Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A person identified as O.R. appealed the decision of the Los Angeles County Superior Court to place his child, N.R., under the jurisdiction of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) based on allegations of substance abuse. The Supreme Court of California reviewed two issues concerning the interpretation of the Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(D), which allows for jurisdiction over a child in cases where the parent’s substance abuse results in an inability to provide regular care for the child and causes or could cause the child serious physical harm or illness.First, the court clarified the term “substance abuse” as used in the statute. It rejected O.R.’s argument that “substance abuse” must be shown through a medical diagnosis or by meeting the criteria for a substance use disorder as outlined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). The court held that “substance abuse” in this context should be given its ordinary meaning, which refers to the excessive use of drugs or alcohol. The court cautioned that to establish dependency jurisdiction, the abuse must render the parent unable to provide regular care for the child and either cause the child serious physical harm or illness, or place the child at substantial risk of such harm or illness.Second, the court rejected the so-called “tender years presumption,” which holds that substance abuse by a parent is prima facie evidence of an inability to provide regular care and a substantial risk of serious physical harm when the child is very young. The court held that this presumption is not supported by the language of the statute or the legislative intent, and improperly simplifies the analysis required under section 300(b)(1)(D). Instead, the court held that the government must establish each element of the statute separately, without shifting the burden to the parent to rebut a presumption created by a finding of substance abuse.The court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In re N.R." on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky addressed the procedural issue of whether a notice of appeal could be filed electronically in a termination of parental rights (TPR) case that had been sealed. The court had to interpret the relevant statutes and rules, which stated that TPR cases should be sealed upon the entry of the final order and that sealed cases were not eligible for electronic filing. The Court of Appeals had ruled that the appellant had complied with the rules for timely filing a notice of appeal, as the rules were ambiguous about whether a TPR case could be electronically filed after it had been sealed.However, the Supreme Court of Kentucky disagreed with the lower court. It held that the statutory law and administrative rule, read together, effectively prohibited a notice of appeal from being electronically filed in a TPR case. The Court found no ambiguity in this interpretation. It pointed out that the rules clearly stated that TPR cases were always confidential but would only be sealed upon the entry of the trial court’s final order. Once sealed, these cases were no longer subject to mandatory electronic filing.Therefore, the Supreme Court of Kentucky concluded that the appellant had not complied with the rules for timely filing a notice of appeal, as the notice should have been filed conventionally. As a result, the Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s termination of the appellant's parental rights. View "CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES V. D.W." on Justia Law

Three sisters, Danielle, Angela, and Alyssa, were placed in the custody of their aunt, Kathy Riggle, and her husband, William Kenneth Riggle Sr. (Senior) in 2009 due to their parents' struggles with drug abuse. For the eight years they lived with the Riggles, the sisters alleged that they were sexually abused by Senior and his son, William Kenneth Riggle Jr. (Junior). The abuse was reported in 2017 after the girls were returned to the custody of their mother. Senior was charged with and convicted of multiple counts of sodomy in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, and intimidating a participant in the legal process. The trial court imposed a 70-year sentence in line with Kentucky law. Senior appealed, raising four allegations of error.The Supreme Court of Kentucky found no reversible error and affirmed the convictions. It held that the trial court correctly admitted testimony from two other minor girls who had experienced inappropriate sexual conduct from Senior, as this evidence demonstrated a pattern of conduct and was not merely proof of propensity. The Court also ruled that the testimony from Angela's school counselor was admissible for rehabilitative purposes, as it was offered to explain an inconsistency in Angela's testimony, not to verify the truth of her allegations. The Court further held that any issues with jury instructions regarding unanimity did not rise to palpable error, given the overwhelming weight of evidence against Senior. Finally, the Court found that the trial court did not err in failing to direct a verdict of acquittal on certain counts, as the Commonwealth had produced more than a mere scintilla of evidence to support the charges. View "RIGGLE V. COMMONWEALTH" on Justia Law

In this case, Ángel Menéndez-Montalvo, while serving a term of supervised release arising from his conviction for a federal firearm offense, violated the conditions of his release by breaching Article 3.1 of Puerto Rico's Domestic Violence Law. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had to determine whether a violation of Article 3.1 is a "crime of violence" as used in section 7B1.1(a)(1) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The court found that it is not because Puerto Rico courts have applied the law to encompass less-than-violent force. As such, the court vacated Menéndez's sentence because the district court had held to the contrary in calculating a sentencing range that was higher than it should have been. The court further clarified that its decision does not prevent the district court from considering Menéndez's conduct while on supervised release as it bears on the factors specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "US v. Menendez-Montalvo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire was presented with a case involving the mental health of the respondent, D.E. In the case, the Circuit Court had denied D.E.'s motion to dismiss and granted New Hampshire Hospital’s (NHH) petition for guardianship. It also granted NHH’s petition for involuntary admission. D.E. appealed these decisions, arguing that his due process rights were violated by the simultaneous hearing of both the guardianship and involuntary admission petitions, and that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the petitions as he was not a resident of New Hampshire nor was he lawfully detained there.The Supreme Court held that D.E.'s due process argument regarding simultaneous hearings was not preserved as it was not raised in the trial court and was therefore not eligible for review. However, the court found that at the time the non-emergency involuntary admission petition was filed, D.E. was not lawfully detained and thus the trial court did not have jurisdiction on this basis. The question of whether D.E. resided in New Hampshire, giving the court jurisdiction, was remanded to the trial court for determination.In relation to the guardianship order, the Supreme Court found that the trial court's findings that D.E. was incapacitated and that a guardianship was the least restrictive form of intervention were supported by the evidence. The court also found no error in the trial court's appointment of D.E.'s brother as guardian, despite D.E.'s preference for an independent, professional guardian. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision on guardianship, vacated the decision on involuntary admission, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Guardianship of D.E." on Justia Law

