s biological mother (mother), did not live in the home. The social worker spoke to minor and R.Q.2, the biological daughter of presumed father and mother, who both reported incidents of physical abuse by stepmother. Despite stepmother and presumed father both denying the allegations, the department took minor into protective custody pursuant to a warrant. The department filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 3001 petition alleging mother and presumed father failed to protect minor from physical abuse; that mother and presumed father had substance abuse problems; and that mother had an untreated mental illness. C.H. indicated he had not found out about minor's birth until she was two years old. After paternity testing, supervised visits and ultimately a social worker review, at a dispositional hearing, it was recommended the minor be placed with C.H. Presumed father contended the court abused its discretion in placing minor with C.H. The department agreed that a juvenile court did not have authority under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.2 to place a child with a “mere biological parent”; however, the department maintained that a juvenile court has discretion to order such a placement under its broad authority to act in a child’s best interest. Thus, the department argued the court acted within its discretion in placing minor with C.H. To this the Court of Appeal agreed with the department and affirmed the court order placing the child with her biological father. View "In re R.Q." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court affirming the judgment of the family court awarding Jennifer W. $10,000 of spousal support, payable over twelve months, holding that the family court's award of spousal support in gross was error.Jennifer filed for divorce from her husband Michael W. after nearly nineteen years of marriage. The family court entered an order awarding "spousal support in gross" of $10,000. Jennifer appealed, arguing that the family court abused its discretion by awarding "lump sum" alimony instead of permanent spousal support. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that the in gross award was clearly inadequate and constituted an abuse of discretion. View "Jennifer W. v. Michael W." on Justia Law

Appellant R.L., presumed father (father) of minor C.L. (the minor), appealed the juvenile court’s order terminating father’s parental rights and freeing the minor for adoption. The minor was removed from his parents through a protective custody warrant under Welfare and Institutions Code section 340. Father contended the Amador County Department of Social Services (the department) failed to comply with the initial inquiry requirements of California law implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) because the department did not inquire of extended family members as to the minor’s Indian ancestry when he was removed. The Court of Appeal agreed with father and held that the duty to inquire of extended family members applied when removal is made via a section 340 protective custody warrant. Because the department failed to comply with this duty, remand was required. Remand was also required because father stated that his great-grandmother was full-blooded Cherokee at the detention hearing, triggering a duty of further inquiry into the minor’s Indian ancestry. This further inquiry duty was not satisfied. The Court therefore conditionally reversed the order terminating parental rights. View "In re C.L." on Justia Law

Defendant Seth Alarie appealed a final relief-from-abuse (RFA) order requested by plaintiff Carissa Poss, his former girlfriend. On February 6, 2023, plaintiff filed a form RFA complaint alleging defendant physically abused and stalked her on two previous occasions. The family division issued a temporary RFA order on that date, and set a hearing for ten days later. Defendant was served with the complaint, both affidavits, the temporary order, and the notice of hearing at 4 p.m. on February 15. Both parties appeared at the hearing pro se. After the hearing, the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant had abused and stalked plaintiff. The court issued its findings and conclusions orally from the bench and followed up with a written order prohibiting defendant from, among other things, contacting plaintiff or coming within 300 feet of plaintiff, her residence, place of employment, or car for one year. Represented by counsel on appeal, defendant attacked the proceedings, arguing that due process rights applied to RFA proceedings and that the court violated those rights by holding the hearing after he received less than twenty-four hours’ notice and not granting a continuance for defendant to retain counsel. He argued the trial court violated other due process rights when it did not permit him to cross-examine plaintiff and took testimony outside the scope of the facts alleged in the pleadings. Finding no deprivation of due process nor other reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Poss v. Alarie" on Justia Law