Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

In the case of a contested divorce between Quin Whitman and Douglas F. Whitman, the founder of a once successful hedge fund, the Court of Appeal of the State of California ruled on several issues. The court affirmed that Doug failed to prove he retained any separate property interest in the hedge fund at the time of dissolution, despite an initial $300,000 investment of his own separate funds. The court also ruled that the community was not financially responsible for any of the legal fees Doug incurred to defend against criminal charges brought against him for insider trading or the $250,000 fine imposed on him in that case. However, the court erred in holding the community responsible for the $935,000 penalty imposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission for illegal insider trading. Quin did not demonstrate that the court erred in holding the community responsible for legal fees expended by the hedge fund when it intervened as a third party into these proceedings. The court also concluded that Quin failed to prove her claim that Doug breached his fiduciary duty in connection with the sale of the couple’s luxury home. The court concluded that the couple’s entire interest in the hedge fund is community property, subject to equal division. The court also found that Doug's legal expenses incurred in defending against insider trading charges and the $250,000 fine imposed on him were his separate debts. View "In re Whitman" on Justia Law

In the case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District, a dispute arose from the marital dissolution proceedings of Daniel Gilbert-Valencia (husband) and Kate McEachen (wife). The husband argued that the family court erred in awarding 100 percent of the net proceeds from the sale of the parties’ quasi-marital property to the wife, excluding evidence of domestic violence perpetrated by the wife, and retroactively modifying the tax deductibility of spousal support payments made by the husband.The facts of the case reveal that the husband sold the house over the wife’s objections during the dissolution proceedings, believing it was his personal property. He used the net proceeds from the sale exclusively for personal purposes. The family court decided that the wife was a putative spouse, the house was quasi-marital property, and the husband had breached his fiduciary duty to the wife by selling the house and using the proceeds for personal purposes. Consequently, the court awarded 100 percent of the net proceeds from the sale of the house to the wife.The appellate court agreed with the husband's first two contentions. It held that the family court committed an error by awarding 100 percent of the net proceeds from the sale of the quasi-marital property to the wife without finding oppression, fraud, or malice by the husband. This decision was an abuse of discretion because it contradicted the requirement under Family Code section 1101 for such findings to justify an unequal division of community property.The appellate court also held that the family court erred in excluding a videotape that was documented evidence of the wife’s domestic violence. In addition, it found that the family court failed to consider the husband's request for a domestic violence restraining order, admitted into evidence with the wife's consent, when deciding on spousal support. This failure was deemed a reversible error.The appellate court reversed the family court's orders and remanded the case for reconsideration of the division of quasi-marital property and spousal support, and a decision on the tax deductibility of the husband's spousal support payments. View "Marriage of Gilbert-Valencia & McEachen" on Justia Law

In a case heard by the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, the appellant, a mother (La.B.), challenged the juvenile court's decision to terminate her parental rights. The mother claimed the court failed to adequately inquire into her child's (L.B.'s) potential Native American ancestry as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Despite the mother's indication on a form that she might be a member of a federally recognized tribe of unknown name and location, no extended family members were asked about the child's potential Native American ancestry.The appellate court agreed with the mother's contention, finding the inquiry into the child's ancestry inadequate and thus, an abuse of discretion. The court noted that the inquiry was legally required to include extended family members, regardless of how the child was initially removed from their home. The trial court had failed to adhere to this requirement despite the availability of several family members who could have provided relevant information.The appellate court conditionally reversed the judgement and instructed the juvenile court to order the Social Services Agency to complete the initial ICWA inquiry, including inquiries required under section 224.2, subdivision (b). Depending on the results of the inquiry, the court should proceed in accordance with ICWA and related California law. If no evidence of the child's Native American heritage is found, the juvenile court should immediately reinstate the judgement. View "In re L.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Wyoming upheld a lower court's decision to grant a divorce, award the mother custody of two minor children, order the father to pay child support, and divide the marital property between the parties. The father had appealed the decision, challenging the court's division of property and its child support and custody decisions. The father and mother had been married since 2015 and had two children. The father was self-employed at a trucking company, and the mother stayed home with the children and homeschooled one of them. The court found that both parties could provide adequate care for the children, but that the mother had been their primary caretaker. The court also concluded that it was in the children's best interest for the mother to have custody. The court determined the father's net monthly income for child support purposes and ordered him to pay the mother monthly alimony for a period of time. The court also divided the marital property, awarding the mother more property because she had left established employment to be a homemaker and caretaker for the children. The Supreme Court determined that these decisions were a reasonable exercise of discretion by the lower court and affirmed the decision. View "Hyatt v. Hyatt" on Justia Law