In a divorce case, the appellant, Mr. James Baker, contested the decree entered by a successor district judge after the original district judge who presided over the trial retired. Mr. Baker argued that the successor judge violated his right to due process by making findings of fact and conclusions of law without a formal certification under the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure (W.R.C.P.) 63.The Supreme Court of Wyoming concluded that Mr. Baker had waived his right to object to the successor judge's procedure. During a status conference, in which the successor judge proposed to proceed with determining the case based on the trial transcripts, Mr. Baker's counsel affirmed this approach and requested the court to make a ruling based on the existing record. Therefore, the court ruled that Mr. Baker intentionally relinquished his right to object to the successor judge's procedure, constituting a waiver.The court also clarified that the language in W.R.C.P. 63 does not necessitate the successor judge to advise the parties of their rights under the rule. The court found no authority supporting an affirmative duty for the successor judge to do so. Hence, the court affirmed the decree of divorce entered by the successor district court judge. View "Baker v. Baker" on Justia Law

In this case heard by the United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit, the appellant, Tiano N. Trice, was appealing against a decision by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa - Eastern. The dispute arose after Trice was arrested while on supervised release, leading to the revocation of his supervised release for domestic assault and child endangerment. Trice was sentenced to a 24-month imprisonment period, followed by 12 months of supervised release.In his appeal, Trice did not challenge the domestic assault violation but contested the child endangerment finding and the district court's factfinding and credibility determinations. The incident involved Trice and the mother of his children, Clareshanda Chamberlain, getting into a heated argument in the presence of their children, during which Trice lifted the bed Chamberlain was in and dropped it to the ground. The children, scared by the altercation, fled from the house or hid.The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, stating that the district court's factual findings and credibility determinations were not erroneous. The court also rejected Trice's argument that hearing the assault, as opposed to actually seeing it, is insufficient to trigger child endangerment, stating that Iowa law does not make this distinction. The court concluded that Trice was aware his children were present during the assault on their mother, which constitutes child endangerment under Iowa law. Therefore, the district court did not err in finding that Trice committed child endangerment and did not abuse its discretion in revoking Trice's supervised release. The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court. View "United States v. Trice" on Justia Law

In this case, the Nebraska Supreme Court had to consider an appeal against a lower court's decision to terminate the parental rights of a mother, Samantha M., to her daughter, Jessalina M. The child had been removed from Samantha's care shortly after her birth due to concerns about Samantha's behavior and mental health issues. The child was placed in foster care and later with her father, Jose M.The court firstly clarified the meaning of "out-of-home placement" for the purposes of the relevant statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292(7). It held that this term refers to any placement outside the home of the parent whose rights are at issue, including placement with another parent. Therefore, it held that Jessalina’s placement with her father was an “out-of-home placement” as far as Samantha was concerned.The court then considered the point at which the existence of the statutory basis for termination should be determined. It held that this should be determined as of the date the petition or motion to terminate parental rights is filed, not the date of trial or the date of the termination order. This is because the facts supporting the grounds for termination must be set forth in the petition or motion and must be based on facts existing at that time.Based on these interpretations, the court determined that the statutory basis for termination existed in this case, as Jessalina had been in out-of-home placement for more than 15 of the most recent 22 months before the termination petition was filed. It also held that the lower court did not err in finding that Samantha was unfit and that termination of her parental rights was in Jessalina's best interests. Therefore, it affirmed the decision of the lower court to terminate Samantha's parental rights. View "In re Interest of Jessalina M." on Justia Law

In 2021, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sued Luis Jimenez Carrillo for securities violations he allegedly committed well after his divorce from Yolanda Sanchez-Diaz. Sanchez-Diaz was named as a relief defendant in the suit and the SEC sought to recover from her the value of a car she received four years earlier, claiming Carrillo paid for it with illicit funds. The SEC did not accuse Sanchez-Diaz of any wrongdoing but argued she had no legitimate claim to the car because she had not provided any consideration for it. The district court agreed and ordered her to pay almost $170,000, including interest.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a relief defendant in an SEC enforcement action has a legitimate claim to funds if they have provided something of value in exchange and the value they provided is more than nominal in relation to the money received. In this case, the court concluded that through a 2016 child support agreement, Sanchez-Diaz provided more than nominal value in exchange for Carrillo's promise to purchase the car. The court found that the district court erred in its finding that Sanchez-Diaz provided no value at all. Accordingly, the Appeals Court reversed the district court's disgorgement order. View "SEC v. Sanchez Diaz Monge" on Justia Law

In this case heard by the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota, Ivan and Donita Weber, who were married for less than four years, sought a divorce. Prior to their marriage, Donita owned significant assets, including a valuable farmland. During their marriage, the couple co-mingled and jointly titled most of their assets, including the farmland. They worked on and made improvements to the farm before selling it and most of the accompanying assets for approximately $2.5 million. Upon divorce, the circuit court treated most of the parties’ property as marital but awarded Donita a much larger share. Ivan appealed, arguing that the circuit court abused its discretion in dividing the marital assets and in failing to award him spousal support.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the circuit court appropriately considered the relevant factors, including the duration of the marriage, the value of the property owned by the parties, their ages, health, ability to earn a living, the contribution of each party to the accumulation of the property, and the income-producing capacity of the parties’ assets. The court found that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the marital property, given the short length of their marriage and the fact that Donita brought in significantly more assets into the marriage than Ivan.Regarding Ivan's argument for spousal support, the court found that Ivan had waived his right to appeal this issue because he failed to present any issue concerning spousal support to the circuit court. Therefore, the court declined to award Ivan any attorney fees and awarded $5,000 in appellate attorney fees to Donita. View "Weber V. Weber" on Justia Law