A South Dakota resident, Abby Engel, commenced a divorce action against nonresident defendant Collin Geary in South Dakota. Geary objected to the jurisdiction of the South Dakota court and the sufficiency of the service of process. The court dismissed Geary’s objections and entered a divorce judgment in Engel's favor, dividing the couple's property and imposing certain financial obligations on Geary. Geary appealed, arguing that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him and thus could not make orders affecting him or his property interests.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reversed the lower court's decision. The Court found that the lower court lacked personal jurisdiction over Geary as he had not purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in South Dakota, and the cause of action did not arise from his activities directed at South Dakota. The Court also determined that the lower court erred when it divided the parties' property and imposed financial obligations on Geary, despite lacking personal jurisdiction over him. The Court concluded that while the lower court had jurisdiction to grant Engel a divorce, it did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate Geary's property interests or impose financial obligations on him. View "Engel V. Geary" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota, the dispute involves a married couple, Michael Erickson and Tara Erickson, who got divorced and had a stipulation and agreement (the Agreement) incorporated into their divorce decree, to settle matters such as child support and custody. Tara claimed the couple's two minor children as dependents on her tax returns since 2018, believing the Agreement allowed her to do so. However, in 2022, Michael argued that he was entitled to claim the children as dependents per the Agreement's language and moved to enforce the Agreement and hold Tara in contempt. In turn, Tara moved to modify the divorce decree and Agreement, alleging a mistake in the language Michael cited.The circuit court found that the provision of the Agreement upon which Michael relied was due to a drafting error, denied Michael’s requests, and granted Tara’s motion to revise the Agreement and her request for attorney fees. The Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The Court agreed with the circuit court that the Agreement was ambiguous and that, based on the parties' intent shown through parol evidence, Tara was meant to be the one to claim the children as dependents. Therefore, the Court found that Tara did not willfully disobey the court order as Michael alleged. However, the Court reversed the circuit court's award of attorney fees to Tara, finding that it did not make the necessary findings to support the reasonableness of the fees. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this issue. View "Erickson V. Erickson" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the appeal of Christopher Lamm against a disorderly conduct restraining order issued by the District Court, preventing him from having contact with Amanda Anderson, the mother of his child. Anderson claimed that Lamm had threatened her, made false child abuse allegations, and exhibited other threatening behavior. The District Court issued the order based on Lamm's visit to the town where Anderson resided, which it deemed as disorderly conduct. Lamm appealed the decision, and even though the restraining order had expired by the time of the appeal, the Supreme Court acknowledged potential adverse collateral consequences for Lamm and considered the appeal on its merits. The Supreme Court determined that the evidence provided was insufficient to prove that Lamm's presence in the town where Anderson lived constituted disorderly conduct. The court clarified that mere subjective fear of the petitioner or the respondent's unwanted presence was not enough to qualify as disorderly conduct or to justify a restraining order. The court found that Anderson failed to demonstrate how Lamm's actions adversely affected her safety, security, or privacy, and therefore, the District Court's decision to issue the restraining order was deemed as an abuse of discretion. In conclusion, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the District Court's disorderly conduct restraining order against Lamm. View "Anderson v. Lamm" on Justia Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of Ohio, the court considered whether a derivative claim for loss of parental consortium could proceed even when the primary medical negligence claim, on which it was based, was barred by the statute of repose. The appellants, Mr. and Mrs. McCarthy, had filed a medical negligence claim against Dr. Lee and associated medical practices, alleging negligent care in the treatment of Mrs. McCarthy's condition. The claim was dismissed due to the statute of repose. Subsequently, the McCarthys filed a separate claim on behalf of their three minor children for loss of consortium due to the treatment of Mrs. McCarthy's condition. The medical providers moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that it could not stand alone as it was a derivative claim of the previously dismissed medical claim. The trial court granted the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the children's derivative claim for loss of parental consortium could not exist when the principal claim on which it was based was extinguished by the statute of repose. The court explained that the statute of repose operates as a substantive bar to a claim, extinguishing both the remedy and the right. Therefore, when a principal claim is extinguished, no other claim derived from it can exist. The court affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss the children's derivative claim for loss of parental consortium. View "McCarthy v. Lee" on Justia Law

In the case, Jose Martinez Jr. was convicted by a jury in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, for two counts of incest, criminal distribution of dangerous drugs, solicitation to commit tampering with witnesses or informants, and three counts of criminal contempt. This case arose from allegations by Martinez's stepdaughter, S.M., that he had been sexually abusing her since she was 10 years old. The trial court allowed the admission of statements made by S.M. to a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) and a physician, despite Martinez's objection that their admission violated his right of confrontation as S.M. was not present to testify at the trial.The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed Martinez's conviction. It held that S.M.'s statements to the physician were nontestimonial and made for purposes of medical treatment, and thus, were admissible under Montana Rule of Evidence 803(4). However, the court found that S.M.'s statements to the SANE were testimonial and their admission violated Martinez's right to confrontation. Nevertheless, the court ruled that this error was harmless given other evidence produced at trial and because the SANE's testimony was cumulative.The court's decision reflected the distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial statements in the context of the right to confrontation, and the admissibility of statements for purposes of medical treatment under the rules of evidence. The court also demonstrated the application of the harmless error doctrine in the context of a Confrontation Clause violation. View "State v. Martinez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Ohio examined the appropriate standard of review for cases involving a juvenile court’s decision to award permanent custody of a child and to terminate parental rights. The case stemmed from a dispute surrounding the custody of a minor child, Z.C., with the Ashtabula County Children Services Board (ACCSB) granted permanent custody. The father, D.C., appealed this decision, resulting in a conflict between the Eleventh District Court of Appeals and other appellate districts regarding the correct standard of review. The Eleventh District Court of Appeals applied an abuse-of-discretion standard to its review, while other courts applied a sufficiency-of-the-evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the correct appellate standards of review in these cases are the sufficiency-of-the-evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standards, depending on the arguments presented by the parties. The Court found that the Eleventh District Court of Appeals erred in applying an abuse-of-discretion standard and remanded the case for review under the correct standard. View "In re Z.C." on Justia Law